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Abstract 
 
This work asserts that bureaucratic organization is not only an inevitable part of the 
modern administrative state, but that a high quality bureaucracy within a strongly 
empowered executive branch is an ideal mechanism for running government in the 
modern era. Beginning with a philosophical inquiry into the purpose of American 
government as we understand it today, this paper responds to criticisms of the role of 
expanded government and develops a framework for evaluating the quality of differing 
government structures. Following an evaluation of the current debate surrounding 
bureaucracies (from both proponents and critics), this thesis outlines the lessons and 
principles for structuring and managing an efficient bureaucracy. Finally, this paper 
concludes with two case studies – Puerto Rican bureaucratic failures and 
Japanese/Chinese national development – to consider the effects of compliance and non-
compliance to the lessons outlined in this work. The inquiry finds that principles such as 
specialization, political autonomy, effective information systems, higher accountability 
standards, and managerial emphasis on policy implementation are all critical to superior 
bureaucratic governance. 
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Introduction 
 
“Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself, 
make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On the other hand, 
disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster”  
– President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
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 The modern administrative state is unquestionably the dominant governing 
system of our time. Looking around the world today, one will notice that developed 
nations of the modern era all share a particularly striking feature. Aside from a recent 
history of robust economic growth, declining mortality, rising health/education outcomes, 
and vast improvements in material wealth and quality of life relative to their less 
developed peers, these countries have in common a centralized, administrative 
bureaucracy. 
 Since the turn of the 20
th
 century, rapid growth in population and technology has 
made the planet more globalized and connected than ever. The increase in data available 
to study and understand the world around us helped fuel the expansion of more intricately 
structured social organizations, allowing us track and process these new variables. From 
government to private corporations to local associations and non-profits, these 
organizations became an indispensable mechanism for coordinating the actions of large 
groups of people. As these organizations grew to the point where individual coordination 
between all of the participants became impossible, they eventually began relying on rules 
and structures that could be followed by anyone, independent of their personal 
connection to any of the other decision makers in the organization. This structure became 
what we know today as bureaucracy.  
 The purpose of this work is to simplify the basic purposes, structures, and 
tradeoffs inherent to bureaucracy and make the otherwise dense and seemingly 
impenetrable systems that surround us in daily life more accessible. Furthermore, for 
those who play an instrumental role in running bureaucratic organizations or even voters 
 8 
 
who wish to improve their government, this work contains easily digestible lessons for 
how to improve bureaucratic efficiency, accountability, and management.  
 
Why Should We Care? 
 While you as a reader may at times come to believe that this work is as 
cumbersome and sluggish as the stereotypical bureaucracy you imagine in your head (for 
that, I apologize), that does not diminish the importance of its content. Indeed, 
bureaucracy may be one of the most overlooked and underrated facets of modern life.  
 First, we ought to consider the existence of bureaucracy as a simple matter of fact. 
Given its prevalence and the need to organize so many aspects of our modern lives in a 
world of limited resources, bureaucracy is not only an integral but ultimately inevitable 
part of society today. Lacking a transition to a post-apocalyptic world or rapid declension 
into a failed state, for better or worse, bureaucracy is here to stay.  
 As a result, understanding how bureaucracy works and how to make it better is of 
personal importance to all of us. Most urgently, anyone looking to enter public service 
and work for (or manage) a public bureaucracy will find the lessons contained here useful 
in guiding their actions and improving their ability to accomplish their goals. However, 
even beyond government work, many of the issues addressed here also apply equally to 
private sector bureaucracies. For anyone aspiring to run a large organization in today’s 
society who is unwilling to confront and understand the implications of these lessons 
risks intellectual negligence.  
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 This framework is also important for understanding a variety of public policy 
issues. For example, these issues often affect foreign policy. As much as stable modern 
states rely on their bureaucracies as a touchstone of their consistency, failed states are 
often equally marked by their lack of a professional civil service. Certainly other factors 
such as race, geography, access to natural resources, religious strife, and cultural 
homogeny are integral parts of these stories too. But for each of these variables, an 
equally compelling narrative could be told about how their impact on a country’s 
bureaucracy (or lack thereof).  
 Even for those concerned more with the domestic impact of this work, you will 
not be disappointed. Particularly here in America, bureaucracy is something that we love 
to hate. Whether it is your favorite story about waiting in line at the DMV or spending 
three hours on hold with customer service,
1
 it is not difficult for most people to find an 
anecdotal example highlighting the apparent failure of bureaucracy. However, without an 
equal understanding of the positive impacts these bureaucracies have or even recognition 
of why apparent bureaucratic sluggishness in the face of your impatience may
2
 have 
actually served an important function can have a devastating effect on our domestic 
electorate. 
 This danger is exemplified when we see presidential candidates who are propelled 
by rash calls for carte blanche, random elimination of entire federal departments. This 
danger is shown by the vicious cycle generated when the very effectiveness of our 
government is undermined by the widespread belief that a government bureaucracy is 
                                                 
1
 Shout out to Bank of America and American Airlines! 
2
 Admittedly, this is a big “may.” Obviously, not all instances of slow bureaucracies are necessarily good.  
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incapable of accomplishing anything. This danger is the collective angst and anger that 
brings out the worst in ourselves when we believe that systemic problems are 
unapproachable and society is on the decline when most of the evidence points to the 
contrary.
i
  
 A good understanding of bureaucracy is important for people of all political 
persuasions. It is important for American liberals who require an applied theory of how 
exactly (and importantly, under what conditions) expanded government can work rather 
than a reliance on blind faith that ‘it just will’ – chances are, without dedication to proper 
implementation, it probably will not. Equally, critics of bureaucracy who still 
acknowledge the inevitability of bureaucratic structures and that an outright dismantling 
of the modern state is inconceivable should care deeply about ways that we can improve 
our present bureaucracies.  
 Even for a non-partisan, bureaucratic theory matters. The role of bureaucracy in 
our society has significant impacts for our democratic character. Americans spend most 
of their years in primary education studying civics, the importance of voting and self-
governance, and the role of elected officials in crafting policy. Meanwhile, massive and 
notably unelected bureaucracies toil away at enforcing and generating policy decisions 
that affect our everyday lives. In spite of this central role, bureaucracies are criminally 
disregarded in these discussions about the very notion of government by the people and 
for the people.  
 Understanding bureaucratic operation is crucial in contextualizing how the daily 
operations of our civic institutions fit into the bigger picture of why our society is 
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structured the way it is, what our values are as a country, and what our civic identity is as 
Americans. It is essential for moving political debates beyond a simplistic and damaging 
debate about ‘big’ vs. ‘small’ government to a case-by-case analysis. We can have a 
society where facts are what drive a determination of whether a policy is likely to work or 
fail rather than relying on philosophies driven by anecdotes that cause us to throw the 
baby out with the ideological bathwater. It is my sincere hope that this work and other 
analyses like it will help force the American electorate back to a path of critical analysis 
in policy evaluation and a reduction in partisanship that is caused by the overreliance on 
simplified ideological premises. That is that standard to which our great nation ought to 
aspire.  
 
Scope, Definitions, and the Path Forward 
 This paper covers two primary focuses – a philosophical contextualization of 
bureaucracy within our collective values and understanding of government, as well as an 
applied focus on the structure and management of bureaucracies.  
 Section I starts at the broadest of these levels. Beginning with a detailed 
breakdown of the nuanced debate between conservative libertarianism and modern 
liberalism, it asks the question, “why do we have government?” Looking at our moral 
intuitions about how we ought to make decisions, how do we balance values such as 
liberty, equality, and utility (among others)? Once we understand what we tend to want 
out of a society/government, what do these priorities suggest about the most important 
factors when considering governmental organization?  
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 Section II begins to transition from the philosophical to the political. It begins by 
delving into the impact that bureaucracy has on our democratic character and specifically 
responds to the criticism that bureaucracies risk making our system less democratic. 
From there, the section moves on to acknowledge and respond to a variety of other 
arguments (both for and against) bureaucracy in the current debate. In particular, chapter 
2.2 disabuses bureaucratic proponents of the notion that there is a clean division between 
administrative efficiency and political decision-making – an argument that has long 
intended to artificially avoid the aforementioned democracy criticism. Following that, 
chapter 2.3 responds to critics of bureaucracy, addressing a myriad of concerns from 
efficiency to executive overreach.  
 Sections III and IV finally address the application of bureaucracies in real life. 
Section III includes lessons about how to ideally structure bureaucracies in order to 
maximize their efficiency. These lessons are divided into the need for bureaucratic 
division and specialization, increased bureaucratic autonomy from political forces, and an 
emphasis on how to improve bureaucratic accountability (especially in light of calls for a 
marginally reduced role for ‘balance of powers’ due to increased political autonomy).  
 Section IV provides lessons for administering a bureaucratic organization. It 
begins with a discussion about how information flows throughout an organization, how 
that information is shaped by the incentives of individuals operating at various levels, and 
how a manager can maximize the quality of information they receive in order to make 
decisions. Having made a decision, the section moves on to highlight the most important 
variables that affect implementation of decisions including types of workers assigned to a 
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project and the impact of morale on various parts of the organization. Finally, the section 
culminates by combining all of the lessons in Sections III and IV to cover the ultimate 
goal for any executive: how to implement new policies or reforms and overcome 
inevitable resistance to their decision(s).  
 To conclude, Section V provides some useful case studies to demonstrate how 
these lessons are applied in the real world. In particular, the failure of Puerto Rico is 
highlighted to show what poorly organized bureaucracy looked like (in spite of a number 
of other advantages of modern, developed society), what they did wrong, and what could 
be fixed. Additionally, the co-development of Japan and China into the modern era (end 
of the 19
th
 century through WWII) is examined to highlight the role of Japan’s well-
organized bureaucracy that permitted it to outpace the decentralized Chinese government 
despite beginning in similar points of economic development. Furthermore, this narrative 
reverses in modern times (1945-2007) as the quality of the Japanese bureaucracy declines 
and the Chinese administration improves.  
 Before getting to the substantive material, it is important to take this moment to 
discuss the operative definitions of some terms used throughout this paper. As many 
lessons about bureaucratic structure (particularly in Sections III and IV) are meant to be 
transferrable, words such as “manager,” “executive,” “CEO”, and “President” are treated 
as basically synonymous (although “President” is exclusively used in government 
contexts or in relation to evidence relating to a government bureaucracy). These words 
are meant to represent leaders at the apex of an organization
3
 and are typically the central 
                                                 
3
 Also presumably the ones attempting to make the decision.  
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unit of analysis throughout this work. Below them, “senior officials” are considered 
advisors and direct subordinators of the “manager” and everyone else such as 
“implementers,” “analysts,” or “agents” are the mass of middle men or workers on the 
ground at the lowest level of decision making in the organization.  
 It is also important to recognize that personality caricatures (such as those above 
or references to “career officials” vs. “in-and-outers”) are not meant to be definitive 
characterizations of how such people behave in all situations. Rather, they are useful 
generalizations that an intelligent manager can use to identify certain incentives or 
tendencies based on one’s background.  
 Finally, allow me to outline the scope of this paper. While it may appear almost 
laughable to discuss limits to a paper that arrogantly aims to summarize issues related to 
‘all of bureaucracy,’ even the greatest egoist among us faces their limits. In particular, the 
focus of the paper is on bureaucracy and its ideal structure and management. 
Consequently, it discusses political and personal challenges with implementation insofar 
as they are relevant to a manager or another internal operator of a bureaucracy. This 
paper, however, does not accept the burden of discussing a path to political viability for 
instituting the structural changes recommended herein – that is a job I will happily leave 
to the politicians.  
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Section 1: The Morality of the Modern State 
 
“The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction, is the first and only 
object of good government.”  
– Thomas Jefferson 
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Overview 
 In modern America, as it has been ever since the Enlightenment, citizens fiercely 
debate the role of government. Why do we have government and how well are our 
current institutions doing at achieving those goals? As the primary purpose of this work is 
to serve as a defense and recommendation for improving a particular form of government 
– the modern administrative state – it is important that we have a metric by which we can 
assess whether one form of government is better or worse than any other. This section is 
meant to do just that.  
 Starting with the Chapter 1.1 Libertarianism vs. Big Government, expanded 
bureaucratic power is defended against some of its most outspoken and compelling 
critics: libertarians. After generally demonstrating room for the legitimacy of a large and 
potentially expanded government, Chapter 1.2 answers the broader question about how 
we justify the role of government in society. As such, what do these answers suggest 
about the appropriate size of government and the standards by which we should measure 
whether a system of government will do a good or bad job?  
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1.1 Libertarianism vs. Big Government: The Myth of the Minimalist State 
 
 Before we begin, let us take a quick stock of where we are headed. The purpose of 
this chapter is to more closely analyze the validity of the claim that libertarian doctrine is 
morally superior to that of big-government, high liberals or utilitarian classical liberals. In 
particular, it is meant to respond to the most compelling
4
 counterargument to expanded 
bureaucratic government in contemporary American politics. This analysis will conduct 
two lines of questioning. First, does libertarian doctrine fulfill the claims it sets for itself 
in upholding liberty? Second, is the libertarian liberty framework the only one that can be 
used to maximize freedom and if not, can liberal doctrines also uphold liberty? These 
questions will serve to highlight that conventional libertarian political claims are often 
unjustified or at least, severely restricted, leaving significant room for an expanded 
bureaucratic government both on the simple basis of utility (discussed next chapter) or 
even on the basis of liberty itself.  
 Addressing the libertarianism critique is an important threshold for justifying a 
theory of expanded bureaucracy. It is perhaps the largest political movement with a moral 
claim opposing nearly any kind of government action expected of a modern 
administrative state. Given its political and rhetorical success in modern America, if 
libertarianism is true (as conventionally understood), it poses a threat to expanded 
bureaucracy.  
 In responding to this critique we will hopefully establish two things: first, 
legitimize the general notion of big government, both through demonstrating the 
                                                 
4
 Based on its general prevalence/acceptance among the American public 
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incoherence of the libertarian argument vis a vis liberty and by highlighting a pro-
government perspective on the basis of liberty. Second, in the process of refuting 
libertarians, consider alternative frameworks for the justification of government beyond 
liberty but also provide a framework to measure government/bureaucratic effectiveness. 
The latter is largely covered in Chapter 1.2 Why Government.  
 
The Libertarian Case  
Let us take a break to look at the logic that belies the libertarians’ argument and 
why they so regularly appeal to the protection of negative rights rather than positive ones. 
As the name suggests (and we shall explore more deeply later) the libertarian values 
liberty. In this view, as freedom has inherent value, coercion is bad per se as it reduces 
freedom. From a libertarian perspective, negative interests are superior on the basis that 
they protect a greater degree of freedom/liberty (by using little to no coercion) and 
subsequently ought to be preferred to positive interests. As a historical matter, libertarians 
have long tied this notion of negative rights to certain ‘personal’ liberties such as speech, 
life, and property, which they believe are freer than guaranteeing other kinds of 
‘governmental’ rights that may require more active state intervention to enforce. Clearly 
there is still some degree of state intervention/coercion, but it is sufficiently minimal to 
justify protecting the right. 
Before we can discuss whether libertarianism truly upholds liberty and if so, the 
degree to which such liberty should be valued, let us first establish a more specific 
understanding of what exactly liberty is. According to Isaiah Berlin, (negative) liberty “is 
involved in the answer to the question, ‘What is the area within which the subject – a 
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person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, 
without interference by other persons?’”ii In other words, areas of negative liberty are 
concerned with the specific types of activities one can be free to do without being 
interfered with by other people.  
But what exactly does that mean and how are we to measure the amount of 
freedom a certain state of affairs exhibits? Berlin goes on to define political liberty as 
“the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others.”iii You are thus unfree only 
insofar as others prevent you from doing what you could otherwise do, and if this 
interference becomes particularly extreme, you “can be described as being coerced:” the 
functional opposite of being free.
iv
 There is an important caveat here. You cannot be said 
to be coerced just because you cannot achieve something you desire or that someone else 
might be able to achieve, “[y]ou lack political liberty or freedom only if you are 
prevented from attaining a goal by human beings.”v This is because coercion implies 
deliberate interference by other humans. Berlin gives the examples of being unable to 
jump ten feet high, or being unable to run because you have a disabled leg. Although you 
may be unable to do these things, this inability would not be described as a lack of 
freedom. To reiterate, liberty is the range of things you can do on your own without being 
interfered with by other human beings. 
Now that we understand what liberty is, let us return to the important line of 
argumentation that libertarians often use to great political success: their advocacy is for a 
political framework that protects negative, not positive, rights. To assess the validity of 
this argument we need to both understand the potential distinction(s) between positive 
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and negative interests and determine if negative rights are truly superior to (e.g. less 
coercive than) positive ones. The most common conceptions of the positive/negative 
rights division are viewing coercion or lack thereof as (1) inherent to actions taken by the 
government, or (2) inherent to actions taken by individuals.  
 One of the more simplistic distinctions between positive and negative rights is 
centered on the role of government. Indeed, many observe that the distinction “seems to 
track the politically […] familiar contrast between small government and big government 
[…] Negative rights ban and exclude government; positive ones invite and demand 
government.”vi The simplicity of this appeal clearly contributes to its prevalence. 
Furthermore, if true, this could be devastating for advocates of an extensive 
administrative state – a priori to any considerations of efficiency, utility, or potentially 
even democratic will, if the purpose of government is exclusively to protect negative 
rights, anything further is necessarily an infringement of the good life.  
An alternative (and probably more compelling) line of reasoning for making a 
distinction between negative and positive rights, is not centered on the state (government 
or no government), but rather focuses on the action by individuals that is required to 
enforce the given right. For reasons we shall see shortly, this distinction might be made 
along the lines of performance vs. forbearance.
vii
 A positive right would be one that 
requires another person to actively behave in a certain manner. A negative right might 
only require that another person not perform a certain action. This understanding allows 
the libertarian to remain committed to a broader expanse of negative ‘personal’ rights. A 
negative, forbearance right may only require that another person not come onto your 
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property, or not come and kill you in your sleep. Conversely, a positive, performance 
right might actively force a debtor to repay a debt or a counterparty to perform to uphold 
their end of a bargain.
viii
  
Theses delineations of positive vs. negative rights certainly seems politically and 
rhetorically compelling based on its prevalence. After all, besides appearing intuitive, 
such a distinction is easy to understand and apply; one merely needs to classify action 
into one side of the binary to determine whether it is morally legitimate. Unfortunately 
for the libertarian, upon closer scrutiny, neither of these methods of viewing positive vs. 
negative rights is internally coherent with libertarian’s avowedly preferred government 
policies.  
The small/big government demarcation makes very little sense in application. 
Nearly every appeal to protect a right is an appeal to the government to act in a way to 
secure or legally protect it. A right to property is an appeal to the government to 
prosecute anyone who might trespass or try to take what you own. A right to life requires 
an active government police force to protect you from wandering marauders. As Cass 
Sunstein and Stephen Holmes point out, “[i]f rights were merely immunities from public 
interference, the highest virtue of government (so far as the exercise of rights was 
concerned) would be paralysis or disability. But a disabled state cannot protect personal 
liberties.”ix  
While Sunstein and Holmes go on to claim that even protections against the state 
itself require the state and therefore are ‘positive’ in this respect, libertarians might 
correctly identify this as a non sequitur. After all, if the government were never 
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empowered to use certain forces such as a large police force or a lengthy penal code, a 
government would not be required to control itself. However, even granting that there 
may be some rights (such as free speech) that may still be negative in this sense by virtue 
of the fact that it could still be achieved in the complete absence of government, such 
examples are few and far between. This clearly is not a distinction of rights that is 
comprehensive enough to be materially significant. The primary problem is that this 
government vs. no government framework counts almost all rights as positive. As 
identified earlier, the government is an instrumental part of securing almost every right 
we value today. In a sense, “all legally enforced rights are necessarily positive rights,” 
under this framework.
x
 In order to be internally consistent, the theory loses much of its 
intuitive appeal. Libertarians often like to claim ‘personal rights’ as a sub-section of 
negative rights; but through this lens, personal rights are very actively positive rights – 
they require the government to intervene to protect them. While this interpretation may 
actually be acceptable to a proponent of expanded government, it is apparent that the 
libertarian political advocacy cannot rely on a vision of positive/negative rights that 
corresponds to presence/absence of government action. 
 To engage the second positive/negative rights conception, let us for now grant 
that forbearing an action is meaningfully less coercive than forcing a performance. This 
breakdown still poses massive problems for the free market libertarian as it questions 
some of the ‘personal rights’ they claim to hold dear. In this view, some of the basic 
tenets of free market capitalism are undermined. As noted above, freedom to contract is 
only possible if one can count on the government forcing a reneging counterparty to 
perform the agreed action or pay for the costs of backing out. While we might still 
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consider this to be a socially beneficial action (see Chapter 1.2) that alone does not deny 
that such a right is enforced by positive means under this definition.  
 Additionally, it is not even clear where the forbearance vs. performance 
distinction lies. For example, imagine a law that prevents the discrimination in 
employment on the basis of race or sexual orientation. From the employee’s perspective, 
they may view their right as negative: the employer only need stop themselves from 
considering race or sexual orientation when they make their hiring choice (implicit 
premise – the employer is going to hire someone no matter what). However, from the 
employer’s perspective, they may view this law as affirming a positive right: they are 
forced to hire someone they would not otherwise employ. While this is not necessarily a 
fatal problem for the argument, certainly a court of law or a philosophy professor could 
sift through such issues; this framework requires more comprehensive analysis on what 
constitutes the base case of moral entitlement. If the base case is hiring no one, non-
discrimination is a positive right; if the base case is hiring someone for sure and just a 
matter of choosing whom, non-discrimination is a negative right. In determining what 
base case one has a claim to, it may be more likely than not that the libertarian risks 
running into even more tricky questions about moral entitlement.  
 Moreover, with the forbearance/performance distinction, the libertarian is left 
with significantly reduced grounds to object to transfer payments and welfare institutions. 
The free market line of argumentation proceeds as such: “creating these institutions 
requires taxing my money which is a necessarily coercive act and forces me to perform 
by working and then paying the government.” This defense rests on the “widespread but 
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obviously mistaken premise” that the most important (negative) rights/interests are 
virtually costless.
xi
 As we identified earlier, all legally enforceable rights, including many 
deeply treasured by the libertarian, requires government action and consequently 
demands costs to maintain. In fact, the costs to maintain the world of law and order many 
of us take for granted requires an amount of resources so vast that it would put most 
individual transfer programs to shame.
5
 This alone requires a significant level of 
coordination and, if so, opens up legitimate room for arguments asserting that an 
efficiently structured bureaucracy is the most effective way to achieve that. But that is not 
all; if the libertarian feels that taxation is a manner of coercion sufficiently minimal to be 
legitimately used to protect personal rights, on what basis can he/she object to taxation 
for the purpose of maintaining rights that require transfer payments? He/she might be 
able to prove that certain programs cost more than the structures necessary to protect the 
‘negative’ personal rights – but this is clearly a question of degree and not of kind.6  
 The libertarian is then perpetually engaged in a conversation about the superiority 
of the mechanism for securing rights, not about the moral content of the rights 
themselves. So long as this holds, the libertarian argument can no longer categorically 
defend that a minimal state protects negative rights which are necessarily morally 
superior to positive rights – whether such a claim is factually accurate is subject to a case-
by-case inquiry and a matter of empirical analysis. Moreover, every dollar saved by using 
                                                 
5
 “[D]escribing a political system that is genuinely capable of repressing force and fraud as “minimal” is to 
suggest, against all historical evidence, that such a system is easy to achieve and maintain. It is not. One 
piece of evidence to the contrary is the amount we spend, as a nation, to protect private property by 
punishing and deterring acquisitive crimes. In 1992, for instances, direct expenditures in the United States 
for police protection and criminal corrections ran to some $73 billion – an amount that exceeds the entire 
GDP of more than half of the countries in the world.” – Holmes/Sunstein Pg. 63-64 
6
 The argument that the funds for ‘negative interests’ go to pay for themselves as opposed to others is 
morally unpersuasive.  
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a system that is more cost-efficient (for example, by utilizing economies of scale and 
reduced decision making time in a centralized bureaucracy) makes the argument for an 
expanded executive government even more compelling.  
Below and in Chapter 1.2, this paper will analyze how the implicit claim about the 
supposed supremacy of liberty as a moral value is to be considered against other moral 
values. However, understanding that the root of the argument is founded on the 
assumption that negative interests are functionally less coercive than positive ones opens 
the door to a factual challenge to the libertarian’s claim – if one can demonstrate that 
some other type of interest or action (maybe a large welfare transfer program) actually 
causes less, not more, coercion than some of the libertarian’s valued personal rights, a 
big-government liberal may be able to demonstrate superiority of their policy on the basis 
of freedom itself. This is the reason why the negative vs. positive right distinction is so 
important to the libertarian – unless he/she can prove that there is a class of ‘negative’ 
interests that are consistently less coercive than some class of ‘positive’ rights, it is 
impossible to sustain the libertarian’s desire to argue that negative rights ipso facto are 
consistently superior (in any single dimension) to positive rights as he or she must first 
prove that their preferred policies are empirically less coercive than the liberal’s. 
This is perhaps the most dangerous argument libertarianism could face. To the 
extent an advocate of big government could demonstrate that a large government 
bureaucracy could act with sufficient efficiency and restraint of their reach into individual 
personal lives, so long as the government pursued policies that improved freedom 
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(however that may be defined), a large administrative state remains plausibly justified 
within libertarian doctrine.  
 While this should be enough to critically hobble the libertarian’s claim to moral 
superiority, let us assume that he/she manages to articulate a delineation of positive and 
negative interests that meaningfully, categorically, and consistently aligns along the 
parallel border of coercion and liberty that justifies protecting personal liberties against 
subsidies provided for others. The advocacy for our free market libertarian still has to 
demonstrate that these negative rights (interests) are the best for upholding liberty and 
that the difference in liberty is enough to outweigh competing moral considerations.  
 
Robust Liberty and Government Interventions 
Until this point, our discussion of (negative) liberty has been based on the 
assumption that the ‘true’ way of understanding freedom is the manner as portrayed by 
the libertarian. That is to say, liberty is a form of negative right/interest, presuming that 
some cogent distinction between negative and positive interests has been made, that 
shows liberty as a justification of rights that ‘leaves one alone’ in contrast to a positive 
scheme of rights that involved active duties or ‘subsidies’ owed to others. But what if (as 
much of the earlier argumentation suggests) this is not necessarily the case? The big-
government liberal may be able to make the case that state intervention is still justified on 
the basis of liberty itself. I will hereafter refer to this conception of freedom as “robust 
liberty.” 
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 Let us remember quickly what exactly it means for one to be free: you are free 
insofar as you could naturally do something without the interference of other people. But 
how then are we to measure one’s freedom? Surely all interferences are not created equal. 
If someone demands that you give them your bank account number but one robber will 
only slap you in the face if you do not comply and the second robber has a gun to your 
head, clearly that is not an equal amount of coercion. The second question this raises: 
what does it mean to have choices? Imagine again that the robber has the gun to your 
head and is threatening to kill your if you do not give up your bank account. You might 
be tempted to say that you are completely coerced: you have no choice. But strictly 
speaking that is not true; one always has a choice. You could still choose to not comply; 
you would just also happen to be dead.  
This example indicates that there are a number of factors that compose the 
formula of how we calculate freedom. Berlin suggests that these factors include, (1) the 
number of options that are available, (2) how easy or difficult it is to exercise each 
choice, (3) how important is this choice relative to what you would like to do with your 
life, (4) to what degree the limitation on choices is caused by deliberate human acts, and 
(5) how much value the general sentiment of society places on the possibilities.xii While 
there are unquestionably objections to this particular framing of the factors, nonetheless 
they can give us greater insight on how we are to think about liberty.  
In thinking about robust liberty, let us consider the first two factors in securing 
freedom: the number of choices available and the ease with which the choice can be 
exercised. Some liberals, and indeed, some philosophers argue that liberty has little value 
 28 
 
without the ability and resources to make it effective.xiii The value of liberty is thus 
proportional to the resources available to utilize it. There may be an argument to be had 
that the value of liberty is distinct from the amount of liberty one has but if we are to 
consider, as Berlin suggests, ease of exercising each choice, ability to access choices is 
just as important as theoretically having the choices available. We can see that this begins 
to open up the liberal’s claim to a form of robust liberty. People may be theoretically 
‘free’ to buy bread, or water, or housing, but if those options are not an attainable goal 
because one does not have enough money, it may be the case that a costly state program 
that provides food and housing to the poor may be justified on the basis that it actually 
upholds liberty by opening up available, usable choices. In other words, an efficient, 
expanded government that provides basic capabilities to may be an essential component 
of preserving freedom.  
However, to demonstrate this, the liberal still must show that this inability to 
access material things stems from human actions. Otherwise, the person without food or 
housing does not meet the conditions of factor four and cannot be described as being 
‘coerced’ by others. The proper liberal response might be that although the effects may 
not be targeted at any individual, the entire economic system already represents human 
decisions to intervene in one’s life. If left to their own, a given individual might be able 
to work to build their own house, hunt or grow food, and generally sustain themselves; 
however, it is the very institutions of the modern capitalist system that prevents self-
sustainability. Property rights prevent people from finding and settling on land, patents 
prevent people profiting from an idea so long as someone has thought up or sold the idea 
previously, and licenses to businesses and corporations allow managers to design a 
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system that exclude certain people from participating in their only form of remaining 
recourse: working at a job so that they may buy the things they might otherwise supply 
for themselves on their own. Even the basic police force stops one from stealing the ripe 
apples from a neighbor’s farm. Insofar as any human-made institution is preventing one 
from accomplishing something, one can be said to be coerced and deprived of freedom. 
Conversely, programs that provide one access to the choices they are otherwise denied 
might be considered a re-expansion of liberty.  
This is the basis of the high liberal’s appeal to liberty. As a matter of economic 
history and prolonged collusion, government and government protected businesses have 
designed a society that systematically deprives some individuals of freedom. On the 
whole, these government decisions (such as a clear, but unequal definition of property 
rights) has had a net positive impact for society and economic growth (it improved our 
utility). However, such a decision based on utility does not overcome fact that human 
society elected to infringe individual ‘freedom’ to improve general utility. For the basic 
arrangement of ‘markets’ that we have come to accept and use today, non-government 
systems and institutions have long designed and benefitted from using government power 
as an extension of their interests. Consequently, we ought to focus more about the nature 
and direction of government capabilities and policies than pretending that it could be 
eliminated while maintaining many parts of society that we know and love.  
To give a few examples of government power being indispensable to ‘free’ 
markets, if you do not fulfill your end of a contract, businesses have a right to sue you 
and make the government (through the courts) enforce their private contract at the risk 
 30 
 
of having the police cart you off for being in contempt of court. Similarly, the 
government can delegate the use of legitimate force to privately hired security 
companies which materially allows businesses (or individuals) to have access to use of 
force. This is not an unimportant observation – while a free market defender may claim 
that private security forces might only be delegated powers for ‘self-defense,’ this is a 
historically misleading claim. Private security forces have a long and bloody history of 
breaking up protests and strikes held by unions; an activity freely conducted by 
consenting individuals to try and gain bargaining power in the workplace that was 
nevertheless stopped or dis-incentivized by force. More generally, in creating an 
economic system, the government has clearly prioritized some economic goals at the 
expense of others. We may all agree that there are important reasons to establish private 
property and have the government protect property someone has acquired. However, 
we cannot lose sight that the government, a collection of human interests has 
collectively denied your ability to have access to that property.  
These are the grounds on which a liberal might be able to claim that instituting 
programs that alleviate certain un-freedoms caused by the economic system actually 
help upholds the value of liberty in a way that might offset the libertarian’s claim of 
coercion with an argument that may be just as strong, if not stronger on the basis of a 
robust understanding of liberty. Active state intervention and even transfer programs 
may maximize liberty by shielding individuals from the lack of choices they face as the 
result of bearing the brunt of a socially constructed economic system. This alone at 
least gives liberals the tools necessary to reject libertarian doctrine on the basis that a 
strong, interventionist state may be necessary to reduce coercion and expand freedom.  
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However, like the libertarian argument above, this analysis is one of degree rather 
than kind and still assumes the centrality of liberty as a guiding principle. This brings 
us to a discussion of a framework of civic ethics that accounts for the range of values 
that Americans hold dear is likely a better interpretation about our collective intuition 
about the purpose of government. Under such a framework, the case for an expanded 
administrative state becomes even more pronounced.  
 
Looking Forward and the Value of Liberty 
 Up to this point we have considered both the incoherence of libertarian notions of 
positive/negative rights in the context of liberty and a reinterpretation of robust liberty 
that itself may call for expanded government action. However, before we end, let us 
reconsider the validity of our operating premise that we have left unchallenged until now: 
liberty is the be-all, end-all of values and is the ultimate dimension on which civic 
morality can be based.  
 Continuing to use Berlin’s conception as an operating definition for liberty and 
freedom, let us examine some of the issues that arise from the way that libertarians view 
freedom. In such a world, the basic conception of a person is someone left to their own 
devices, wandering around doing what they want until they are interfered with by other 
people. They can then freely work with those individuals, but they are cannot be coerced 
because they always have the right to walk away from something that they do not wish to 
do. On this basis, liberty and freedom is inherent to humans as core characteristics of 
their personhood. Additionally, a social organization that can force its will upon members 
who may disagree with a decision or who are unable to leave at will (e.g. government) is 
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necessarily coercive insofar as other humans have conspired to prevent you from doing as 
you like. Given an implicit correlation between the size of this government and its chance 
of interfering in a sphere you would rather be left alone by others, one ought to oppose 
any expansion of government or the concentration of tis power.  
 As any moral ideal, such a vision is idyllic and utopian. However, upon scrutiny, 
this world not only faces practical inconveniences; we can see that it is constructed on 
faulty premises. To begin, this view entirely dismisses the statist preconceptions of 
laissez-faire systems. Sunstein and Holmes emphasize this by pointing to defense 
spending as a way of protecting one’s property. They show that “ownership becomes 
quickly enmeshed with sovereignty”7 and highlight the point as it manifests in the Israeli-
Palestine conflict.xiv Ability to protect property is contingent on the state defending it. 
Finding methods of legal recourse to allow one to buy and sell property can only be done 
within the boundaries of a state (for example, you cannot just unilaterally secede and 
declare your house a sovereign nation, or sell your house in Seattle to a Canadian who 
would declare the land now part of Canada). They go on to show that the state is crucial 
both as the primary authority over land and also as an enforcer of certain rights (such as 
the right to be left alone). 
In common law, only the sovereign is said to have an absolute interest in land: 
ordinary landowners “hold of the sovereign.” This quant legalism expresses a 
deep truth. An autonomous individual, in a liberal society, cannot create the 
conditions of his own autonomy autonomously, but only collectively.xv 
This speaks to a further issue which is that the notion of an individual person operating 
and responsible only to him/herself is likely empirically inaccurate. Human beings are 
                                                 
7
 In 2011, the U.S. spent $718 billion on defense 
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naturally a social species and thus, for far longer than we can remember, likely emerged 
from a ‘state of nature’ which was far more interdependent and socially reliant than the 
libertarian utopia would suggest. Subsequently, freedom likely never was nor ever will be 
absolute and held to the exclusion of competing pro-social considerations. As such, pure 
liberty cannot possibly be the purpose for which we have government and arguments 
against either centralizing its power in an administrative branch or generally expanding 
the size of the government (measured by the size of its bureaucracies) will have to be 
made of different grounds.  
 Another fallacy of this argument is the notion of baseline non-interference. Earlier 
we regarded freedom as inherent to people because in their natural state, they had the 
ability to freely walk away from any deal they did not find desirable and therefore the 
“base case” was to do nothing and have nothing happen to you. In the real world, the 
government actively protects this right/interest. “The individual’s freedom, his ‘right to 
be left alone’ by thugs and thieves, cannot be separated from his entitlement to state 
help.”xvi Therefore, liberty cannot be thought of differently than other moral values as 
something inherent to people by a natural state of affairs,8 but rather should be 
considered to be a moral entitlement. It may certainly still be a worthy moral entitlement, 
but liberty requires enforcement and some degree of collective action to guarantee, 
similar to other moral values. This highlights that the libertarian’s liberty conception is 
not per se immune from being weighed as one of many moral interests.  
                                                 
8
 There is no claim here about moral inherency. As we noted earlier, pre-political moral conceptions of the 
person are notwithstanding in this paper 
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 In this chapter we have covered a variety of responses to the libertarian critique. 
First, the criticism of government action exclusively on the basis of a positive/negative 
rights delineation is incompatible with the preferred policy outcomes of many 
libertarians. As a consequence, libertarian doctrine either needs to be severely contracted 
(which seems to preclude many utility improving institutions that are functionally 
essential to running a modern government or market system), or it must be expanded to 
include a conception of robust liberty. This robust liberty leaves ground to invite more 
government action so long as such action is maximally efficient – sounds like a perfect 
place for a theory of bureaucratic efficiency! But before we get ahead of ourselves, let us 
move to Chapter 1.2 to discuss other values that play a role in our conceptions of 
government and efficiency in addition to the principle of liberty.  
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1.2 Why Do We Have Government? 
 
 In any work attempting to describe how we ought to organize a government, it 
would seem self-evident that one would also have to answer the question, why do we 
have government? This question is not meant in a historical, ‘how did government come 
to be’ sense, but rather in a philosophical one: as we understand it in our highest ideals, 
how ought government behave and what goals is it meant to accomplish? For obvious 
reasons, this is an incredibly difficult question to answer. Indeed, the very essence of 
politics, everything from war and revolution to diplomacy and debate, are inextricably 
intertwined with this pursuit.  
 It would be impossible and, in some ways, potentially irresponsible to claim to 
form and describe a definitive answer to this question. However, the purpose of this 
chapter is to describe how we (the American public in particular) tend to prioritize these 
civic values, identify which values can be inferred from our expectations about 
government, and outline a framework about how we think about observing and applying 
these values to the structures of our government (rather than a specific declaration about 
how we ought to apply values in a particular, manifest law).  
 Across our various political parties and among our political debates, consider the 
diverse variety of values Americans claim to hold dear. Americans care about liberty and 
the freedom of personal choice. Americans value justice and fairness and the notion that 
people are treated equally under the law but held responsible for personal choices that 
break such laws. Americans value democracy and equality that respects the humanity of 
every individual to be treated as any other and share an equal voice in their collective 
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governance. Americans value security and the protection of our ‘natural rights’ such as a 
right to life and the pursuit of happiness. These values are reflected in all forms of 
American political discourse. However, as the very existence of politics and invigorated 
political division suggests, we cannot fully achieve all of these important objectives all of 
the time.  
 Given this, many tradeoffs have to be made in deciding on a policy. We care 
deeply about the liberty of all citizens, and yet tend to agree that the government ought to 
provide public roads that require taxes on individuals, land that had to have come from 
somewhere (or someone), and the ability to restrict an individual’s right to action (you 
cannot walk across a highway or litter on the street or drive over the speed limit). We 
believe that the increased utility of having public roads equally accessible to everyone, 
having been supported by our majority democratic will, is sufficient to overrule the 
liberty that has been sacrificed. On the other side of our contemporary political spectrum, 
high liberals who care deeply about the equality of humans and citizens find their limits. 
We may want everyone to be well off, but if a transfer program that made all equally 
wealthy also dis-incentivized anyone from working and crashed the economy, the loss of 
utility or the significant loss of liberty would likely draw reluctant rebuke from even the 
most ardent socialist. Or what about a policy that uniquely discriminates against gays and 
lesbians or Muslims? Even if such laws are widely popular (democratically supported) 
and bring great value to the large majority (maximizing utility), such decrees deeply 
offend our sense of equality, justice, fairness, and claim to natural rights as individuals.  
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 These questions about how to evaluate the relationships between these values 
brings us to a discussion about ‘value pluralism.’ 
 
Value Pluralism 
 It can be said without dispute that Americans hold many principled values in 
envisioning their ideal society. It can also be (regrettably) said that a key limitation on 
bringing these utopias to life is the tension and conflict between these simultaneously 
held beliefs. The questions then remain, how do we envision an ideal society that is 
responsive to this limitation and what is the role of government in helping us get there?  
 From political pundits angrily screaming from your TV screen to philosophy 
professors coolly writing from the ivory tower, many will suggest that divining the 
conception of our ‘good life’ and identifying the purpose of government is all about 
finding one or two magical principles that we should abide by. Ideological purity is the 
name of the game. Unfortunately for them, with a very little bit of scrutiny it becomes 
quickly apparent that viewing our civic morality in such stark terms does not stand up to 
the most basic tests of our moral intuition. 
 The resolution to these moral dilemmas rests in a concept known as “value 
pluralism.” Simply put, value pluralism is the notion that not all good values necessarily 
go together. Liberty and justice might both be morally valuable things, but sometimes 
may contradict each other. Perhaps a world where people have more freedoms may lead 
to seriously unjust outcomes; or a world that cares to enforce justice may need to curtail 
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some liberty. Berlin refers to this concept in contrast to value monism (the idea there is at 
least one moral principle/value that cannot be violated under any circumstance) thusly: 
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on 
the altars of the great historical ideals – justice or progress or the happiness of 
future generations, […] or even liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of 
individuals for the freedom of society. This is the belief that somewhere, in the 
past or in the future, in divine revelation or in the mind of an individual thinker, in 
the pronouncements of history or science, or in the simple heart of an uncorrupted 
good man, there is a final solution. This ancient faith rests of the conviction that 
all the positive values in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible, 
and perhaps even entail one another.xvii 
 Isaiah Berlin perceptively observes that in philosophical thought, there is often a 
great tendency to try and artificially construct world views that allow all values to be 
simultaneously upheld in a manner that does not conflict and/or create a framework of 
universalized maxims or principles that can apply to any given situation in the same 
manner. While this observation does not prove that such potential does not exist, to date 
there have been no ideas that have accomplished this without great logical criticism and, 
perhaps more importantly, this is rarely the way general people think about these kinds of 
issues. Perhaps we agree that individual people should never resort to violence because 
violence is morally bad. But what if you had to act in self-defense? Surely the freedom to 
defend yourself has some weight in the question, even if you don’t have the freedom to 
attack someone else. Moral questions like these are rarely as clear or black and white as 
one might like to make them seem.  
 For example, is “liberty” the magical principle around which our moral universe 
is centered? While in its simplest form the ideal may appear compelling, recall the 
entirety of the previous chapter which demonstrates the number of ways this breaks down 
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when we look at the details. If a world centered on liberty condemns children to a life of 
poverty for no reason other than they were born into an impoverished family, would we 
find that acceptable? Probably not. While the issue will not be re-litigated here, given the 
significant shortcomings that a pure-liberty ideology has, it seems that our society and the 
government responsible for organizing
9
 it is not meant to be an unlimited maximizer of 
liberty.  
 However, in the event a modern liberal is preparing to gloat, it must be noted that 
it would be equally erroneous to claim that government ought to be an equality 
maximizer. Certainly one need look no further than the failure of the communist project 
to see the serious practical limitations of such an endeavor. Even liberal critics may argue 
that the artificial treatment of everyone as equal merely hides institutionally prevalent 
discrimination and oppression that takes place on account of power differentials that exist 
no matter how hard we may try to correct for them.
10, xviii
 Indeed, for any of the other 
values that we will review here
11
 including natural rights, justice/fairness, democracy, 
and security, it seems unlikely that choosing one of them to maximize to the exclusion of 
the others will yield morally compelling ‘utopia’ we desire.  
 Another important advantage of realizing this is that once we shed the bias of 
trying to make all good values work seamlessly together, we significantly reduce the 
                                                 
9
 “Organizing” is used in its most basic sense. Even to the extent that we collectively agree not to have 
government or one solely responsible for limiting itself, the basic fundamentals of society and the ‘rules of 
the game’ have still been organized.  
10
 Indeed, this is a criticism often levied in a number of circumstances. “Separate but equal” schooling for 
black children in the U.S. certainly shows the role of equality rhetoric in hiding irreversible inequalities 
(particularly damaging ones deserving of ongoing criticism). Similar disapproval is expressed for the 
French approach to State secularism while Muslim minorities are treated as ‘less equal’ than other large 
Abrahamic religions. 
11
 Albeit, in an admittedly simplistic manner 
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likelihood of constructing a moral philosophy riddled with logical inconsistencies 
tortured together for the sake of creating some universalizing framework. That being said, 
how can this apply to the question we have at hand? We can all agree that liberty and 
freedom may be important values and still think about how our actions fit into the whole 
schema of other values we also hold dear. While it could be the case that the liberal and 
libertarian fight over whether they are trading off different types of liberty itself, we can 
also consider the question if libertarian or liberal policies have other moral implications 
that we care about (including justice, equality, reciprocity, etc.). Most importantly, we do 
not have to get caught up with the fallacy that each of these values is absolute.  
The notion of value pluralism significantly helps us reconcile values we care 
strongly about with our conventional use of rights-language. Speaking of rights in a way 
that suggests they are inviolable is logically facetious. Not only do people naturally think 
in terms of trade-offs, it is okay to think about such trade-offs. There are times the utility 
of saving 10,000 lives may be great enough to reduce one’s right (liberty) to free speech. 
This is not to say either that utility is the only consideration at play or that liberty is 
worthless merely that, while they both have value, the strength of one may value, at 
times, be greater than the strength of the other.  
The need to make trade-offs between these values brings us to a concept central to 
the notion of value pluralism: moral satisficing. While there is debate about the proper 
understanding of what satisficing means,
xix
 we will use the term as defined by its creator, 
economist and Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon. “Satisfice” is a combination of the words 
“satisfy” and “suffice” and means to “seek something that is ‘good enough’”xx within a 
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set of parameters. This is less extreme than optimization (maximization or minimization), 
which requires going all the way to the end of an objective or principle without 
compromise. This approach is highly helpful for understanding our moral intuitions and 
further suggests the strength of value pluralism. We no longer need to take a no-holds-
barred approach to attaining ideologically pure morality and can instead view issues in 
the more fluid tradeoffs in which we actually find ourselves during day-to-day life.  
 None of these questions of how to balance values are easy to answer. Value 
pluralism may prevent us from achieving a philosophically ‘pure’ framework of our 
purpose for government, but it may also help us understand a better, more realistic picture 
of politics and the American character. While recognizing an infinitely large range of 
potential alternative arrangements, below is one proposal that hopes to describe the 
American character and how we think about balancing and upholding the various values 
we holds dear.  
 
Thanksgiving Dinner and Utility Satisficing 
 As suggested above, we are still left with the question of what value are we 
primarily supposed to satisfice? Although the analysis that follows is, by design, 
decidedly simplistic, it seems that our moral intuitions point us towards being utility 
satisficers bounded by the parameters of all of the values mentioned previously, namely 
liberty, equality, natural rights, justice/fairness, democracy, and security. To boil this 
intuition down, let us not jump to the big picture questions of government, policy, and 
society – instead just think of yourself as a family member at Thanksgiving dinner.  
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 Imagine you are hosting Thanksgiving, your husband or wife has spent all day 
slaving away to get everything ready for your guests, and you have invited over all of 
your family and friends. You have to figure out what social rules are going to govern how 
the evening goes. But first, let us meet our guests! 
 Obviously, there is your spouse who has spent all day doing the hard labor to set 
things up for everyone – we will call them F (fairness) 
 Your uncle who is perpetually hungry and always wants to be able to eat whatever 
he can get his hands on – we will call him L (liberty) 
 Your sister who is tragically cursed with a variety of allergies including dairy, 
gluten, and poultry. Moreover, she is vegan! – we will call her J (justice) 
 There are the collective children who are running around. They aren’t able to help 
out much right now because they are so young but, for reasons only heaven 
knows, you keep them around anyway – we will collectively call them E 
(equality) 
 Finally, there is a friend of your sister’s that she wishes to bring along. You and 
the rest of the family do not really know him but he has no family to celebrate 
with and your sister feels he should take part in the Thanksgiving spirit – we will 
call him N (natural rights) 
Now that everyone has shown up, the food is ready and it is time to eat. At this 
dinner, how would you determine how the meal should go? The important thing to 
realize is that while our resources are limited (the amount of food available/prepared 
is fixed), we will still try to accommodate everyone’s needs and preferences. We 
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intuitively assume that everyone gathered has some kind of claim to the food; 
otherwise we would just let them go hungry. You would even be willing to give some 
food to your sister’s friend, N, though you do not know him! The same is true of the 
children (E) who have not contributed in any way (and have probably been pretty 
annoying). While you might be able to justify this decision in terms of claims for 
natural rights, or equality for the food, it is important to consider that you think this is 
the arrangement that will make everyone the happiest with the least amount of cost. 
Even if giving them food means that everyone else goes away pretty full as opposed 
to unbelievably bloated, this is an acceptable tradeoff, if the alternative is that some 
people leave not having eaten anything and ravenously hungry.  
On that note, you may be unwilling to make getting food a free-for-all if you 
know that your uncle L is going to take 90% of the food and leave only a little for 
everyone else. For him and other such individuals, you may have to put limits on 
what they are free to do even if the effects on everyone else are indirect.
12
 
It is important that no value other than utility was treated in a maximizing context, 
just as a limiter for the worst case scenario. You probably will not maximize equality 
by giving everyone exactly equal portions of food – your spouse did all the work and 
may have deserved more, the children are smaller and do not need as much to be full 
so you may apportion them less, and you can never predict the preferences of your 
uncle L and so may give him the freedom to choose which food and how much he 
takes (within limits of course).  
                                                 
12
 Indirectness is determined by the lack of a bilateral relationship between L and another guest. The fact 
that the uncle took food and there was not enough left over is equivalent to situations considered a step 
once-removed in typical distributional conversations.  
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Consider how this applies to your allergic sister J. There are three ways you could 
respond to her allergies: you could redesign the whole meal around her but her 
allergies and vegan-ness would require eliminating a lot of dishes that everyone else 
wants; you could say, “tough luck!” and not make any accommodations such that she 
does not get to eat anything or you could make a couple of dishes just for her that no 
one else gets to eat (even if they may decide at the last minute that they like it better). 
It seems that most people would prefer this last course of action. It would simply be 
unjust to deny your sister any food, but equally you are unwilling to sacrifice 
everyone else’s meal satisfaction by redesigning the whole meal just around her. 
Instead, we choose the middle ground that makes the most amount of people 
satisfactorily happy.  
Taking a look at the bigger picture, what lessons can this teach us? 
 While we may consider any set of claims legitimate, we do not choose to 
maximize any of these values such that the other values are considered 
irrelevant 
 At the core of each justification to allow or limit someone’s access to food is a 
consideration of how satisfied everyone will be at the end of the meal 
(maximized utility) 
 However, even the effort to maximize utility is not unlimited. Even if it might 
make everyone collectively happier not to accommodate your sister J or feed 
the stranger N, the ‘peripheral values’ play an important role in limiting how 
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far we can take utility forcing us to be satisficers instead of maximizers of 
utility.  
Let us consider a real world example that may intuitively demonstrate why this 
model is an accurate way of describing our worldview. In particular, let us consider an 
issue that was briefly touched on last chapter – contracts. Protection and enforcement of 
contracts is often a key example that libertarians use to highlight an example of a 
negative right that the government can only legitimately protect because it preserves 
liberty. However, it is clear that pure liberty to contract with each other is not the 
exclusive basis on which we protect them. For example, there are a number of limits on 
contracts that cannot be explained in terms of personal free choice or coercion alone. Ha-
Joon Chang points out that we are not allowed to trade votes, government jobs, legal 
decisions, school admission, or human beings and organs.
xxi
 If bilateral consent were all 
that was required to make a morally acceptable contract, one should be able to trade any 
of those things (perhaps with the exception of humans) in a free market. 
So we need another way to explain why we care about contracts. Consider another 
important pre-requisite for contracts – informed consent. Now, it is perfectly plausible to 
have a system where the government does not pass active legislation forcing people to 
abide by certain levels of disclosure. People are free to say what they want and 
counterparties, knowing that the person they are contracting with could be lying or 
misrepresenting, can choose to accept the risk of transacting with them – if the 
economists are right, the fact that the counterparty is still around must mean that they are 
trustworthy or else other people would have stopped dealing with them. To a pure 
 46 
 
libertarian, the risk of being duped is merely the ‘price of freedom:’ if they really want to 
trade they will have to take the risk.  
Obviously, without government enforcement of contracts, these ‘free’ markets 
collapse. Inability to trust counterparties or rely on a government to enforce contract are 
common characteristics among failed states. So why do we reduce our liberty in 
exchange for government supervised contracts?  Because the market system it enables is 
the engine of economic growth that drives the prosperity of countries with modern 
economies. While there are certainly important liberty components that limit the extent to 
which freedom to contract can be violated, at the end of the day, the contract system that 
we know and rely on is ultimately justified on the basis of the utility it provides.  
In summary, we generally permit contracts because of their utility maximizing 
characteristics. However, we readily recognize limits to contract as restraints on those 
very limits on the basis of other peripheral values such as democracy, fairness, equality, 
liberty, etc. One will find that this arrangement and relationship between utility and the 
limits of other values is common across many of our justifications for public policies.  
 
The Framework 
 So what does this tell us about how we think we ought to organize society? So far 
we have established that utility is at the core of any set of decision making but must be 
considered satisfactorily compatible will all of the other peripheral values we find 
important (all of those mentioned so far and likely many others). But that just tells us 
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how we ought to think about issues in the abstract, who gets to determine what the right 
balance is? 
 In the Thanksgiving example, you had entire executive fiat to make those 
decisions. We will call this the “I am king” model – it was your house and you had sole 
control over the decision. However, on a societal level this method becomes far more 
troublesome; no one has presumptive authority over all of society. Alternatively, we 
might think about this decision making in terms of a social contract. Everyone implicitly 
agrees to contribute something to the whole of society and someone is appointed to 
executively direct all of these resources without any input from anyone else. With regards 
to Thanksgiving dinner, we might call this the “Monica Geller potluck” model. There is 
any number of ways that we might describe the procedure for making these decisions on 
how to balance values. However, the method that Americans have settled on is 
democracy, everyone gets a voice.  
 There are two important aspects to recognize about the role of democratic 
procedure in this model. First, its ultimate purpose is as a mechanism for balancing 
values and translating them into policy – for moving us from the philosophical to the 
political. However, just as importantly, democracy is not merely a tool, nor is it just an 
expression of utility (we think everyone else will be happier if they make their own 
decisions). If that were true, Americans should be comfortable with any other form of 
government that instituted effective policies even without democracy. So why do we not 
see mass migration to Singapore? Because American commitment to democracy is also 
about a moral commitment to notions of self-government and personal responsibility that 
 48 
 
we are unwilling to abandon.
xxii
 As such, democracy is both a procedure for balancing 
these values and another substantive limitation on considerations for utility (or any of the 
other values) in translating these preferences into policy.  
 A framework that encompasses this process can be illustrated by the diagram in 
Figure 1.2.1 
 
Figure 1.2.1 – Utility Satisfaction Model of Government 
 
 
 So what does this tell us about how we should evaluate structures of government 
as better as or worse than others? Well, assuming that we meet the limiting conditions of 
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all of the other values (and it is impossible to improve one of the values in any dimension 
without trading off with another), governments ought to try and improve the utility of its 
citizens using the same or fewer resources that it currently uses. Holding all else equal, 
the purpose of government is fundamentally about utility maximization.  
 As we will discuss in Chapter 2.2 Efficiency vs. Politics, words like efficiency are 
often used meaninglessly and without context for what ‘more efficient’ really means. 
This framework provides a useful way of understanding that drive – a call for greater 
efficiency is fundamentally a call for greater utility outcomes with a given amount of 
resources.  
 This is the fundamental burden that this work will work to demonstrate. Insofar as 
it is compatible with democratic government, bureaucracies in the modern administrative 
state have the capacity to maximally test and implement high quality policies as quickly 
as possible. Bureaucracies are fundamentally adaptable to long run changes and can be 
best prepared to weather worst-case scenarios that the government may face (Chapter 2.3 
Bureaucratic Efficiency & Centralization). While it would be impossible to claim that the 
worst version of a bureaucracy is better than the ideal version of an alternative system, a 
highly functioning bureaucracy has the capacity to outperform any (currently known) 
competing system of governance and, in the modern era, may in fact be an indispensable 
part of modern government. In order to best position bureaucracies to handle these 
challenges, Sections III and IV are dedicated to elucidating some of the principles of 
good bureaucracy and contain lessons about how they ought to be structured/run and 
what problems ought to be avoided.   
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Section 2: The Current Debate 
 
"Sometimes it’s the people that no one imagines anything of that do the things that no 
one can imagine."  
- The Imitation Game   
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Section Overview 
While the previous section’s work helped us understand what values we hold as 
Americans, what we want out of an ideal society, and how those desires justify our need 
for a government, it actually tells us very little about how we are supposed to apply these 
principles in the real world. In particular, what do these objectives tell us about what we 
should look for in our governing institutions? 
 Recall from last chapter that we identified three core components of our 
framework for understanding the purpose of government: (1) a core of utility satisfaction, 
(2) a variety of surrounding moral values that determine the limits of pursuing utility 
maximizing policies, and (3) a procedure for determining how to balance these various 
values that is reliant on the notion democratic self-governance. We are now faced with 
the task of understanding how the modern administrative state fits into this framework. 
Over the next three chapters, this section will lay out the various academic arguments that 
are commonly made about bureaucracy and evaluate the extent to which each of them is 
accurate. In many cases, understanding the importance of these answers relies on the 
context provided by our civic moral intuitions. 
 To begin, there are people who would reasonably look at governments run 
predominantly by bureaucracies and think, “this system is totally undemocratic! All of 
the most important decisions are being by people who are never directly accountable to 
voters.” This is certainly a reasonable intuition; alas, it is also overly simplistic. As 
Chapter 2.1 Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucracy will show, bureaucracies are 
actually highly responsive institutions, which are frequently more representative of 
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society as a whole than politicians elected to the legislature. This argument ultimately is 
crucial for understanding bureaucracy in the context of the philosophical framework 
outlined in Chapter 1.2 Why Government. As the key linkage from the world of 
philosophy to the world of policy, ensuring that the democratic process is upheld and 
protected is indispensable for any recommendation for a government structure meant to 
represent America’s civic ethos.  
 While some people maintain that bureaucracy is damaging to a country’s 
democratic character, other scholars who favor strong administrations take the exact 
opposite position. In their minds, elected politicians make all of the political decisions 
and bureaucratic administrations are only responsible for ensuring that policies are 
efficiently carried out. As a consequence, bureaucracies are literally incapable of having 
an impact on democratic representation. Unfortunately, this characterization is equally 
naïve. For one, bureaucrats clearly wield political power – every time they make a 
decision to enforce a law or decide that the cost of one approach outweighs the benefit of 
doing so, they are making a judgement about resource allocation that is fundamentally 
political. 
 Moreover, what “efficiency” means in the abstract is not clear. For example, what 
is the “efficiency” of a public park? Calls for efficiency are ultimately normative claims 
about how we ought to prioritize some costs or benefits over others. Fortunately, the 
philosophical framework has provided a barometer for this measurement: maximizing 
efficiency is no different than maximizing the core of utility – the ultimate purpose of 
government. That said, since utility is not the only value, we may accept some inefficient 
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policies insofar as the alternative is to violate other fundamental values that we might 
care for. However, the underlying governing structures ought to be graded on the extent 
to which they can maximize their ability to increase utility (e.g. efficiency). All of these 
issues and more are discussed in Chapter 2.2 Efficiency vs. Politics. 
Finally, Chapter 2.3 Bureaucratic Efficiency & Centralization addresses one final 
set of criticisms of bureaucracy. Even if we accept that bureaucracies uphold our 
democratic values and that we should prefer governing structures that are efficient (e.g. 
improve our utility), why is the answer bureaucracy? These arguments posit that 
bureaucracies simply are not an efficient form of social organization; the chapter 
responds these claims. In doing so, it sets up an expanded bureaucratic state as the most 
effective way of achieving our philosophical goals, preferring a democratic method of 
improving our lives, while broadly upholding the variety of other moral commitments we 
hold as Americans. 
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2.1 Democracy, Representation, and Bureaucratic Capture 
 
In America, as in most republics and democracies, citizens care deeply about 
ensuring that their voices are heard and their wills are enacted.  The most conventional 
narratives that we teach in elementary civics center on the role of elected officials in 
representing the will of the citizenry in combination with Adam Smith inspired notions of 
self-interested incentive alignment: if politicians do not represent constituents as they 
would like, they are punished by being voted out of office. While this idyllic vision of 
politicians being controlled by the voters and punished for bad behavior through the 
democratic system appears to be a fictitious bedtime story we tell ourselves to help us 
sleep,
13
 even in the ideal world of theory, a strong conception of bureaucracy cannot 
assert any claim of direct accountability to voters. How then can advocacy for 
empowered administration amount to anything less than the functional abandonment of 
democratic representation? This chapter deals with issues relating to concerns about 
accountability and the relationship between citizens and a government operated by a large 
bureaucracy.  
 
Bureaucracy vs. Democracy 
 As discussed in the previous two chapters, a core tenet of public administration is 
the ‘scientific efficiency’ that supposedly eliminates the inefficiencies of political 
decision making. However, the scholars who advocate this position also attempt to accept 
                                                 
13
 It seems unfathomable to look at a Congress that barely scratches double digit approval ratings and yet 
maintains 80-90% re-election rates and credibly believe that politicians are actually punished for poor 
performance. 
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democracy as a guiding principle which seems particularly ironic given that from the 
‘scientific’ perspective, democracy is “a notoriously inefficient basis of organization.”xxiii 
There are a number of reasons democratic decision making can be inefficient; to name a 
few:  
1. Democracy requires a significant amount of time to deliberate, coordinate, and 
build consensus. 
2. In instances in which consensus cannot be reached, gridlock may ensue ensuring 
that no action is taken to respond to a problem. 
3. Representatives that have to worry about short-term timeframes until election may 
have a greater tendency to prefer policies with short-term benefits to long-term 
investments. 
4. Representatives of particular geographical districts have incentives to create or 
continue federal projects that bring funding and jobs to their district, even if the 
overall value of the project itself is minimal and exceeded by its costs. 
5. Outcomes are based on consensus, which may be detrimental in situations that 
require bimodal outcomes. 
Obviously, these arguments suggest some of the reasons that, in some ways, 
democracy itself prevents government from being maximally efficient. That being said, 
there are certainly still many reasons to value democracy, intrinsically or procedurally. It 
may be a good thing that contentious decisions are decided more slowly and with greater 
thought. And in the modern world, it is generally accepted that a government that 
represents the interests of its citizens is a better, more legitimate form of rule. This does 
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not mean that questions of efficiency are irrelevant, but if we assume that a representative 
government is better than a non-representative one, how then does a framework for 
efficient bureaucracies take this into account?  
As noted above, it is not immediately clear how or whether bureaucracies 
represent democratic interests. Bureaucrats are not subject to direct election by voters, are 
often difficult to identify as specifically responsible for a particular policy decision (how 
does one find the responsible bureaucrat out of hundreds of agencies?). They can only be 
held accountable indirectly through the elected officials who themselves are held 
responsible for far more things than specific misdeeds committed by the bureaucracy and 
thus likely consider it a relatively unimportant part of managing their re-election.  
These types of issues are commonly referred to in game theory and economics as 
“principal-agent” problems. That is to say, the principal(s) (the American public or even 
elected representatives) cannot sufficiently control the agent(s) (politicians or 
bureaucrats, respectively) that are meant to work on their behalf. In theory, their interests 
are aligned: if the public or legislature does not get what they want, they punish the 
offending agents. Unfortunately, without sufficient information to know when the 
principal’s goals are being usurped or an inability to punish the agents well enough, the 
agents may develop other interests that are not supposed to play a factor in their decision 
making on behalf of the principal.  
In a 1994 study, Dan Wood and Richard Waterman undertook an extensive study 
that applied principal-agent analysis to federal bureaucracies in the U.S. to determine 
how these effects play a role in democratic government. Although the results are 
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discussed in depth (and through the context of other studies) in the sections below, the 
study found the following: 
“1.  Bureaucratic responsiveness to political control is the norm rather than the 
exception. 
2. Political control mechanisms are important, especially presidential 
appointments. […] 
3. Organization matters – [responsiveness is greater in executive or cabinet 
departments although quality of long-term policies may be greater in 
independent agencies] 
4. Presidential statements [and statements of high-ranking congressional leaders] 
are influential.”xxiv 
While it is not necessarily self-evident that bureaucracies represent the interests of 
general citizens and voters, as we will see below, empirical findings suggest there may be 
a number of reasons why bureaucratic decision-making is more representative than 
generally assumed.  
 
Bureaucracies may protect democracy better than elected officials alone:  
For the purpose of simplifying this discussion to purely an analysis of the 
“democracy” variable, we will for the moment make the gross oversimplification that, the 
quality of “democratic-ness” is determined by how well the government actually creates 
and implements policy in accordance with the desires of its constituent public, explicitly 
expressed or otherwise.  
In this context, bureaucrats enjoy a number of advantages. To begin with their 
most important characteristic, on the whole, is that they are likely experts in their field, 
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whether by experience or by training. When politicians are elected, they are naturally 
forced to be a generalist – they must represent their constituents on every issue; not 
merely issues they can pick and choose based on expertise. And while individual 
politicians may (hopefully) have a few fields of expertise, for any individual there will be 
plenty of subject areas in which they know little and moreover, the likelihood that all of 
the politicians that must vote to approve particular policies are experts in the given area is 
virtually nonexistent. As a consequence, related to the efficiency consequences 
highlighted in Chapter 2.2, the quality of bureaucratic decision making, particularly on an 
average, day-to-day level of decision making, is likely to be better than that of generalist 
politicians and by implication, will better achieve what citizens desire from their 
government.  
Furthermore, there may be reason to believe that decisions made by a person with 
the personality of a bureaucratic civil servant may be preferable to those made by the 
personality of a politician. Put another way, the job of being a bureaucrat is much 
different than being a politician: their focus and general authority (read: power) is far 
more narrow; most of their work is silent and behind the scenes with minimal public 
recognition;
14
 and with a presumable background in the relevant field, a likely passion for 
dealing actively with the issues at hand. In contrast, a “politician” personality can be 
typecast as power-hungry and attention seeking. Obviously, such generalizations are 
neither universal nor likely even observed in a particular individual at such extremes. 
                                                 
14
 When was the last time you thought to yourself, “that civil servant did a really excellent job!” rather than 
just holding the basic expectation that a process would run seamlessly? Indeed, this selective observation 
bias where citizens only recognize when bureaucracies have done something wrong and with little credit 
given when things are done right is likely a major reason Americans tend to hold such disdain for 
bureaucracies.  
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Nonetheless, they do highlight that the self-selection for people choose to become civil 
servants could have an important correlation with their ability to implement policy. 
Similarly, the arguments show why publically elected politicians may have more 
limitations than Americans generally accept. In another context, Americans are 
frequently baffled at how politicians fail to come to agreements even in the face of 
overwhelming public consensus, a clear public interest in solving the problem, and 
supposed need to face accountability at the ballot box. Reconceiving a “politician’s” 
interest on an extended basis makes such outcomes far less surprising – even if there is a 
compromise consensus that everyone could agree to, so long as there is still potential to 
extract concessions from the opposition, media attention, etc. there is value in dragging 
out a policy fight. In contrast, bureaucrats face far fewer perverted incentives and tend to 
have personalities that are less likely think of issues in these power-politicking (and 
ultimately undemocratic) ways.  
Finally, politically autonomous bureaucrats may be less at risk of being 
“captured” by politicians than the politicians are themselves liable of being bought off. 
That is to say, in the republican process, there is always a risk that politicians are coopted 
by effective lobbying efforts, large campaign contributors, and a variety of individuals or 
organizations that can convince politicians to adopt areas of focus or perhaps even 
specific policy positions that a majority of the American public may not approve of. Of 
course, the easiest counterargument is that similar cooption can happen to bureaucrats 
and organizations as well. This risk is admittedly meaningful and explored in detail later 
in the chapter. However, this does not negate the issue of “captured politicians” being a 
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legitimate risk to the quality of democracy – a risk that may be mitigated by more 
insulated bureaucracies.  
As these reasons emphasize, the quality of our democracy may actually be 
improved by the inclusion of bureaucratic organizations that are less structurally 
accountable to elected politicians. This is certainly not to generalize and say that 
democracy would benefit by entirely replacing ‘dirty, avaricious politicians’ with a mass 
of ‘honest and hardworking civil servants;’ but having a healthy bureaucratic branch may 
help limit some negative effects inherent to a purely republican system.  
 
Bureaucracies represent diverse, democratic interests: 
For this next section, let us narrow our definition of “democracy” to be a bit more 
stringent. The previous section relied on a fairly amorphous, nearly tautological, 
conception wherein decisions that any set of citizens would want are necessarily better 
than those that citizens would not. Here, let us specify that representation of democratic 
interest requires specific regard to the polity that is supposedly being represented. For 
example, how well does the U.S. government represent the broad swath of ethnicities, 
religions, genders, etc. that make up America? How well does it represent and 
incorporate uniquely “American values” in its policies? 
Even under this definition, there are a number of arguments for why 
bureaucracies are good tools for representing the character of a nation as a whole.
xxv
 The 
most fundamental reason is that if an administrative apparatus has the same values of the 
citizens as a whole then it will naturally move to behave in ways that incorporate the 
 61 
 
broadly shared values and be responsive to changes in shared images.
xxvi
 While that is a 
big “if” that is not easily dismissed, there is reason to believe it is not prohibitive. In 
Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980), Michael Lipsky points out that a majority of street-
level bureaucrats such as teachers or police officers and other groups of people who are 
largely integrated into society and its diversities are ultimately responsible for 
determining actual policy. “For example, no matter what the law says the speed limit is, 
in practice, it is determined by the individual traffic cop.”xxvii Insofar as these government 
agents that you interact with on a daily basis are diverse/representative, it becomes 
clearer why bureaucracies cannot be wildly unaccountable. When bureaucrats go to 
implement policy, they all put their own spin on the issue for whatever is appropriate for 
the context and situation. In this subtle but pervasive manner, our government represents 
our local democratic interests far more than we imagine.  
 While we may agree that ground-level bureaucrats are fairly representative, is this 
still true at the federal or policymaking levels? The answer appears to be yes. A variety of 
academic work suggests that national legislatures (e.g. elected politicians) are often 
composed of, influenced by, and generally favor the interests of the highest and most 
privileged classes in society.
xxviii
 As a result, they often do not truly represent the whole 
of society on a range of national interests. In contrast, in his work “Bureaucracy and 
Constitutionalism,” Norton Long demonstrates that the whole gambit of people working 
for the federal civil service is far more diverse in a manner that more closely resembles 
(the American) public.
xxix
 He further suggests that the bureaucracy has a greater 
democratic character wherein the public’s “interest receive[s] more effective and more 
responsible representation.”xxx 
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Of course, this claim relies on the belief that bureaucracies are actually diverse in 
their representation. More recent findings in the U.S. suggest that while this claim is true, 
there are limitations. In particular, in The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy: 
Diversity and Responsiveness in a Government Agency (1997), Sally Selden finds that 
while, in the U.S.  “women and minorities are proportionally represented within the 
bureaucracy as a whole,”xxxi this does not continue to be true at the uppermost levels of 
the hierarchy.
xxxii
 While this suggests there is certainly more work that can be done to 
increase the democratic character of the U.S. civil service,
15
 there is no a priori reason to 
assume that bureaucrats cannot represent the values and interests of the citizenry they 
serve and, in fact, that the wide range of the bureaucratic labor pool provides some 
unique advantages over elected politicians in best advancing the diversity of the public’s 
interests. 
 
Bureaucracies link the consensus among warring, gridlocked, or transitioning political 
factions:  
 Alas, even proof that bureaucracies have advantages over political elements in 
representing the values and interests of citizens generally is insufficient for a true 
democrat. No one makes the right decision all of the time and, in instances of poor 
judgement calls, whoever is in charge must be explicitly responsive to changes in public 
opinion to maintain credibility. This leads us to the most stringent definition of 
                                                 
15
 Indeed, the problem appears itself to be that the approval of higher level bureaucrats requires approval of 
the aforementioned privileged, upper-society Congress who naturally prefers civil servants who are most 
focused on their areas of interest. This suggests that an even more independent bureaucracy as discussed in 
later chapter may actually improve the democratic character of the administration.  
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“democracy” where the bureaucracy must be able to demonstrate that it is capable of 
shifting itself to match a particular polity’s expressed interests and fully represent the 
public’s changing interest through such times of transition.  
 Fortunately for the sake of democracy, a significant amount of empirical research 
suggests “that bureaucracies tend to be highly responsive both to their political principals 
and to public opinion generally.”xxxiii Being responsive to politicians vs. public at large is 
not an unimportant distinction. The former is important as it satisfies our intrinsic desire 
to have unelected officials be responsive in enacting the will of elected, “accountable” 
decision makers. However, given the limitations of national legislatures and politicians in 
making truly representative decisions (discussed above), it is important that bureaucracies 
are also directly responsive to public opinion. This means that in cases of perverted 
political interests that are contrary to the general political will, bureaucracies may still 
resist those mandates in favor of policies that more closely match the expressed interest 
of constituents.  
 Indeed, this split focus between allegiance to political principals and the public as 
a whole may be the best of all worlds. Consider the perspective of the procedural 
democratic purist where the only legitimate way to act is to follow the direct instructions 
from the politicians they serve. For one, significant inefficiencies would arise as a result 
of being unable to respond to slightly new or adapted scenarios without express 
authorization in the form of a statute from Congress. For another, direct political 
allegiance would result in a dramatic shift in policy from one election to the next as a 
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new political party took power. Aside from being an interesting intellectual exercise in 
political hypotheticals, we actually know what such a system would look like in reality.  
During the 19
th
 century, the U.S. was dominated by the “spoils system” of civil 
service wherein when a new party took power, the first decision was to replace the entire 
bureaucratic apparatus with agents that would more closely institute the policies of the 
newly elected party. In this system, political decisions were largely made by party 
loyalists on positions based on patronage in enacting the will of the party. Of course, to 
the procedural purist, “[s]uch a bureaucracy can be viewed as an extension of the 
majority party, and therefore of the preferences expressed at the ballot box.”xxxiv Of 
course, such a system also destroyed most senses of bureaucratic 
expertise/professionalism and resulted in significant levels of corruption.  
 In a well-functioning system, bureaucracies help facilitate gradual transitions 
between elections. Bureaucracies that retain more independent character permit more 
seamless and, likely, legitimate transitions from one party’s control to another. If it is 
considered widely unacceptable to treat bureaucratic appointments on the basis of party 
loyalty, people will instead be considered on the basis of their non-partisan expertise. 
Such experts are then provided the experience necessary to make gradual adjustments to 
policy in a manner that reduces the transition costs of an election and probably better 
represents public preferences – with a few exceptions, the American public probably 
looks for targeted changes in specific policies, not a massive systemic overhaul. As 
Waterman and Wood put it best, “bureaucracies perform an integrative function for U.S. 
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democracy, [blending] demands from past democratic coalitions with those from current 
democratic coalitions to produce a policy output at a consistent level.”xxxv  
 This characteristic remains even if the specific voting system has a high degree of 
misrepresentation error.
16
 Bureaucrats therefore do a better job of representing the 
collective voting public than an official representing a specific party – for example, how 
well does a Republican politician elected with 55% of the vote represent the remaining 
45% of constituents who did not vote for him/her? At any given time, the whole voting 
public or even voters within a particular district do not fully subscribe to one party or its 
platforms; rather, people are constantly divided over issues, perpetually debate them, and 
gradually shift their opinions about them.  
In 1950, Dr. Kenneth Arrow developed his Impossibility Theorem
xxxvi
 which 
proved that the notion that the groups of officials who are elected somehow represent a 
“general will of the public” is fundamentally flawed. Institutions that represent groups 
which fundamentally disagree with each other (such as Congress) benefit from a “fallacy 
of false personification” when we rhetorically refer to them as a singular “it” rather than 
the more appropriate “they.”xxxvii This type of language suggests that decisions that a 
particular statute or law passed by Congress is necessarily representative of citizens’ 
collective preferences. Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that, mathematically, just because 
a ‘majority of representatives through a specific set of procedures’ managed to pass a law 
                                                 
16
 A First-Past-The-Post system or, perhaps worse, a multi-party system where elections are held regionally 
almost ensures that an official is elected where less than 50% of the voters would have chosen him/her as 
their first choice. By its nature, this misrepresentation of the collective voters’ true interests relative to the 
final decision that had to be made at the ballot box reduces the quality of democratic representation.  
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does not in any way meaningfully approximate the level of democratic support from the 
public for the law.
xxxviii
  
In such a world, bureaucracy certainly does not have as high a threshold for 
“democratic representation” as most people commonly believe – making decisions 
through elected representatives is not much better in reflecting people’s preferences. 
However, over time, bureaucracy has the unique, added advantage of “blending” a large 
variety of policy preferences across the political spectrum, a number of different political 
administrations, and appealing to a number of constituents which, unexpectedly, may 
make it a more democratic institution than a particular legislature under even our 
narrowest definition of democracy.  
 What then is the most appropriate manner to fully incorporate our fundamental 
belief in democratic values while also permitting an unelected bureaucracy sufficient 
political autonomy in order to act decisively and efficiently? The above observations 
certainly correct the misconception that not being directly elected to an office necessarily 
reduces such a person’s value to democratic representation. However, it would be an 
equally absurd misconception or interpretation of the evidence to conclude that a state 
should be entirely run through various series of internally appointed bureaucrats without 
any formal election process.
17
  
Instead, the compromise to be gained from these lessons might be the following: a 
system of administration for large governments should formally authorize expert 
bureaucrats a first-attempt at resolving problems within a clearly defined jurisdiction and 
                                                 
17
 Such a system is approximately what currently exists in China today. 
 67 
 
somewhat broad set of powers. However, such a system must still be flexible enough to 
permit change in response to elected will if citizens greatly disapprove of some decisions 
or the system is not working. If the bureaucrats are presumptively responsible for 
proposing policy, what then is the role for elected politicians? In this world, elected 
legislatures and officials ought to be more focused on oversight of the empowered 
bureaucracy and intervene in specific situations that are clearly being mishandled rather 
than micromanaging of every component of legislation that could be better left to 
Administrative Law (see Chapter 3.2 Autonomy).  
 
Bureaucratic Capture 
 As alluded to in the section above, the players in the struggle for control of 
decision making authority are not only the bureaucrats, the politicians, and the direct 
citizens. In private spheres where the purpose of the bureaucratic arm is regulation of 
business, there remains the risk that, rather than being ‘captured’ and used as tools of 
politicians looking to further their careers, bureaucrats are instead ‘captured’ and used as 
tools by the businesses they are attempting to regulate.  
Such an outcome would certainly be concerning for any true democrat: rather than 
representing the democratic will of citizens, the government is instead wielding its power 
to further the interests of a few, non-voting actors. In particular, the apparent will of the 
public to regulate some types of business activity to prevent terrible externalities that hurt 
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citizens
18
 will certainly not being reflected and enforced by the government supposedly 
meant to serve the people.  
Before we go too deeply down this doomsday scenario, do keep in mind that 
much of the evidence provided in the section above refutes this argumentation. Even to 
the extent that this does happen (and let us be clear, there are instances where this 
happens), the empirical research suggests that, on the whole, bureaucracies are generally 
responsive to democratic will and the opinions of the public. To the extent that that is 
true, bureaucracies do serve the public and are not merely corporate serving tools used to 
defraud taxpayers.  
Nonetheless, given the severity of its implications, this argument deserves to be 
taken seriously. In particular, there are a number of competing ways that political 
scientists have speculated that this phenomenon may occur. The first is the simplest and 
basically materializes in the manner just described. That is, industries, particularly those 
that are heavily regulated or licensed (such as airlines, roads, or telecom at the national 
level or retail generally at the local level), eventual develop relationships over time 
whereby they come to heavily influence or even control their regulators.
xxxix
 These 
relationships develop gradually and might come about through direct lobbying or the fact 
that the regulators spend more time interacting with the regulated parties than with other 
government officials or citizens who have strong desires to regulate or curtail certain 
aspects of the industry. As a result, the regulators eventually just come to identify more 
with the interests of the parties they work with.  
                                                 
18
 Pollution water and land, destruction of ecosystems that has spillover effects from reduced biodiversity, 
construction of noisy and obnoxious production plants next to a residential neighborhood, etc.  
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It is certainly not difficult to imagine that if you are constantly presented with one 
side of the argument (“look at all the problems I suffer as a result of regulation! I could 
be so much more profitable if I didn’t have these restrictions!”) with only minimal 
exposure to the counterargument (“these actions result in polluted water that harm our 
long term health” or “this behavior exposes our entire financial system to significant risk 
if something goes wrong!”) that very soon you begin to attribute an outsized value of 
importance on the ‘problems’ that you are always faced with.  
Industries that are highly regulated or licensed are also more likely to capture 
their regulators as there is a limited amount of competition. With only a few large firms, 
representatives and lobbyists from the businesses can develop close relationships with the 
bureaucrats rather than the regulators treating these representatives as simply ‘a face in 
the mass of the crowd.’ In addition, when those firms are institutionally protected, the 
need for new licenses can prevent new competitors from entering the market which might 
then bring attention to the unfair advantages
19
 that the existing players extract from the 
government.  
A second version of bureaucratic capture has a slightly expanded perspective of 
the relevant players. Rather than just the private businesses and the particular agency, this 
view also considers the role of a congressional committee which is tasked to oversee the 
agency. This committee also has the potential to be captured through the process of 
democratic capture we discussed in the last section.
xl
 Under this framework, the 
                                                 
19
 Or as an economist would refer to them, “rents” 
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bureaucratic process is controlled by a triumvirate of actors, frequently known as “iron 
triangles” or “issue networks.”xli 
A third but potentially less concerning theory considers bureaucracies to be 
controlled by policy elites (as opposed to specifically elected actors such as a President, 
mayor, governor, etc.).
xlii
 Naturally, this is less concerning as it seems more likely that 
‘policy elites’ such as those who work at think tanks view issues from a public interest 
perspective more than an acutely self-interested profit motive.  
Regardless of which specific method that this happens through, how does the 
theory stand up to empirics? Apparently, not too well. In particular, the very existence of 
the deregulation movement in the U.S. raises serious questions about the degree to which 
regulatory agencies, on the whole, are likely to simply serve the interests of their 
‘capturers’ whom they are responsible for regulating. Wood and Waterman specifically 
comment on the implications of this example: 
The deregulation of the 1970s challenged one of the [bureaucratic capture] 
theory’s basic premises, namely, that the regulatory agencies serve the interests of 
the regulated clientele, not the public interest. The theory could not stand up to the 
empirical test…In one industry after another, regulatory agencies aggressively 
promoted deregulation. Had the deregulation movement been confined to one or 
two agencies, it might easily have been dismissed as a mere exception to the 
larger rule. But the deregulation movement was broadly based, involving 
numerous agencies and regulated industries.
xliii
  
If it was truly the case that businesses had substantially captured these agencies to 
their own benefit or to protect a highly valued oligopoly, then one would expect that the 
‘regulated’ companies would resist deregulation which would sacrifice their ability to 
control government policy. Similarly, the ‘captured’ bureaucrats would similarly resist 
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deregulation efforts as an extension of the wishes of their corporate controllers. Of 
course, this was the exact opposite of what actually occurred.  
 What is also interesting about the latter two versions of this theory are that 
problems actually arise from an excess of political control over the bureaucracy. As 
discussed earlier, capture of elected officials is far more likely according to empirical 
observations. Whether by subcommittee or kowtowing policy elites (ex. chiefs of 
staff/campaign managers), it is the micromanaging of the bureaucracy by individuals who 
are captured higher up the food chain that most commonly results in capture according to 
these theories. Coincidentally enough, these efforts are often what generate the 
procedural nonsense and inefficiency that most people think of when they angrily rant 
about the ineffectuality of bureaucracies. As James Q. Wilson notes: 
Congress has always micromanaged the federal bureaucracy, but the form of that 
micromanagement has changed from seeking favors for political supporters (there 
is still a good bit of this) to devising elaborate, detailed rules for bureaucracy, 
engaging in close oversight, and demanding information.
xliv
  
These elaborate procedures frequently slow down decision making processes
20
 
and are often wielded in manners that neutralize the ability of agencies to perform the 
jobs they were tasked to do and instead represent the interest of undemocratic interest 
groups. To reiterate the lesson to be learned from this, it seems clear that an important 
method for improving the quality of our bureaucracy, both for the sake of efficiency and 
our democratic values, is to increase the administration’s political autonomy by providing 
                                                 
20
 Regrettably named “the bureaucratic process” as such restrictions are certainly not necessarily to nearly 
such an extent as we currently observe and greatly contributes to the bureaucracy’s ‘PR problem’ 
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agencies with broad
21
 (but clearly defined) tasks, jurisdiction, and tools with which to 
address issues. While one should always be vigilant for the dangers of bureaucratic 
capture, the overall threat is negligible relative to an excess of micromanagement by 
politicians who have been properly bought off. As another consequence, this particular 
line of argumentation against bureaucracy on the grounds that it is antithetical to our 
democratic values is further debunked and leaves it as a powerful compliment to directly 
elected democratic officials.  
 
Privatization & Client Serving Behavior 
 We now return to the question of alternatives to bureaucracy and, in particular, 
the role of privatization in achieving government objectives. The argument for 
privatization is compelling: bring the full weight of market efficiencies to solve the 
problem and you can even ‘out-efficiency’ a bureaucracy that, by comparison, is slow 
and bumbling.  
 This case is compelling because in some cases it is right. In instances where the 
only remaining relevant factor to a project is cost, the market system is remarkably good 
at maximizing cost efficiencies. When the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) asks Elon musk to design and test space-ware that meets certain 
specifications
xlv
 or the Department of Defense relies on Lockheed Martin to manufacture 
its F-22s,
xlvi
 these are instances in which reliance on the private sector or private-public 
partnerships (PPPs)
xlvii
 can greatly improve efficiency.  
                                                 
21
 Broad, in this context, is meant to denote a lack of micromanagement. For example, one might be able to 
broadly, yet clearly task the EPA to reduce carbon emissions without specifying a variety of procedures for 
holding hearings and proscribing the specific method of solution the agency is to enforce. 
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However, while private sector companies are very good at minimizing costs and 
maximizing profits, the pinpoint focus on these objectives can be detrimental in the 
pursuit of public-interest objectives. These limitations are the reason that large-scale 
privatization of government departments is not a viable alternative to bureaucracy (in 
most cases). In particular: 
 Public functions being run by private companies (but enabled by the writ of 
government) is fundamentally undemocratic and fails to meet the democracy 
standard described in the last chapter. 
 The objective may contain a sufficient number of ‘public good’ components such 
that there is no market for the ‘good’ that the government is trying to develop. 
 Privatization of departments that will find insufficient competition or free barriers 
to entry will merely result in a private rentier monopoly funded by taxpayers. 
 Finally, if there are considerations other than cost (for example, the means used to 
accomplish the result matter), private sector profit incentive may fail to achieve 
all of the project’s objectives.  
Let us consider these criticisms one at a time. Critics of widespread privatization 
efforts such as Moe and Gilmore (1995) assert that “from the standpoint of representative 
democracy, the mission of any public bureaucracy has to be top-down, not bottom 
up.”xlviii In other words, while publically run agencies are ultimately accountable to 
Congress and the public, private companies are not. In the event of their failure, the worst 
that can happen is that they are fired and lose their contract. Public companies are 
fundamentally not built to divine the interests of the public broadly, only the ‘clients’ 
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they serve in a transaction. As you can imagine for programs like Social Security, 
prisons, or tax collection, there are important public interests that should be considered 
more than focus on the undefinable ‘clients.’  
In many of these examples, things go wrong because cost is not the only 
important variable – how a goal is accomplished is significant. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.3 Accountability, tax collection that is driven by overzealous profit incentive 
encouraged tax collectors on behalf of the federal government to improperly pressure 
people into paying taxes that could not be proven to be incurred by the individuals or to 
make payments when the taxpayers could have legitimately qualified for exemptions. 
Similarly, the privatization of the prison system has come under significant fire due to 
prisoner mistreatment, high levels of recidivism on account of ‘probation fines,’ and 
increase use of jail terms by lobbying judges to hand down harsher sentences (especially 
to minority suspects).
xlix
 These are examples where the means (how you jail/treat 
prisoners, how hard it is appropriate to push people to garner tax revenue) of 
accomplishing a public objective have significant impacts on the legitimacy of the action. 
These kinds of actions from private contractors are highly disturbing from the perspective 
of democratic accountability and the public interest and are not problems that tend to be 
generated by agencies designed to act in the public interest without the need to adhere to 
a strict profit motive metric of success.  
Moreover, even for systems in which there is a clearer ‘client serving’ role that 
might be acceptable (ex. welfare), the ‘market’s’ preferences may not be good ones and 
the lack of democratic process in determining them in accordance to the balance of 
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values discussed earlier is even more damaging to a society’s democratic character. As 
some critics note:  
Democracy is ultimately a set of guarantees about process -  your rights to participate 
in collective decisions – not about outcomes. […] Market values and democratic 
values are not interchangeable equivalents […] One of the earliest calls for a system 
of school choice, that is, to create a competitive market within public education, was 
by Southern whites in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education desegregation order. 
Going unmet was the demand for racial segregation, and the creation of a market for 
public education was seen as a way to persuade schools to pay less attention to 
external political institutions and more to local consumers.
l
 
As this example makes perfectly clear, the role of democracy in protecting the other 
‘peripheral rights’ as described in the last chapter is to overrule discriminatory sentiment 
in favor of recognition for democratic equality as humans. That is a value that private 
firms cannot understand or exhibit.  
 A third concern is that the definition of a market is not always clear. Market 
transactions help improve efficiency by identifying a beneficial transaction of a good or 
service and pricing it such that competitors will not outcompete you. As a whole host of 
economists led by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz point out, not all markets are perfect or 
have these characteristics.
li
 When it may not be possible to identify a clear ‘buyer,’ 
‘seller,’ ‘good/service,’ or ‘price,’ market-based systems are likely either to collapse or 
cause negative externalities. All of most economic theory (anything based off of general 
equilibrium theory) that espouses the wonders of market systems requires these core 
assumptions to hold – they regularly do not in the context of public objectives/goods.  
 Finally, privatization may be rejected on empirical grounds. While government 
agencies work directly at cost, private companies naturally require a profit margin in 
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order to operate. In some cases, the fact that companies make a profit is irrelevant – if a 
comparable government agency could not accomplish the same task for less than the cost 
than the company can for the cost plus profit, taxpayers are still benefited by using the 
private system. It is further prudent to recognize that in many cases (assuming the 
transaction passes all of the conditions above) that this is usually the case. However, it is 
equally important that to recognize that instances may exist in which governmental 
economies of scale trump those in the private sector in which case there is no basis for 
preferring a privatization approach for the sole purpose of ‘making the government 
smaller.’  
 In summary, limited use of the private sector or cooperation through PPPs can be 
a highly efficient tool used in conjunction with expanded bureaucracies. However, 
privatization does not provide a legitimate alternative to executive bureaucratic 
organization. Full-scale privatization risks devaluing the democratic commitments that 
America was founded upon as private companies are neither accountable to the public, 
nor necessarily responsive to the public interest
22, lii
 in the same manner as bureaucracy, 
and often cannot overcome the potential perversion of the profit motive to act in ways 
that are not compatible with our other civic values.  
  
                                                 
22
 Frequently, companies found to have flagrantly acted against the public interest change their names 
rather than reform their practices (which would be a sign of responsiveness to public interest). For example, 
Blackwater has changed their name twice, first after shoddy work that killed two U.S. soldiers and then 
again after killing civilians in Iraq. Phillip Morris renamed itself to distance itself after marketing 
campaigns for tobacco were launched to target children.  
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2.2 Efficiency vs. Politics: Response to Bureaucratic Proponents 
 
 
 At the beginning of this section we mentioned one of the core arguments that 
those in favor of an administrative state often use: namely, that bureaucracies are more 
effective at actually getting things done unlike those useless politicians. For many of us 
who look at a fairly dysfunctional political system stymied by gridlock and hyper-
partisanship, we are already familiar with the ineffectiveness of politicians arguing to 
score political points rather than effecting meaningful policy. Compared to that, surely 
any alternative would be better, right? And while we are at it, why not give that job to 
experts in the field who already know what the best, most efficient solution is to a 
problem in their given area of expertise?  
 There are certainly merits to such arguments that will be addressed in the next 
chapter. First, however, we need to consider the implicit premise that this argument 
assumes: decisions made by bureaucracies are really only about the best way to do 
something and are therefore not really political. Anyone who looked at a particular 
problem with the right expertise would come to the same conclusion about which 
decision is more efficient and so bureaucrats should be free to make utility maximizing 
decisions that are self-evidently beneficial and leave the ugly fight over power and 
politics to the politicians. While one may dismiss this as a meaningless distinction, the 
philosophical implication is powerful. If one can fully separate political decisions from 
the decisions about how to efficiently do something, the administrators do not really need 
to be accountable to anyone except other experts who will evaluate whether their 
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decisions are efficient or inefficient as a matter of fact, not opinion or balancing values. 
As a consequence, so long as political decision making is still done by elected 
representatives, one need not worry about whether bureaucratic decisions are fair, just, or 
representative – the politicians already did all of that – it only matters whether they can 
be proven right or evaluated against a more efficient alternative. 
 While this work ultimately supports and argues in defense of a properly 
structured, meritocratic, quasi-autonomous bureaucracy, it is important to recognize the 
serious flaws in this argument. After all, a case is only compelling if it has fairly treated 
all of its objections and can still stand on its merits. While it is important for a 
government to strive towards increasing its effectiveness and the utility of its citizens, 
values such as representation and democratic voice cannot be dismissed so easily.  
 In order to consider how much bureaucrats are engaged in political behavior we 
must first have an operating definition for politics. Often politics is defined as an 
“authoritative allocation of values” or the determination of “who gets what, when and 
how.”liii This definition also provides insight to the discussion of why we have 
government (as explored in Section I) as the nature of politics is itself meant to be the act 
of balancing competing values in a manner compatible with American values. The 
argument for public administration described above attempts to claim that the 
determination of “how” certain missions are accomplished is less subject to the 
‘allocation of values’ and thus less political than the other questions. As Woodrow 
Wilson described a theoretical framework of public administration, “[t]he process of 
government can be separated into two parts: determining the will of the state (politics) 
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and executing the will of the state (administration).”liv The attendant question is whether, 
in practice, this difference really exists in a meaningful way? 
 As much as we would all love to believe in a government administration that was 
perfectly efficient and instituted all of its policies that made everyone maximally 
satisfied, regrettably the answer to this question (as evidenced by decades of 
dissatisfaction with the DMV) is no. As one author noted, for reasons both practical as 
well as intellectually ethical, “students of administration cannot deal with the problems of 
politics by assuming them away.”lv There are three core reasons that the 
politics/administration dichotomy is false. One, bureaucrats are empowered with 
authority to make political decisions that affect the will of the state. Two, the very notion 
of efficiency is embedded with normative value judgements that functionally express a 
manifestation of politics. Three, the organization of bureaucracy itself is typically a 
function of the political interests of those who empower it (namely, the legislature) and is 
often viewed merely as a tool to shift power from some actors to others.   
 The first counter-argument is that upon a little inspection, bureaucrats regularly 
engage in politics. A prominent study in the field of public administration from John 
Gaus noted that beyond implementing “clearly understood directives from Congress,” 
bureaucracies regularly shape policies themselves by interpreting relatively vague 
statutes into specific actions and policies.
lvi
 Indeed, the entire notion of Administrative 
Law (covered more in Chapter 4.2 Autonomy) is predicated on the importance of 
administrative agencies operating as the semi-ultimate authority for interpreting statues 
and rules even when they are unclear or potentially politically controversial.  
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For example, consider the SEC’s decision to allocate resources in prosecuting 
fraudulent bankers – it could expend lots of resources prosecuting a banker through a trial 
and get a personal, criminal conviction or it could accept a much milder plea deal with a 
fine while expending a fraction of the cost. On one hand, one could argue that the lawyers 
determine what the most efficient way to use their resources, making it a non-political 
decision. But implicitly, a number of political decisions were made. (a) Would we rather 
have the criminals pay fines or serve jail time? (b) If there is a difference in a 
punishment’s effectiveness, are there some types of crimes the SEC should pursue more 
vigorously than others to set an example for high priority issues? (c) Should the severity 
of a financial crime be comparable to other jail-able offenses? (d) If so, is there an 
important justice component in ensuring the equality of punishments? While there are 
certainly some questions of efficiency that could be determined empirically (ex. jail time 
vs. fine effectiveness in deterring future crime), many others involve establishing 
political priorities.  
The second counterargument also ensures that bureaucrats engage in political 
decision making. The reason is that the notion of ‘efficiency’ has a host of implicit 
political and value judgements embedded in it. While one may try to define 
‘administrative efficiency’ as a realm dealing with facts rather than value judgements, it 
is clear that bureaucrats regularly have to exceed this line. For example, how would one 
determine the efficiency of the Department of Agriculture, or a library? The most 
common way people consider ‘efficiency’ is an assessment of “an input-output ratio” 
where someone has to assess the amount of inputs and outputs and weigh the value of 
different inputs against each other and against various outputs. Therefore, choosing 
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between decisions necessarily means balancing values at some level; “efficiency can 
hardly be value-neutral.”lvii While advocacy for governance by pure scientific efficiency 
may be convenient, it is not based on a valid argument.  
Indeed, Dwight Waldo, one of the most central thinkers in public administration 
recognized that “public administration scholars have a vision of what the ‘good society’ 
looks like: It is industrial, urban, and centrally planned; it has no poverty, no corruption, 
and no extremes of wealth. Science is its ideal, and waste and inefficiency are its 
enemy.”lviii Aside from whether this view is accurate, the underlying point is significant: 
one way or another, proponents of public administration do have their own vision of what 
‘efficiency’ accomplishes and how it fulfills their vision of the good life. While this is not 
necessarily a criticism of bureaucracies per se, it is an important philosophical question 
that advocates must answer rather than pretending away the inherently political nature of 
bureaucracies. For this work, Chapter 1.2 Why Do We Have Government has attempted 
to clarify and resolve these issues as it relates to bureaucracies.  
The final counterargument was most convincingly put by Harold Seidman in his 
1970 work Politics, Position, and Power. The argument can be summarized thusly: “The 
institutional location and environment of a policy or program and the organizational 
structure, process, and procedures that govern it help determine the distribution of power 
and influence within the polity.”lix That is to say that all too frequently, bureaucracies are 
not arranged according to their efficiency but instead by their political value to different 
players among the government.  
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The argument that political atmosphere determines the power of an agency 
advances two points: One, it cements the first argument mentioned here that 
bureaucracies are not and cannot truly be separated from politics. Two, it helps explain 
many of the existing inefficiencies that appear in bureaucratic organizations. For 
example, agencies and executive oversight responsibilities are often duplicated due to 
political fights in Congress over power. Seidman highlights a number of these instances. 
For example, banks, savings and loans, and credit unions are regulated by five different 
federal departments which increases disputes over regulatory authority, resource 
allocation, etc.
lx
 Seidman explains this as the result of a fight between Congress and the 
various influential arms of the banking industry to help “commercial banks pick their 
regulators according to the activity they’re engaged in.” (this problem and phenomenon is 
covered more in Chapters 2.1 Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucratic Capture and 
3.3 Accountability).
lxi
  
Another example can be found in highway regulation. In 1966, both the National 
Highway Safety Agency and the National Traffic Agency (each with their own agency 
head) were created to do many of the same tasks. This is obviously inefficient, but makes 
sense from a political perspective. “The reason for the two agencies rather than one was a 
simple matter of inter-chamber politics: two Senate committees wanted to confirm the 
agency head, and the creation of two agencies achieved this purely political goal. The 
organizational and administrative ‘problems’ of the executive branch are thus often 
‘nothing but mirror images of jurisdictional conflicts within the Congress.’”lxii There are 
also a number of examples of this cause of duplication in foreign policy such as the 
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creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI).  
To be fair however, such outcomes are hardly inexorable. There are a number of 
agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that do 
not appear to face these problems. While the next couple chapters will cover specific 
responses to the types of inefficient arrangements Seidman addresses, his argument 
highlights an important point on behalf of the bureaucracies themselves. That is to say 
that many of the problems of bureaucracies are not the result of incompetent bureaucrats, 
but rather of incompetent (or power hungry) politicians. Chapter 3.3 will cover the role 
that other, non-bureaucratic parties play in managing the U.S. federal bureaucracy and 
how they can fulfill their responsibility to generate a more efficient government. The 
important point to remember is that the purpose of this work is not to defend that the U.S. 
government as it exists now is efficient, well-managed, or even particularly good. Rather, 
the purpose is to highlight best practices that can help create efficient bureaucracies and 
defend that even in the face of political realities such as those highlighted here, even 
merely mediocre bureaucracies are ultimately indispensable for the management of the 
modern state.  
To review, we have covered three of the primary objections/limitations to the 
efficiency claims of public administration proponents. We recognize that bureaucrats do, 
in fact, engage in lower-level political decision making. We have acknowledged that 
bureaucrats do need to have a vision of ‘the good life’ when evaluating claims of 
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efficiency and that they ought to do so primarily with regards to bounded utility 
satisfaction. And finally, we have recognized that bureaucratic efficiency is ultimately 
(and unfortunately) limited by the political climate and politicians who are unwilling to 
subscribe to the lessons of efficient bureaucratic organization that will be discussed in 
Section III.   
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2.3 Bureaucratic Efficiency & Centralization: Response to Critics of Bureaucracy 
 
 
 Up to this point, all this paper has explored is the nature of the identity crisis that 
constitutes our attempt to understand “what exactly is the purpose of government?” and 
“how do our conceptions of ‘efficiency’ match with our democratic values in achieving 
our ideal society?” However, for those lines of inquiry to matter, we first have to deal 
with the empirical question, “can bureaucracies actually be efficient?”  
 Before we begin, let us establish some ground rules: first, for the purposes of this 
discussion, the definition of “efficiency” will generally be limited to whether decisions 
are made faster, with higher quality,
23
 and lower cost. Noting that the previous sentence 
is hopelessly filled with comparative adjectives, we have to briefly modify the question 
to, “what are bureaucracies more or less efficient than?”  
Again, this is a despairingly difficult question to answer, as it is impossible to 
contrast bureaucracies with the nearly infinite list of potential alternatives. Direct 
democracy? A hereditary monarchy? A hierarchical meritocratic technocracy with a 
quasi-elected executive? Obviously producing an endless list of potential alternatives is 
hardly productive. Perhaps even more frighteningly, consider the modern world we live 
in: high levels of data and transactions are constantly needed to sustain even basic public 
services such as a military, police, roads, or a legal system.  With the exceptions of direct 
democracy or anarchy, to run even the most basic of tasks, nearly any kind of 
                                                 
23
 “Quality” of decisions will be proxied by the amount of nonpartisan expert input  included in final 
decisions. 
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government system one can think of will almost inevitably rely on some form of 
bureaucracy!
24
 Therefore, the purpose of this chapter and, indeed, this entire work is 
simply to make the prospect of the wide-spread bureaucracies we see today a little less 
“frightening” and, in the later chapters, discuss the ways in which bureaucracies can be 
structured and used in more efficient ways while recognizing their limitations where 
alternatives such as privatization ought to be considered.  
Let us return to the question of whether bureaucracies are indeed generally 
efficient. In later chapters, we will discuss the specific factors that contribute to 
bureaucratic efficiency; but at a macro level, political scientists suggest that principles 
such as centralized administration, meritocracy (bureaucrats hired by expertise rather 
than political loyalty), and political insulation are critical to ensuring a well-run modern 
state. While discussed more in depth in Chapter 2.1 Democracy, Representation, and 
Bureaucratic Capture, this line of thought was particularly developed in response (and in 
contrast to) the “spoils system” in the U.S. that saw a “public administration shot through 
with incompetence, ripe for corruption.”lxiii  
Referring again to Dwight Waldo’s seminal work The Administrative State, 
George Frederickson and Kevin Smith summarize the theoretical grounds best: 
Good administration (and thus good government) could best be promoted by 
centralizing and concentrating power, by running agencies according to sound, 
scientific management principles, by making technical competence the criteria for 
civil service employment, and by shielding these technical experts from whatever 
winds happened to be stirring the dust in the political arena. […] An efficient and 
expertly run administrative apparatus insulated from politics and under the 
authority of a powerful executive would increase accountability and promote 
                                                 
24
 Discussion of privatization is considered in Chapter 2.1 
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effective, competently run public programs and policies. If things did not work, 
everyone would know who to blame and why, and the representative institutions 
of democracy could act accordingly.
lxiv
 
 There are a couple of key takeaways from this that are important to highlight. 
Aside from the variables such as technical competence, political insulation, and the 
mechanics of accountability that are explored in depth later in Sections III and IV, an 
effective administration is generally more effective when it is centralized. A 
decentralized mechanism that still acts with a unitary purpose
25
 is as much a mismatch as 
using a spoon to shovel a pile of dirt – chances are that it is going to require an 
extraordinary amount of wasteful duplication.  
 A natural consequence of this centralization is a relative increase in executive 
power. Of course, such a proposal is easily concerning to those inherently skeptical of the 
risk of government overreach. Given the strength and validity of these claims, let us take 
a detour from discussions of efficiency to respond to concerns some may have regarding 
the centralization implied by expanded bureaucracy.  
Certainly, in combination with factors such as an elimination in formal 
democratic voice (transition to an autocratic system) or significant expansion of the 
purview of government power into our personal life (transition to a totalitarian system), 
such centralization would indeed be alarming. However, to those who look at the long-
term effects of an alternative to a marginally empowered executive relative to the 
legislature (a shifting of type of check/balance), it becomes apparent that this is the lesser 
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 E.g. Acting on behalf of a single “government,” (unitary purpose), a decentralized mechanism still does 
not possess the potentially efficient characteristics of a marketplace where decentralized actors can 
‘invisible hand’ their way to efficiency through, (a) competition, and (b) focus on a near singular objective 
– economic profits. 
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of evils for those concerned about the abuse of state power. In particular, while it is 
important to consider the threat of the executive to individual rights and democratic 
institutions during times of normalcy, it is perhaps more critical during times of crisis. 
Consider the maxim, “[a]utocracy during hours is the price of democracy after hours.”lxv 
As a matter of historical example, during times of panic, even (and perhaps especially) 
democratic societies often find themselves in a rush to safety. Naturally, a response to 
crisis requires speed (e.g. a component of efficiency) and long democratic deliberation is 
often unconducive to a satisfying response. Lacking an existing mechanism to guide them 
out of crisis and insufficient time to deliberate extensively, democratic societies are often 
forced to abandon their existing institutions and individual protections in exchange for a 
fully unitary executive that can respond to the crisis at hand. Of course, such conditions 
are ripe for abuses of power and a hurtling trajectory towards concentration of power that 
can never be reversed. Such is the risk to a society that does not build in an emergency 
mechanism for a sufficiently strong executive prior to times of crisis.  
Lest we repeat the abject failure of the Articles of Confederation or suffer the fate 
of countries such as Italy, Germany, and Egypt, among a panoply of others who 
succumbed to such influences, let us consider the role of an empowered bureaucracy as 
an institutional alternative to prevent the risk of descent into outright totalitarianism. 
Centralized bureaucracies and a relatively empowered executive branch maintain the 
ability to make quick decisions
26
 in times of crisis while remaining accountable to 
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 Of course, some may question the “quickness” of a bureaucracy to make decisions. However, remember 
to consider these comparisons as relative. Relative to a lengthy Congressional debate, drafting of 
legislation, etc. a Presidential decision is unquestionably faster. (Remember that in such instances, the 
bureaucracy is usually used to implement executive will more so than form it, thus making the process even 
faster). Is it the case that by anecdotal example, private sector transactions work even faster by comparison 
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democratic institutions that can not only check an executive during the event but even 
more importantly, in the period that follows. Sufficient empowerment prevents the 
justification for further suspending important checks and balances during times of crisis. 
If the bureaucratic system as it exists is sufficiently empowered, capable, and quick to 
respond to a crisis, a demagogue will ill intent will find it much more difficult to justify 
suspending individual rights or suspending democratic procedures.  
Returning to the issues of efficiency and quality of governance, Kevin Smith and 
George Frederickson note that empowering bureaucracy also increases accountability by 
bringing to bear a greater degree of executive focus. While this phenomenon is explored 
in more detail in Chapter 3.3 Accountability, limiting the number of people responsible 
for particular actions prevents blame shifting and diffusion. That is to say that when bad 
things result from general Congressional inaction, even if people are upset with Congress 
generally, it is difficult to hold accountable and vote out of office a specific 
representative for a pervasive culture and the collective behavior of 525 people. 
Conversely, when the bureaucracy does something wrong, everyone knows that the 
President is to blame and are quick to vote him/her out of office. This incentive structure 
results in a highly attentive executive branch to ensure that things get done – after all, all 
of their jobs are at stake.  
So far we have demonstrated why centralized bureaucracies are capable of 
meeting the lower cost (less duplication) and faster decision conditions of efficiency. 
Finally let us return to the question of expert input in decision making. The first method 
                                                                                                                                                 
to examples everyone loves to hate such as the DMV or waiting for the State Department to issue a 
passport? Absolutely. However, lacking a comfortableness with Walmart making decisions about issues of 
national security, it appears that we’re still left with government bureaucracy.  
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this theory uses to attain expert competence is almost unfair, as it is basically definitional. 
In order to meet the “technical competence” standard described above, it is necessary to 
have a hiring criterion for bureaucrats that is based on previous experience and/or 
education in the relevant field. If we have further defined the executive to be broadly 
expanded with more discretionary authority and we have guaranteed the people hired to 
wield that authority are experts, by definition experts have a greater influence on policy 
making. However, there are also subtler ways in which this effect manifests: evidence 
suggests that as the bureaucracy is filled with greater expertise and tasked with more 
responsibility, even elected lawmakers come to rely on their advice, testimony, and 
opinions of these expert administrators.
lxvi
 As a consequence, properly structured and 
understood, bureaucracies have the foundational capability to significantly add to the 
efficiency of the modern state.  
 
Counterarguments 
 Of course, such idealistic projections only exist in a world where considerations 
of the failings and limitations of bureaucracy are not considered. Let us take a moment to 
run through some of the common arguments relating to bureaucratic inefficiency and 
consider why they are either untrue or not as critically damaging as we might assume.  
 
Bureaucracy generates lots of useless material: 
 If you ask people who are skeptical of the government’s ability to do anything 
competently to provide words they associate with the word “bureaucracy,” some answers 
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you are likely to find will include responses such as “useless,” “redundant,” “repetitive,” 
“slow,” or “unimaginative.” This is due to one of the most legitimate criticisms of 
bureaucracies; by the nature of their size, they can often be difficult to manage. 
Government bureaucracies in particular have incentives to produce as much material as 
possible on as many issues related to one’s particular agency that one can think of – even 
if a large portion of the material may not appear relevant at a given moment.  
 Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Colin Powell made the 
following criticism of the JCS prior to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act: 
The sixteen-hundred-member joint staff that worked for the JCS spent thousands 
of man-hours pumping out ponderous, least-common-denominator documents that 
every chief would accept but few Secretaries of Defense or Presidents found 
useful. The tortuous routines worked out for processing this paper flow would 
have done credit to a thirteenth-century papal curia.
lxvii
 
 Beyond the testimony of a government official who has firsthand experience 
helping run the administration, it would obviously be ludicrous to deny that bureaucracies 
often face problems with redundancy and wasting resources on needless materials. 
Recognizing that such problems are some of the most critical, Sections III and IV detail a 
variety of mechanisms to help reduce this problem. However, even lacking those 
changes, there are reasons to believe that all is not lost for those who would like to be 
optimistic about the possibility of a well-run government.  
 For one, there is an important lesson to be learned from Mr. Powell’s anecdote. 
The most important factor in making the JCS documents useless was that they were 
“least-common-denominator.” That is to say, on areas where there was harsh contention 
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that needed to be advanced to a higher level for decision, such disagreement was instead 
masked by advancing material that was uncontentious but without substance that was 
ultimately useless for decision makers higher in the chain of command. In Chapter 4.1 
Information, the contexts for adversarial vs. consensus decision making are considered 
more deeply. However, the lesson here is clear: when lower-level decision makers cannot 
come to an agreement, such disagreement should be clearly presented to the higher level 
managers highlighting all of the available options in order to be resolved. Indeed, as 
applied to the JCS, this issue was vastly improved upon passage of the 1986 Defense 
Reorganization Act which was strongly supported by Colin Powell. A critical change was 
allowance of the JCS Chairman to voice his/her own opinion to the President while the 
other chiefs could continue to disagree, rather than having to representing an artificially 
forced and fake consensus. This demonstrates that, by design, the rules of the 
bureaucracy can have beneficial (or harmful) impacts on its level of efficiency.  
 Besides that takeaway, there is also an explanation for why widespread 
production of supposedly “useless” material is actually critically important for 
governments. Agencies, legislatures, private sector researchers, and plenty of other actors 
are perpetually engaged in the process of evaluating and re-evaluating particular policy 
decisions and potential alternatives. Similarly, when something goes wrong or the 
unexpected hits, a quick turnaround with a backup plan may be imperative. As such, even 
if only a limited fraction of material such as reports, policy memos, or process 
documentation appears useful at a given moment, is critical to preserve ‘response 
optionality.’ For example, if a terrorist attack suddenly breaks out in Azerbaijan, you can 
bet that the ground reports and memos the State Department has been ‘uselessly’ 
 93 
 
producing for decades suddenly begin looking a lot less useless to decision makers that 
suddenly have an urgent need for that information.  
 The great quantity of information and data is also critical for government 
transparency and allowing citizens, investigators, and researchers to understand, evaluate, 
and especially criticize government actions. This type of clarity is an important check on 
the potential for corrupt officials, fraud, or abuses of power. Of course, there is nothing to 
say that the data collection we have now is optimal – certainly we would prefer that 
government agencies make faster transitions to digital production of materials rather than 
having departments like the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relying on paper or even 
video tape methods of holding recorded information. Nonetheless, particularly as citizens 
who have a vested interest in holding government accountable, we should not be so quick 
to dismiss the value of the vast materials produced by an administrative bureaucracy, 
even when its value may not be immediately apparent.  
 
Bureaucracies are rigid and stick to standard operating procedures (SOPs) even when 
they fail: 
 This is perhaps the second-most common argument made in favor of the belief 
that bureaucracies are inefficient. Academics such as Robert Merton and William Whyte 
Jr. hypothesize that the very environment of “bureaucracy,”27 where people are expected 
to conform to specific patters and rules and emphasize methodical focus on details affect 
                                                 
27
 This vision of bureaucracy as primarily rules-oriented is a particular conception that this paper does not 
consider inherently necessary. In chapters 2.1 and 3.2, the notion of reducing this phenomenon by reducing 
micromanagement by politicians is discussed more thoroughly.  
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bureaucrats down the their very psyche.
lxviii
 In their view, enough time spent in a 
bureaucracy is comparable to time spent in solitary confinement: you become so 
disoriented that you can no longer tell what is real, forgetting the end goals you are trying 
to achieve and substituting them with a hyperactive focus the rules designed to get you 
there.  
 While it certainly would not be difficult to a particular example or two to make 
this point, on average, the overreliance on SOPs is generally overstated across the great 
diversity of bureaucracies. In particular, this problem is most egregious in cases where 
legislatures have aggressively inserted themselves in order to micromanage the process. 
In his classic work Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 
(1989), James Wilson found that bureaucrats both frequently have some discretion over 
issues and that a whole host of factors affect how that discretion is used. 
When bureaucrats are free to choose a course of action their choices will reflect 
the full array of incentives operating on them: some will need to manage a 
workload; others will reflect the expectations of workplace peers and professional 
colleagues elsewhere; still others may reflect their own convictions.
lxix
 
This conclusion was made following a study of a large variety of bureaucracies; 
some good, some not; and found that in spite of frequently detailed and esoterically 
prescribed procedures, bureaucratic missions provided by legislatures are often unclear. 
For example, the mission of the State Department is to “[c]reate a more secure, 
democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the 
international community.” What that statement really means is anyone’s guess; but rest 
assured that if your boss gave you those instructions, you would probably be smartest to 
just resign then and there.  
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This lack of clear legislative direction for what the purpose and goals of an 
agency are actually helps explain the tendency towards reliance on SOPs that Merton and 
Whyte criticize. In situations where you do not know what your boss wants from you and 
all he/she has done is hand you a list of rules to follow, of course you are going to just 
start blindly following the rules.   
 
Bureaucracies are simply inefficient monopolies: 
 Let us now consider a more specific type of bureaucratic function. Rather than the 
broad set of all things bureaucrats might do (regulate, produce reports and analysis, etc.) 
let us specifically consider agencies that provide public services. This discussion begins 
with a premise that most of the political spectrum – from high liberals to libertarians to 
conservatives to economists
28
 – would generally agree: at a minimum, government’s role 
should include the provision of public goods or services where by producing it, one is 
unable to exclude free-riders from also using the service. Textbook examples include 
clean air and national defense. Where disagreements begin to arise is when the 
government provides more than that narrow set of goods. At that line, many argue that it 
is instead appropriate to privatize other services and leave them to the free market.  
 Of course, this disagreement is complicated by the fact that the line is irritatingly 
fuzzy.  There are a number of services (garbage, education, etc.) that are provided by 
both public governments and private companies. Conversely, even supposedly pure 
                                                 
28
 Economists have so many unique, odd, and often confounding policy proscriptions that it seems 
appropriate to provide them their own position on the political map.  
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public goods such as national defense regularly utilize private contractors. The questions 
then remain, what role in achieving government objectives should the private sector play 
and how might it serve as an alternative to publically run bureaucracy? While Chapter 2.1 
Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucracy considered the impacts of privatization from 
the more ethical perspective about its broader impact on democracy, this chapter 
considers the impact of these theories on efficiency when applied to government actions.   
 This debate is highly divisive among various political factions. As one author 
points out, “What [authors like Waldo] might call a well-run bureaucracy, Adam Smith 
and Milton Friedman might call a monopoly.”lxx Let us consider for the moment the basic 
assumptions that economists make when taking this perspective: 
1) All of the actors are rational (generally self-interested) 
2) Perfect competition 
a. In a normal market, there are many consumers (in this case, citizens who 
consume public services) and producers (actors providing the services) 
such that each side has lots of options from which to choose 
b. Consumers have good information about all of the choices available  
c. The fact that consumers can choose the ‘cheapest’ option forces producers 
into a bidding war that results in the lowest price possible 
d. Consumers have the ability for costless choice among their options (e.g. 
citizens are perfectly mobile and can easily move from one district to 
another in response to changes in policies that they do not like) 
3) Monopolies 
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a. Monopolies are inefficient and unresponsive because they have no 
particular self-interest not to be – there is no competitor to outbid them 
and the consumer has no alternative than to engage at the price set by the 
monopolist 
b. Particularly if one view bureaucrats as traditionally “rational” (self-
interested in some dimension – personal, professional, institutional, etc.), 
then the citizen consumers are likely to get a very bad deal 
On many dimensions, this case is quite compelling. It also implies a number of 
odd, but potentially effective suggestions for public policy. For example, even for issues 
where it seems impossible to effectively use a private company, even a generally 
decentralized series of jurisdictions may be preferable to a centralized bureaucracy 
presumably administered foremost at the federal level. The theory goes that consumers 
who have different preferences for everything from level and type of taxation to type of 
services provided could look at a large variety of options available to them and move to 
the district that matches their wants. This ‘competition’ would also force inefficient 
agencies in some districts to change their ways or face being deserted by the public.
lxxi
 In 
many ways, this system actually describes the setup of the U.S. as it exists now. Among 
the various states, state governments implement widely varying policies and even at the 
local level counties, cities, and districts implement a fully diverse range of policy options. 
It turns out that this hypothesis, seminally articulated by Charles Tiebout, 
produced an explosion of research “on the differences between polycentric (centralized, 
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single-jurisdiction) and monocentric (fragmented, multijurisdictional) [sic
29
] 
government.”lxxii While the research is inconclusive on whether a polycentric or 
monocentric model results in greater or fewer overall costs,
lxxiii
 a study by William 
Lyons, David Lowery, and Ruth DeHoog (1992) demonstrates fairly conclusively that, at 
minimum, some of the key assumptions relating to rationality and perfect competition 
that were just listed do not appear to hold true.  
First, the study found that the mobile consumers assumption (2.d) is fairly 
restricted and is probably unlikely to produce the kind of pressure the theory requires. 
While people from fragmented areas were slightly more likely to move than in 
consolidated ones, the statistical likelihood was still miniscule with an average of 2.66% 
chance of moving.
lxxiv
  
Second, the study found that not only is the complete information assumption 
(2.b) entirely invalid, fragmented districts made the problem worse! The study found that 
people in polycentric regions had very little idea what government services were 
available to them and that instead, “the residents in our consolidated-government sites 
were far better informed about their local government services than their fragmented-
government counterparts.”lxxv This outcome actually makes a lot of sense when you 
consider that it is much simpler to inform and explain to a public about a single service 
that is available to them through one department rather than a maze of services through a 
maze of departments or jurisdictions that one has to wade through to get what they want. 
This point alone is sufficient to functionally neutralize the theory – if people do not even 
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 The definitions for poly and monocentric are reversed. Monocentric = Single jurisdictional area; 
Polycentric = multijurisdictional areas) 
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really know what they are choosing how can we expect people to be responsive to 
changes in policy across decentralized actors?
30
 And if we believe that consumers are 
rational and self-interested, is it not then preferable to have centralized systems wherein 
long-term consistency is actually better for generating an informed electorate and thus 
public accountability? 
Moreover, as a more general third point, there is little evidence that bureaucrats 
perform their job with a ‘self-interested’ attitude that manifests in a manner that is 
consistent or measurable. Lacking that, the assignment of the government as a ‘rational 
producer’ is no longer viable and it is unclear that external ‘competitive’ pressures will 
have any significant impact in swaying policy decisions.  
Of course, it is impossible to side one way or another on the Tiebout hypothesis’ 
value lacking hard empirical evidence to affirm or rebut it. However, the response is 
sufficiently mixed that, for the time being, it does not present a deadly objection to 
centralized bureaucracy as we currently understand it.  
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 One might argue people do not consider this information from day-to-day but they do heavily consider it 
when moving – even if they may be moving for reasons such as jobs or family rather than over public 
policy. A study by Teske et al (1993) showed that information among movers was actually worse than that 
among non-movers – 24% accuracy by non-movers compared to 19% by movers. This held across all 
variables with the exception of income.  
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Section 3: Bureaucratic Organization 
 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential 
to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those 
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of 
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of 
faction, and of anarchy.  
– Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 69, March 14, 1788 
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Section Overview 
 Up to this point, we have considered very little that would be useful for practical 
application. While the previous Section was largely theoretical and defensive,
31
 this 
Section will begin covering a positive way forward. In particular, the purpose of this 
Section is to cover the ways that bureaucracies are structured and the lessons that can be 
learned on how best to organize bureaucratic systems. After all, despite the previous 
argument that bureaucracy is the least-bad form of administration, that point does little to 
convince people that bureaucracies are largely lean, clean, governing machines. With that 
in mind, it is important to consider and make recommendations on how to improve the 
efficiency and quality of bureaucratic branches rather than accept their current stereotype 
as dysfunctional and inoperative groups of “committees” that seem to perpetually spin 
useless gears.  
 The first chapter will cover the importance of specializing different bureaucratic 
divisions and along which dimensions to do so. The second chapter focuses on the 
importance of autonomy. This includes political independence for the whole bureaucratic 
system as well as appropriate levels of autonomy for a variety of actors throughout the 
system. Naturally, it also addresses issues of jurisdiction among competing branches and 
agencies. Finally, the third chapter includes lessons on how to improve the accountability 
of bureaucratic actors, the current role of parties engaged in oversight, and the incredibly 
damaging effects that improperly structured oversight can have on bureaucratic 
efficiency.  
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 It responded to arguments made by critics of bureaucracy and simply provided a justification for an 
expanded bureaucracy more than articulating a clear path forward.  
 102 
 
 
3.1 Specialization 
 
 Specialization lies at the heart of any social organization system. In the very first 
sentence of the famed Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith attributes the greatest 
improvability in worker productivity to the division of labor that allows individuals to 
specialize in skills of their comparative advantage. Just as the private sector reaps 
monumental gains from labor specialization, it would be reckless for any bureaucracy to 
do otherwise.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to stress the importance of bureaucratic 
specializations and illuminate agencies which manage to perform quite well (or poorly) 
as a result. There are also a number of dimensions on which specialization can be most 
effectively done: (in descending order of importance) type of expertise, level of risk, and 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, as has been discussed throughout this work, clarity of purpose 
and mission is crucial for performance of bureaucrats so that they may best understand 
their objectives. Finally, it is important to remember this lesson even in application to 
institutions that are already working. In particular, bureaucracies that are currently 
effective will not necessarily continue to be so if they are overburdened with tasks that 
violate any of the above conditions.  
 
The Role of Experts 
 The entirety of this paper has relied on the use of experts in making policy. The 
mantra emphasizes ‘experts making expert decisions.’ While the argument is likely self-
evident, it bears emphasizing here, lest the point be understated.  
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 Many of America’s most trusted and competent institutions are the ones most 
reliant on field experts, especially scientists and engineers. Bureaucracies that know the 
value of their experts and make them central to the decision-making process are prone to 
be considered more professional and meritocratic. The Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) for example highlights all of its higher level experts prominently on their 
website.
lxxvi
 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) similarly lists all of their 
experts with their particular specialty, department assignment, and contact 
information.
lxxvii
 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has an alternative approach 
that allows it to readily connect with academia and the private sector – the FDA has 
established connection with nearly every medical and health association in the U.S. 
whose members provide invaluable clinical advice and keep the agency up-to-date on the 
most recent scientific findings and theories.  
 As another example, the Army Corps of Engineers is a model for bureaucratic 
efficiency combining the discipline of the military with the expertise of engineering. The 
Corps is divided into both functional and regional subgroups with clearly delineated 
jurisdictions (see below),
lxxviii
 and requires an intensive amount of training under EM385-
1 guidelines.
lxxix
 The Corps is highly professional and some even maintain that the 
catastrophic devastation caused by hurricane Katrina was largely on account of local 
governments’ unwillingness to listen to the expert advice of the Army Corps of 
Engineers.
lxxx
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Division by Risk 
 Beyond specialization among employee talent/technical expertise, structural 
specialization is also critical. While it is often neglected by pundits, perhaps the second 
most important aspect of structural division within a bureaucracy is division by risk 
profile. Basically, some institutions such as the Department of Agriculture (DoA) cares 
far less about the security and scrutiny of particular pieces of information than, say, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This is natural, the CIA deals with far more sensitive 
information and situations than the DoA.  However, because of the limits on the flow of 
information, information and decision making is transmitted far more slowly at the CIA 
than other agencies.
32
  
 Aside from the fact that agriculture and international intelligence have nothing to 
do with each other, if the two agencies were put under the same roof, information speed 
would have to default to the lowest common denominator. The CIA could not afford to 
risk information slipping out; and so the DoA would have to unnecessarily adopt the 
same strict, but transmission retarding standards as the CIA. This deadweight loss can be 
a massive source of bureaucratic inefficiency if agencies are not separated according to 
their risk level.  
 Even within the CIA, this problem can arise. 90% of the CIA’s information is said 
to come from public sources and a significant portion of its staff dedicated to analyzing 
this non-sensitive information.
lxxxi
 However, because intelligence gathering is housed in 
the same department as other clandestine operations (and the wall between public source 
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 Alternatively, information could be pushed to move quicker in the event of an emergency, but far greater 
resources must be dedicated to accomplish this goal.  
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analysis and covert information analysis is insufficiently defined), this large amount of 
analysis done by the CIA that could be quickly accelerated to senior officials is instead 
stuck far longer at the lower levels, greatly reducing transmission speed.  
 Indeed, the 9/11 Commission found that this problem was, in part, a factor that 
contributed to the intelligence failures leading up to 9/11: 
[A]t least for the CIA, part of the burden in tackling terrorism arose from the 
background we have described: an organization […] institutionally averse to risk 
with its capacity for covert action atrophied, predisposed to restrict the 
distribution of information, having difficulty assimilating new types of personnel 
and accustomed to presenting descriptive reportage of the latest intelligence. The 
CIA, to put it another way, needed significant change in order to get maximum 
effect in counterterrorism.
lxxxii
 
In this situation, the CIA would greatly benefit from spinning off, or at least more 
stringently walling off, non-sensitive parts of its intelligence analysis apparatus.  
 Similarly, the relatively high-risk (stringent control) State Department was forced 
to assume control over the lower risk U.S. Information Agency (USIA) which was closed 
in 1999.
lxxxiii
 Since its formation in 1953, its mission had been one of “public diplomacy” 
– in short, its mission was to spread U.S. culture (arguably, low-level U.S. propaganda) to 
foreign countries and help clarify (read: positively spin) but not develop U.S. policy 
towards other nations.
lxxxiv
 Since the USIA was about promoting U.S. culture, it was 
much less concerned with intricacies such as wording of internal cables or press releases. 
As a result, it was able to rapidly conduct a variety of activities ranging from promotion 
of U.S. movies to hosting U.S. cultural events.  
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 During the consolidation, the USIA lost a significant number of characteristics 
that made it efficient and cost-effective as it adopted lengthier State Department 
protocols. Although the position of Director of USIA had direct connection and authority 
over the various geographic offices allowing information to flow quickly (little ‘analysis’ 
was needed) and responses to follow soon thereafter, the USIA had to soon rely on the 
various geographical bureaus housed within the State Department.
lxxxv
 Furthermore, 
while the former USIA had a stable source of funding that could be quickly deployed to a 
variety of projects, in the State Department, funding is now controlled by the functional 
bureau above the agency which has to decide whether to fund public diplomacy efforts 
among a number of other concerns - funding is not guaranteed to be available and 
requests for projects must be made on a regular basis. 
 These examples highlight the danger of an overreliance on grouping by ‘subject 
area.’ Insofar as an agency can be subdivided into even more specific roles and still find 
itself with a meaningful amount of work to do, it ought to be. Later we will discuss the 
harms of overburdening effective institutions but it is equally important to ensure that 
levels of risk, quality control, and speed of information/decision transmission, among 
other variables are compatible before joining institutions (or when deciding whether to 
split them).  
 
Jurisdiction and Clarity of Purpose 
 Clarity of jurisdiction and purpose are two more factors that are integral to 
efficient administration. Chapter 4.1 Information will discuss some of these effects 
specifically in regard to intra-agency operations but since further ‘specialization’ by 
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creation of new departments or division of old ones produces new bodies of bureaucrats, 
it is important to ensure that each of them has an equally clear purpose. Similarly, clear 
jurisdiction is essential to prevent various bureaucracies from fighting over authority or 
wasting resources trying to increase their jurisdiction if the boundary is unclear.  
 
The Department of Justice 
 The Department of Justice (DOJ) generally and Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) specifically both exhibit these qualities and demonstrate the advantage of 
jurisdictional specialization. What is remarkable is that despite the enormous scope of the 
Department, its overall mission is actually quite clear: 
To enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the 
law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide 
federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for 
those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration 
of justice for all Americans.
lxxxvi
 
Unlike the State Department’s mission mentioned in Chapter 2.3 Bureaucratic Efficiency 
& Centralization, the DOJ’s mission focuses specifically on crime and legal 
administration (specific to its functional jurisdiction) and even provides guidance on the 
sub-areas on which to focus. Moreover, organization of the Department of Justice 
continues to assign clear functional roles to each sub-department. Figure 3.1.1 shows the 
organizational structure of the DOJ.  
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Figure 3.1.1
lxxxvii
 
 
 A quick glance will show that the sub-departments of the DOJ are roughly 
organized into four further functional groups which are easy to keep track of: agencies 
related to community facing roles (civil rights, environment, community relations, etc.), a 
policy affairs group, an enforcement group (FBI, DEA, etc.), and an enforcement group 
that specifically handles issues that could involve national security elements (national 
security division, immigration review, etc.). The clear demarcation of these functions 
allows a department responsible for errors to be easily identified thus accelerating 
responsiveness and reducing the probability of repeated mistakes.  
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 Furthermore, even within the sub-groups, agencies retain their clarity of mission. 
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) assumes responsibilities specifically for 
controlled substance laws,
lxxxviii
 the tax division handles issues related to tax fraud, etc. 
The FBI also plays an important role in this arrangement. The FBI is tasked with the 
“authority to investigate all federal crime not assigned exclusively to another federal 
agency.”lxxxix In essence, the FBI plays the role of mopping up anything not covered by 
the other sub-departments. This is important as a miscellaneous case is not handed 
arbitrarily to sub-departments which do not specialize in the case and are ill-equipped to 
handle it. The remainder of the DOJ can remain specialized and not dilute their clear 
missions and expertise. A key lesson for specialization is to recognize that pre-meditated 
specialization cannot predict the unexpected; consequently, among a variety of 
specialized bodies, a highly professional generalist group is necessary to catch issues that 
would otherwise fall through the cracks.  
 There are even more factors that make the FBI a particularly good example of a 
highly efficient organization. J. Edgar Hoover was responsible for making a number of 
reforms that brought the FBI to the prominence it holds today.
xc
 These included “weeding 
out incompetent employees, stepping up requirements for special agents, and instituting 
regular inspections at Headquarters and in the field offices.”xci In effect, making the FBI 
into a professional, meritocratic civil service. Furthermore, the agency was tasked with 
long-term coordination projects that helped coordinate information between all law 
enforcement agencies including the national fingerprint database, “collecting 
comprehensive crime statistics,” and initiating formal training for law enforcement.xcii 
These are projects that may be inappropriate or would languish in other specialized 
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departments – directing the generalist branch to coordinate inter-specialization efforts is 
an efficient assignment of comparative advantage. Finally, despite being the ‘catch-all’ 
department of the DOJ, the FBI is remarkably well funded. In 2015, its $8.3 billion 
budget exceeded one-fifth of the entire DOJ budget.
xciii
 In essence, if a generalist team is 
meant to catch any stray issues not covered by other sub-agencies or if it is meant to run 
long-term programs, it is important that it is not neglected as a subsidiary consideration.  
 
The Commerce Department 
 On the other side of the coin, the Commerce Department is a prime example of 
the failure to institute clear mission, purpose and jurisdiction. While its purpose is 
nominally to promote U.S. business at home and abroad,
xciv
 the Commerce Department 
houses over 19 sub-agencies ranging from the National Weather Service to National 
Marine Fisheries to the Census Bureau.
xcv
 Notably, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration is also under the purview of the commerce department. That 
is correct, the administration largely responsible for monitoring and reporting on the 
potential impacts of climate change (in large part caused by business admissions) is under 
the jurisdiction of the department tasked to promote the interests of business.  
 Aside from the flagrant and disturbing conflict of interest, this hodgepodge 
collection of agencies clearly suffers from a lack of unifying purpose or specialization 
based on expertise. In fact, this problem has become so abundant that even Congress has 
been considering proposals for reformation – regrettably these proposals have been 
repeatedly made and ‘considered’ for decades.xcvi What is particularly odd is that there 
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seems to be little reason for this lack of specialization. As President Obama’s recent 
proposal for restructuring highlights, there are no less than five other independent U.S. 
federal agencies with varying tasks directed towards promoting U.S. business including 
the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade and 
Development Agency, and the Office of the Trade Representative.
xcvii
  
 The reason why such Congressional reformations have failed thus far could 
actually be predicted from the conclusions in Chapter 2.2 Efficiency vs. Politics – 
everything is political. In particular, congressional republicans oppose reorganization to 
centralize these economic bodies on ideological grounds that it would make the 
government agency too strong as it would closely resemble Japan’s highly centralized 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
xcviii
 While mentioned briefly in 
Chapter 5.2 Japan vs. China, up to the 1980s, MITI provided a central role in Japanese 
economic planning with highly respected bureaucrats working closely with leaders of 
major industries and it is often praised as being a well-administered bureaucracy that 
played a crucial role in Japan’s strong economic development.  
 Meanwhile, the Commerce Department continues to languish. It is a little known 
administration to the American public that is riddled with division in jurisdiction, 
purpose, and type of technical expertise. Its sub-agencies falter due to lack of clear 
coordination as the Patent and Trademark Office generates large backlogs of 
applications,
xcix
 oceans and fisheries faced rapid depletion without a response until 
confronted with intense public pressure,
c
 and the Census department relies on hopelessly 
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outdated technology.
ci
 Poor jurisdictional and objective clarity causes significant 
inefficiencies within/among bureaucratic branches.  
 
Overburdening: The Death of an Institution 
 Finally, while it may be easy to get caught up in some of the examples of properly 
structured bureaucracies, it would be dangerous to forget that bureaucracies cannot do 
everything. In particular, specialization requires that new tasks are not assigned to 
existing bureaucracies just because they are seen as ‘efficient’ – the fact that they are 
efficient at what they do now (and with the jurisdiction, clarity of purpose, etc. that they 
have now) does not mean that they will continue to be so when additional functions are 
added on. The most tragic story is obviously the aforementioned Commerce Department 
that became a figurative Christmas tree of bureaucratic sub-agencies. However, the 
Federal Reserve and State Department, while still generally respected, face these 
problems even now.  
 The Federal Reserve’s sense of purpose and available tools used to be fairly 
straightforward: through Open Market Operations, the Fed controlled interest rates and 
inflation to facilitate stable economic growth and, later, reduce unemployment. However, 
since its creation in 1913, the Federal Reserve’s role in supervising and regulating banks 
has exploded. Despite the various bank failures in 1971 demonstrating the Fed’s inability 
to properly regulate the banks that it was also in charge of supporting (recall that the 
regional Federal Reserve offices are quasi-private),
cii
 Congress continued to task the 
agency with greater supervisory responsibilities. As such, in 2008 the Federal Reserve 
was placed in the awkward situation of trying to simultaneously regulate the nation’s 
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largest financial institutions while also trying to keep them afloat to prevent massive 
systemic risk. The Federal Reserve faces both a conflict of interest and a potential 
inability
33
 to properly regulate financial institutions – this distraction only serves to 
undermine the credibility and efficacy of the Federal Reserve as it was once known.  
 As mentioned above, the State Department has had to manage the inclusion of 
external agencies such as USIA and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. While 
these agencies had sufficiently clear purposes and jurisdictions when they were 
independent (and could still coordinate closely with the State Department), they were 
functionally tacked onto the existing State Department Responsibilities. While, given the 
circumstances, the State Department has managed to do unusually well in managing what 
is otherwise a fairly unwieldy bureaucratic organization, its efficacy could be improved 
by further sub-division or outright separation of ‘non-core functions’ (see Chapter 4.2 
Implementation) in order to focus specifically on bilateral relationships and embassies 
with/in countries around the world.  
 
Conclusion 
 As discussed throughout this work, it goes without saying that experts are, by 
definition, the most qualified individuals to make decisions related to their field of 
expertise. An efficient bureaucracy will make sure to center these experts at the forefront 
of its policy making. Structurally, bureaucracies gain efficiency when their risk levels are 
commensurate with the information/situation they are handling and when their 
                                                 
33
 Due to the lack of centrality regulation plays in the Federal Reserve’s broader mandate, regulation 
becomes only one of many concerns the institution has to deal with.  
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jurisdiction and purpose is clear. However, one must be watchful of the potential to 
overburden an otherwise effective institution. While such actions may be intuitively 
compelling or politically convenient, the ultimate impact on administrative bureaucracies 
can be detrimental.  
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3.2 Autonomy 
 
 Central to the concept of a professional and capable civil service is the notion that 
policy decisions are made based on professional expertise, not political advantage. As we 
discussed in Chapter 2.1 Democracy, Representation, and Bureaucratic Capture, one of 
the most common reasons for bureaucratic failure is actually due to micromanagement 
from politicians that are acting for their personal political interests. As a consequence, a 
healthy bureaucracy requires a certain level of autonomy from its political controllers to 
insulate it from wild swings in the political climate that could coopt the bureaucracy or be 
detrimental to any long-term efforts.  
 
Political Independence 
 While there are many aspects that contribute to bureaucratic autonomy, perhaps 
the most central is independence from political controllers of the bureaucracy. In Chapter 
2.1, we assessed some of the concerns related to democratic capture. However, the 
inefficiency of political wrangling goes beyond that – stalemates based on ideological 
intransigence as well as competing regional interests create collective action problems 
that significantly delay critical policy making.  
 Admittedly, in some cases these issues can be overcome. Notably, they are 
overcome by Congress decidedly taking discretion out of their own hands to avoid the 
political competitions associated with policy micromanagement. For example, over the 
course of normal operations, the Defense Department realizes that some bases are no 
longer useful and ought to be shut down. Unfortunately, when they make these 
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recommendations to Congress, individual congressmen who have a base in their district 
obviously oppose such a decision and want to force the DoD to continue their operation. 
Even more frustratingly, representatives from other districts support such efforts as they 
are afraid that ‘their base could be next’ and prefer to side with keeping the unnecessary 
base open in the hope that others will return the favor.
ciii
 In order to resolve this problem, 
Congress passed the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 which forced itself to 
take an all-or-nothing approach to base closure.
civ
 Since congressmen in the abstract 
could agree that bases needed to be closed, the new procedures made it such that if the 
base closures recommended by the DoD were not unanimously rejected, the Department 
was empowered to unilaterally begin the closures.  
 This example highlights a perfect example of how, by legislative design, 
democratically elected representatives can still retain a say in decisions that they feel are 
particularly poor but leave the default prerogative to the agency which can best determine 
what they do or do not need. Regrettably, these examples are far rarer than we might like. 
Instead, it is probably easier to structure agencies that are more independent by design 
rather than Congress ‘self-policing’ on a case-by-case basis.  
 Many examples of the most trusted federal institutions in America
cv
 are also the 
most independent. Agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), tend to 
face little congressional micromanagement about their decisions or procedures and are 
simultaneously widely regarded for their expert/professional decisions and benefit from 
significant public approval – certainly more than our elected representatives.  
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 A great example of the advantages attendant with politically independent 
executive bureaucracies is the Federal Reserve. Compared to central banks of other 
countries, the Federal Reserve has unusually wide discretion for setting objectives and 
available tools including expanded Open Market Operations, more flexibility in interest 
rate determination, and the ability to autonomously set inflation targets. What is unique 
about this arrangement is that while central banks usually either have control over the 
goals they are meant to achieve or the means by which they can do so, the Federal 
Reserve is fairly unique insofar as it has fully autonomous authority to do both.
cvi
  
 Obviously, the Federal Reserve has a number of other components that make it a 
trusted institution. It hires experts with highly advanced degrees that are specialized in 
their field pursuant to the recommendations made in Chapter 3.1 Specialization. 
Nonetheless, experts suggest that the Fed’s value is derived even more from its political 
independence and ability to make difficult decisions than from its expertise.
cvii
 For 
example, elected officials responsible for fiscal policy have great incentives to inflate 
their way out of debt in the short-term. However, Federal Reserve policy ever since Paul 
Volcker’s tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman has successfully countered those pressures 
as rampant inflationary policy may destabilize the economic system and not be within the 
nation’s long-term interests.  
 In sum, bureaucracies that are granted political autonomy and are permitted to 
hire and make decisions based on experts to the field rather than political considerations 
are likely to generate decisions with greater long-term focus, public approval, and overall 
efficacy.  
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Bureaucratic Jurisprudence and Administrative Law 
 Having discussed bureaucratic autonomy from the perspective of legislatures, it is 
now time to consider bureaucratic autonomy from the courts. One may ask, “what do 
executive agencies and courts have in common and in what sense does bureaucracy need 
independence from the judiciary?” This question brings us to a discussion of 
administrative law.  
 Administrative law is the body of law that governs the activities of government 
agencies. Some agencies, particularly regulatory ones such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), are 
granted authority to make rules, adjudicate them, and enforce them. Over the course of 
this process, disputes arise either because the agency believes someone has violated a rule 
and the subject disagrees or because a subject of the regulation wishes the agency to 
reconsider the rule if there are broader impacts the policy did not originally intend for. 
When these cases arise, they are adjudicated by an administrative law judge (ALJ) who is 
typically an expert of the field being governed, the agency making the rules, and 
generally of law.cviii The ALJ’s role is comparable to that of a trial judge: they take oaths, 
administer testimony, collect and rule on evidence, and make a variety of factual 
determinations.cix 
 The role of these administrative legal proceedings varies across the globe. 
Administrative law in commonwealth countries such as Australia,cx the United 
Kingdom,cxi and Canadacxii (among others) tend to have specific procedures that describe 
the process for judicial review of administrative cases. In essence, one brings a dispute to 
the ALJ who adjudicates; and if one is unsatisfied with the result, they retain the right to 
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re-litigate the issue in front of the general court system (judicial review) on grounds that 
vary across country. While many of the described procedures mentioned for 
commonwealth countries in some ways limit the grounds on which issues can be re-
litigated, countries like the U.S. have very broad limitations which means that almost all 
negative decisions can be re-litigated.  
 In essence, an administrative bureaucracy whose experts are best equipped to 
assess the facts of a case and often best suited to interpret the regulatory rules that were 
issued (after all, the agency did issue the regulations themselves, best know what their 
purpose was, and have the most experience interpreting instructions to their agency from 
Congress) gets to hear the case first. But in countries with broad judicial review, parties, 
particularly corporations, who have decisions that are made against them, have the ability 
to functionally ‘hit the reset button’ and redo the trial34 in front of a judge who is 
probably not an expert in the particular subject matter.  
 This system has two significant negative effects. Firstly, as noted above, the 
ultimate decision about the policies is stripped from the bureaucratic experts who are best 
equipped to assess the facts and determine the criterion for ‘efficiency’ – they know what 
the regulation was supposed to accomplish and what the proper interpretation of the 
rule(s) are. Particularly for highly technical cases such as environmental or financial 
cases, evidence suggests that most judges are simply unqualified to handle these cases or 
even identify what evidence ought to be admissible.cxiii Secondly, the ability to restart the 
litigation process is highly inefficient. For one, it only decreases the chance that 
                                                 
34
 In fairness to the judicial review process, depending on the specific country’s restrictions, the type of 
arguments that can be heard may be limited. For example, one may not be able to re-litigate the facts of the 
case, merely whether the decision was made without bias, with regards to the ‘right’ criterion, etc.  
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regulations actually have deterrent effects by increasing the likelihood that a company 
can escape facing punishment as it only has to have the case decided in its favor in either 
of the two proceedings. For another, the same process is literally duplicated (but with 
worse quality). Given how backlogged the American court system already is,cxiv 
replicating this process is costly both monetarily and ethically.35 
 Of course, that is not to say there is no time that judicial review may be 
appropriate. The judiciary may be required to intervene in cases where the government 
may have greatly overstepped its bounds and may be responsible for a significant 
Constitutional violation. Similarly, a clear demonstration of political bias or conflict of 
interest may be worthy of reconsideration. In either case however, a reconception and 
radical narrowing of the grounds on which administrative law can be reviewed by general 
courts would both improve the quality of bureaucratic policymaking and the overall cost 
of the American court system.  
 While such a change might be radical from the perspective of American 
jurisprudence, such systems are not uncommon throughout the world and demonstrate the 
efficacy of such arrangements. Unlike in commonwealth countries, judicial review of 
administrative law in civil law countries tends to be far more restrained or even non-
existent. For example, French administrative law (the basis of a widely used doctrine 
called “Continental administrative law”) relies on a series of administrative courts for the 
majority of the process only allowing appeal at the last stage to the most senior “Council 
of State” in limited circumstances.cxv In classic fashion, Germany has a variety of systems 
                                                 
35
 Cases which may rely on far greater urgency are delayed which causes a variety of harms, particularly 
for poorer parties trying to get justice in the judicial system.  
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that is basically a whole bureaucracy of administrative law itself!cxvi Even more resistant 
to judicial review, Sweden’s system of administrative courts is entirely separate from the 
general court system.cxvii  
 These examples show that greater bureaucratic autonomy from the conventional 
judicial system is perfectly compatible both with protecting the rule of law and a healthy, 
modern state. Furthermore, they possess all of the advantages mentioned above including 
greater input of experts on regulatory policies and fewer wasted resources on duplicated 
litigation procedures.  
 So what is the status of administrative law in the U.S.? As mentioned earlier, the 
U.S. already has very few requirements relative to most of the modern world that limits 
what is eligible for judicial review. But if that were not bad enough, in a 2015 injunction 
in Charles Hill Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,cxviii  a federal judge 
functionally ruled that an administrative law proceeding was unconstitutional because the 
ALJ was not directly appointed/accountable to the President. Since ALJ’s are frequently 
expert bureaucrats/lawyers who are appointed by officers of an agency on an as-needed 
basis, their appointment is not typically done directly by the President or a senior official. 
While the implications of this case are unclear as it remains unresolved, it has the 
potential to greatly undermine the role of administrative law in the U.S.cxix 
 
Conclusion 
 While accountability of anyone in government is highly important (and discussed 
in the next Chapter 3.3 Accountability), for a professional civil service it is equally 
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important that expert bureaucrats are given sufficient freedom to make expert decisions. 
Whether agencies need greater political autonomy from politicians in the legislature, or 
the ability to enforce their own regulatory rules without the interference of an unqualified 
judiciary, bureaucratic actors need greater autonomy in order to make efficient, effective, 
and lasting policies.  
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3.3 Accountability 
 
 For most people, accountability has been the cornerstone of incentive driven 
behavior throughout the course of their life. Whether it was being discovered taking an 
extra cookie as a child, worrying about being found cheating on a test as a student, or 
your boss realizing that you are slacking at work, the notion of ‘being caught’ and held 
responsible for your decisions is what determines so many of our actions and, perhaps 
unfortunately, particularly our actions to do good. The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss ways in which bureaucratic accountability can be increased, thereby improving 
the quality of governance by bureaucracy.  
 
Minimizing the Unit of Responsibility 
 A fundamental premise to the notion of holding people accountable is that people 
responsible for a particular outcome can be identified and subsequently punished or 
rewarded. However, this task is significantly more difficult than one might think.  
 To showcase this difficulty, imagine you are a teacher of a very noisy classroom. 
In order to teach effectively, you need to get the class to quiet down. Unfortunately, every 
time you turn your back to write on the board, some students start whispering to each 
other. The more some people whisper, the more other people join in and as the noise level 
increases everyone speaks louder in order to be heard. Eventually this escalates into an 
unstoppable crescendo that you can never seem to prevent for long. You are convinced 
that if you can find an instigator, whoever is the first to start whispering, you can crack 
down on him/her and stop this whole chain of events.  
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 Unfortunately, you face a number of problems. First, the students only ever talk 
when your back is turned and when you look back at the class, the culprit could be 
anyone! It is possible that with enough effort you could identify the person responsible, 
but asking every student one-by-one who started talking until you had a definitive answer 
would require a lot of ‘resources’ and ultimately take more time away from teaching than 
just dealing with the noise. As if that were not bad enough, it may not even be the case 
that there is a single individual responsible. If there are multiple groups that all start the 
whispering at once, there is no single individual and it is impracticable to (a) identify the 
specific groups throughout the class, or (b) punish the entire class under the assumption 
that the people who are responsible will be included. If anything, that may make the 
problem worse as there is no deterrent effect – if everyone will be punished for some 
talking anyway, the students who were previously non-talkers may as well join in! 
 In many ways, this is similar to trying to hold bureaucrats responsible if their jobs 
are ‘undifferentiated’36. It is far too costly to identify a particular person responsible 
when someone goes wrong and frequently people’s responsibilities overlap and so it is 
impossible to find an individual responsible. In the world of economists, this is 
considered a type of classic principal-agent problem.  
 Indeed, beyond the world of bureaucracy, this setup explains why it is so difficult 
for voters to hold their elected representatives accountable for anything. To conceptualize 
this, consider two sets of divides: between the agent and what they are responsible for; 
                                                 
36
 Undifferentiated in this context merely means that what one individual is responsible for is 
undifferentiable from anyone else. Either other people equally share the responsibility or there is no metric 
to determine how much you contributed to the group effort.  
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and for each of these, are the agents/responsibilities diffuse or concentrated. This 
provides four possible situations as highlighted by Figure 3.3.1. 
Figure 1 
 
 The first example where there are a lot of actors responsible for one thing is the 
responsibility structure for undifferentiated bureaucracies. When something goes wrong, 
the problem is clearly identifiable. However, while we may be able to identify the 
collective group of people who were responsible (the State Department, the CIA, the 
Federal Reserve, etc.), identifying the particular bureaucrat who could have and should 
have been expected to stop, notice, or do something is very difficult. As it is hardly 
practicable to fire or punish a whole department, such situations often result in 
condemnations to ‘do better’ and a senior official resigning. For reasons we will see in 
situation three, this is an ineffective manner to incentivize senior officials and leaves 
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lower level officials without a strong incentive to expend effort to prevent such situations 
in the future.  
 The second example with lots of actors and a broad responsibility is comparable 
to the way we treat Congress. As it is the worst of the incentive structures, it should be 
unsurprising to us that citizens are so dissatisfied with Congressional performance. In this 
arrangement, two scenarios are possible.  
 Scenario #1 will be called the ‘midterm elections’ situation. Imagine a variety of 
things in the country are going badly, economic growth is poor, our foreign relations are 
souring, and people are generally dissatisfied. Congress is nominally responsible for all 
of these things. Furthermore, let us put aside the issue of being unable to identify actors – 
we can look at the voting record of all of the representatives. However, because every 
given representative voted on all of these things, their record is probably mixed. Maybe 
some representatives voted for a good stimulus package but voted against a key 
international treaty. How do we view these votes? Moreover, how do we evaluate their 
vote on an arcane change to the structure for the CIA that does not receive much media 
attention but may have consequences that are only evident years down the line? Do we 
keep them or vote them out of office? The answer seems unclear and seems (at least 
empirically) to result in us only voting out the people who explicitly voted poorly in all 
circumstances or blaming and voting out an entire party all at once. 
 On the flip side, we will call scenario #2 the ‘incumbent bias’ situation. Let us say 
that in this situation the broadness of responsibility is not a problem – the only problem 
for voters is the status of the economy. Unfortunately, the Congress is gridlocked about 
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the best way to improve the economy and is unable to pass any legislation. In spite of the 
problem being evident, who exactly is responsible for the gridlock is unclear – unlike the 
above scenario, inaction prevents us from identifying the particular legislators at fault. In 
this world, who do we vote out of office to punish? Putting aside the possibility that one 
party might be framed as more responsible than the other, the answer appears to be no 
one. As observed in Chapter 2.1 Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucratic Capture, 
despite unprecedentedly low voter approvals for Congress as a whole, the chance for 
reelection for incumbents in Congress is almost 100%! This outcome only makes sense in 
the context of being unable to figure out whom specifically to hold responsible.  
 In reality, these scenarios are occurring simultaneously. As a consequence, it is 
basically impossible to properly incentivize Congressional representatives to vote for any 
particular plan. Goodbye conventional notions of democratic accountability! 
 If you are inclined to think that this problem is solved by focusing all of our 
attention exclusively on the President and his/her administration, think again. This is the 
third example where one person is held to account for a great many responsibilities. The 
President prototypically embodies this role as the decision of whether to vote for him/her 
could be based on any infinite number of decisions they made, and even many things for 
which he/she was incapable of influencing. This is a poor incentive structure for two 
reasons: first, just like for Congress, how should we evaluate a President who makes 
some ‘good’ decisions and some ‘bad’ ones? Without clear metrics, a President merely 
has to guess at what the electorate thinks is more/less important than anything else. 
Second, because of this, voting a President out of office means very little – what was the 
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straw that broke the camel’s back? Because the reason for losing an election could be a 
result of any number of decisions they made, the incoming President has no better 
information for what the public would like him/her to prioritize.  
 All of these relationships can be seen in Figure 3.3.2, but we are with our fourth 
and final option: a concentrated actor responsible for a specific job/outcome. This is both 
the ideal structure for a bureaucracy and, because bureaucracies have the capacity to be 
structured in this way, why bureaucracies can be so efficient as governmening 
institutions.  
Figure 3.3.2 
 
 This structure is ideal because if something goes wrong, the person responsible is 
easily identifiable and can be punished. Knowledge both that they will be found out and 
of what specifically will trigger a negative (or positive) response is a strong incentive to 
behave in accordance to what is being incentivized. Of course, in order to have such a 
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structure and avoid the ‘undifferentiated’ bureaucracy, a couple of elements are key. 
First, a bureaucracy or incentive structure should avoid instances of shared jurisdiction of 
responsibility. If too many different people (or departments) are responsible, it will be too 
easy for anyone to point the finger at someone else when something goes wrong. If a job 
simply requires multiple people to be accomplished, assigning one person to be 
ultimately responsible for the outcome ensures that there is an actor with sufficient drive 
to closely monitor the task.  
Of course, this assignment of responsibility cannot be blindly carried up a chain 
of command – after all, the same problem still exists wherein many people are 
responsible for one thing and it is impossible to determine who is at fault. On a related 
note, if the number of people required to accomplish a task becomes prohibitively large 
(rather than a small group of people a single person can be responsible for), the 
recommendation above is inapplicable. To compensate for these problems, it is important 
at every point in the chain of command to have key ‘production goals’ that are 
measureable on an individual level.  
These measurable goals will vary from level to level. For example, analysts at the 
lowest level may be responsible for covering a number of specific issues (at the Federal 
Reserve it might be keeping tabs on a number of banks for solvency concerns, at the State 
Department, it might be generating any report relevant to Mongolian agriculture policy). 
This ‘jurisdiction’ (read: responsibility) is ultimately within the purview of the analyst 
and is thus subject to quality control – if the individual neglects to identify something 
crucial among the data, he/she is personally held responsible. Moving up a few levels, 
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middle managers are responsible for taking these reports and escalating issues to senior 
officials. A number of ways to control these transfers are discussed below but these 
individuals should be responsible for prioritizing the importance of these issues before 
advancing them to their boss. Over time, these managers should be evaluated on the basis 
of how their prediction of the appropriate priority of issues is ultimately reflected in 
reality.  
The vagueness here is an unfortunate necessity since what a person could be held 
responsible for varies vastly from organization to organization. However, in the abstract, 
properly structured and measurable objectives on the individual level can solve both of 
the issues mentioned above. Being assigned differently to individuals at every level of the 
bureaucracy both closely defines what a particular person should focus their attention on 
and disincentivizes slacking on the basis of shared responsibility. For situations where 
significant group collaboration is required, these standards can help evaluate the party or 
parties that are contributing least and thus hold them accountable. In a best case scenario, 
such an arrangement results in an ‘arms race’ of productivity as parties struggle never to 
be the lowest level contributor. 
 
Incentivizing Performance 
 This leads us to the controversial subject of performance incentivization. 
Currently, government institutions struggle to vary compensation among individuals that 
incentivizes harder work by rewarding good employees.
cxx
 From a macro perspective this 
creates two more problems. First, morale of existing employees is hurt if feel that they do 
not have the potential to be compensated for superior work to their colleagues (see 
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Chapter 4.2 Implementation for the impacts of this). Second, government is unable to hire 
the most talented workers as the most skilled are able to receive significantly greater 
compensation in the private sector in exchange for their superior skills and/or dedication. 
Ironically, if this situation gets bad enough, this ultimately results in government 
employees being overpaid – offering a ‘fixed’ salary, the government has to estimate the 
average productivity of their workers. As the hardest workers drop out, they may be 
replaced by lower quality workers whose labor is worth less than the previous ‘average’ 
salary.  
 Obviously, this situation is mitigated by the fact that not all people are driven by 
money. As such, for some people in many fields, employees are willing to take a pay cut 
in the attempt to perform their civic duty. Nonetheless, even on the margin the chance for 
improved pay for improved performance still creates positive incentives for more 
concentrated work if one can simultaneously perform their civic duty.  
 Of course, instituting such a policy is far easier said than done. Done incorrectly, 
such a policy could actually prove to be disastrous. If the type of outcome trying to be 
incentivized is misidentified, perverse incentives could cause bureaucrats to work to 
attain their goal by any means necessary; even if that means acting against the public 
interest and violating a civic ethic that might otherwise restrain a well-intentioned public 
servant. For example, in the late 1990s, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed 
performance standards based on metrics such as taxes collected or assessed. As a result, 
agents aggressively tried to assess taxes in inappropriate manners that resulted in 
Congressional inquiry and criticism.
cxxi
 As this shows, those looking to institute pay-for-
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performance reform should do so very carefully and with great consideration for whether 
a particular action is beneficial when increased in the extreme. 
 Another factor to avoid with regards to incentive schemes is tendency of 
incentives to produce groupthink. In particular, if individuals (especially career officials) 
only have the potential to be promoted within their organization, there are heavy 
pressures to conform to the views of the department as a whole, stifling independent 
thought outside the conventional assumptions used within the branch. This problem was 
found to be a particularly acute problem in the armed forces by a Blue Ribbon Panel on 
the Department of Defense commissioned by President Nixon: 
The fact that promotions are within the exclusive authority of an officer’s parent 
Service creates an incentive for an officer, even when they are serving on 
assignments with unified organizations, to adhere closely to the official Service 
position of his parent Service on issues in which he is involved. This circumstance 
can influence the objectivity of an officer’s performance.cxxii  
 One response that may be especially apt is discussed in Chapter 4.2; namely, 
ensure that various branches that have employees with common skill sets should make 
arrangements/career trajectories that permit fluid movement between the institutions. 
Thus, institutional groupthink will not result from (perceived) promotion ineligibility due 
to non-conformity. Beyond that, managers and executives simply ought to be wary of the 
tendency of departments to develop specific shared images that employees may come to 
adopt.
37
 
                                                 
37
 Equally concerning, these images may become so strong that attempts to make policies with a different 
may be resisted at an institutional level.  
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Having assessed a few of the potential problems with pay-for-performance and 
other such incentive systems, the question finally comes down to, how should incentive 
systems be designed? As a disclaimer, there are many ways to accomplish this and the 
methods recommended here are certainly not definitive. However, in addition to taking 
care to avoid the problems listed above, it is also important to consider who is put in 
charge of determining pay-for-performance and how that fits into the broader set of 
bureaucratic constraints that naturally limit the flexibility of a hierarchal structure.  
For example, while a direct supervisor might have the best information about a 
subordinate’s work ethic, work quality, timeliness, etc., putting entire control of 
performance evaluation (and thus in this system, compensation decision) in their hands 
could have negative disincentives for the worker. Research suggests that the desire to be 
promoted or earn financial incentives often discourages lower level analysts from 
providing their honest opinions, particularly if it requires reporting bad or embarrassing 
news.
cxxiii
 In particular, experts on the intelligence failures in Vietnam suggest that career 
officials in the State Department were unwilling to write candid criticisms of the Viet 
Cong following the significant blowback that analysts received simply for providing 
accurate assessments in similar reports on the poor state of Chinese nationalist forces 
during WWII.
cxxiv
  
This problem is expounded if promotion and/or pay decisions are the 
responsibility of one’s direct boss. When identifying news or voicing an opinion may 
reflect negatively on the department, middle level officials who may be held responsible 
will try to bury or positively spin such information. Unfortunately, it is often this 
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information that is most crucial to reach senior officials to avoid a massively escalating 
situation. However, if an analyst’s superior decides to suppress or re-frame these reports, 
that analyst will have little incentive to cause a fuss if it would upset their boss and result 
in negative performance evaluations. Indeed, as will be discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 4.1 Information, creating channels to ensure that time-sensitive information 
reaches senior officials is a critical component of efficient bureaucracy.  
A more explicit example of this problem is provided directly by a State 
Department task force report that found evidence for this incentive problem: 
Under the present system, the key factor in determining whether an officer will be 
promoted is the efficiency report written by his immediate supervisor. The 
knowledge that the good opinion of his supervisor is crucial in determining 
whether an officer advances at a normal rate or falls behind and is eventually 
selected out can act as a powerful deterrent to his forthright expression of views 
on policy matters which may be at variance with the views of his supervisor.
cxxv
 
Consider the following alternative ways decision-making advice or information 
could flow through the bureaucracy. Figure 3.3.3 highlights the ideal mechanism for 
these information transfers. In the diagram, gray circles represent ground level 
workers/analysts, green arrows represent good pieces of advice or information while red 
arrows show bad recommendations. In an ideal world, a manager is meant to prune out 
the bad ideas and pass along the good to the executive. Of course, if this was always 
possible, there would be no need for this paper. In the real world, identifying what 
information/advice is good or bad is a lot trickier than it seems, particularly ex ante. One 
may have to choose more risk-averse or risk-accepting structures depending on a 
particular division’s risk profile as discussed in Chapter 3.1 Specialization.   
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Figure 3.3.3 – Ideal Scenario 
 
Figures 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 show more realistic scenarios under the assumption that, 
without the benefit of hindsight, managers are incapable of perfectly identifying which 
information/recommendation will be important or irrelevant. Figure 3.3.4 shows a 
conservative scenario where managers only pass on recommendations that are 
unambiguously good. This type of manager would be best for a risk-averse bureaucratic 
branch such as the Food and Drug Administration. Conversely, Figure 3.3.5 shows a 
more aggressive scenario where managers err on the side of providing their boss with all 
the possible options on the table, even if some of them may be a bad idea. This type of 
manager would be best for a more risk-accepting branch that can afford to try lots of 
approaches to solve a problem such as the Department of Agriculture or the Federal 
Reserve.   
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Figure 3.3.4 – Conservative Scenario 
 
 
Figure 3.3.5 – Risk-accepting Scenario 
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 Returning to the issue of the ideal way to structure a bureaucracy, let us define a 
few variables. Firstly, there are three primary variables that affect the quality of a given 
structure, cost (C), speed of the advice/information (S), and the quality of the information 
(Q). As such, any ideal form of this type of bureaucratic structure will meet the 
conditions: 
max(𝑆, 𝑄) ; min(C) 
In a given situation, cost may be held as constant (e.g. there is a set budget constraint) 
which would allow for various solutions to the condition max(S,Q). With the definition 
of a few variables such as the number of workers per manager (n), how many managers 
need to review work before it is passed up to the next level (y), the number or 
organizational levels between the ground level and the executive (m), and the number of 
groups at the lowest level (?̅?), the solution set for max(S,Q); min(C) can be described as: 
𝑆 =  𝑚 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛(?̅?) + 1   𝑠. 𝑡. (𝑚 ≠ 0) 
𝐶 = 𝑦 (∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
) − (𝑦 − 1)(𝑛?̅? − 1) 
𝑄 𝛼 𝑚(
𝑦
𝑛
) 
The proofs and attendant assumptions for this model can be found in Appendix 1.1. In a 
world in which C can be assumed to be constant, any bureaucratic organization that 
meets the solution conditions for the variables of speed and quality can be considered to 
be the most effective form of structural bureaucratic organization in terms of passage of 
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recommendations/information in compatibility with measurable performance metrics 
described above.  
 However, for those of us non-economists in the room, let us consider what these 
conditions would actual mean and look like in some real-world examples. First, consider 
an example of a situation that has a number of advantages but does not quite meet these 
conditions. In Figure 3.3.6, we see an example where each group of workers is assigned 
two managers who have to review work before passing it up instead of just one. For ideas 
that are obviously good, both managers support the decision and it is advanced in green. 
Similarly, particularly bad ideas are eliminated by both reviewers. The difference is for 
the ideas on the margin – moderately bad recommendations that look like they could be 
good or good advice that are not so overwhelmingly positive that there is some hesitation 
about passing them on. In this situation, the recommendation is approved by one reviewer 
and rejected by another. The option is still passed onto senior management but with a 
note that it was only supported by one reviewer and thus should only be considered as a 
last resort after exhausting the clearly good options. This improved ranking of 
recommendations (along with increasing the total number passed along to the executive 
to choose from) has significant improvements in information quality (Q).
38
  
 This system is also significantly advantageous for avoiding discouraging honest 
assessments from low level workers. If an analyst submits a report that may be in the 
interest of one manager to hide/re-contextualize, the analyst is not faced with the moral 
dilemma of causing ripples by pushing for the report to be advanced. Instead, the second 
                                                 
38
 The primary increase in Q is a result in the change in the variable y by adding a second management 
reviewer.  
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manager (whose pay/performance evaluation is not controlled by manager #1) still retains 
the ability to advance the report over the objections of the first manager – they become 
responsible and are politically capable of advancing such information.  
 While this structure may work very well for small departments or chains of 
command, this unfortunately is unsustainable on a large scale. Note that this requires a 
second person for every existing person at any level of the organization except the very 
bottom. The effect is to almost double the cost of the bureaucracy as can be seen in the 
equation for C. Therefore, while information quality may be maximized, cost is not 
simultaneously minimized thus disqualifying this structure from being ideal for large 
bureaucracies.  
 
  
 
Figure 3.3.6 – The “Double Check” Structure 
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 Alternatively, let us consider an arrangement that may meet all of the necessary 
conditions. This structure which will be termed the ‘faculty advisor’ model is diagramed in 
Figure 3.3.7. In this model, we return to the original structure with only one manager per group 
of workers. However, instead of assuming that workers are confined to one path for workflow, 
each analyst is assigned a manager outside his/her formal chain of command. Much like a faculty 
advisor at a college, this relationship is formally informal and the second manager is someone 
from whom the analyst can seek advice and mentorship from without having to ask ‘stupid 
questions’ in front of his/her direct colleagues.  
 The structure has a unique solution to the ‘angry boss’ problem for pay-for-performance 
incentives. When an analyst makes a recommendation that his/her supervisor rejects (or that the 
analyst knows the supervisor will not like), they can then turn to their ‘advisor’ manager. On the 
analyst’s behalf, they can give the work a second opinion and independently advance the 
information without the analyst having to personally fight with their direct supervisor/potential 
paycheck controller. Note that there are also key incentives to avoid abusing this system: an 
analyst has to stick their reputation on the belief that this information is sufficiently important to 
advance through abnormal channels. Overusing this system will result in the advisor/manager no 
longer facilitating these advancements and the analyst losing credibility in the eyes of their 
advisor and, if the situation becomes egregious enough for the primary manager to find out, in 
the eyes of their own team.  
 Having resolved the compensation incentive problem, we can now test this system 
against the efficiency calculation. Indeed, we can see that by reducing the number of total 
managers needed at every given level, cost (C) has been notably minimized. Further, assuming 
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that the amount of work to be done and analysts needed to process it (n?̅?) is exogenous and 
constant, C cannot be further minimized without outsized multiplier impacts on speed and/or 
quality. Consequently, the only decision left is a situational judgment of offsetting S and Q based 
on the number of management levels one chooses which will be determined by data that is not 
directly available in this hypothetical.  
 As mentioned before, this need not be the only optimal design, but simply one example 
of many that could fit the relevant production function. The important lesson to take away is that 
properly incentivizing performance is an important step for any bureaucracy; but doing so can be 
tricky and may require considering a lot of factors to ensure that it is done properly.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.7 – “Faculty Advisor” Structure 
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Reviewing Past Decisions 
 Finally, bureaucratic accountability can be improved by formally including 
structures that force organizations to review the effectiveness of their previous decisions. 
In the words of Italian philosopher George Santayana, “those who cannot remember the 
past are condemned to repeat it.”cxxvi While this might be a principle that a majority of 
people might consider self-evident, it is surprising how rarely it is implemented.  
 A perfect example for this lesson is the Federal Reserve. While the Federal 
Reserve tends to admit mistakes that it made long ago, it tends to be far more defensive 
about decisions made in the recent past.
cxxvii
 Furthermore, there is no formal, built-in 
metric that forces the Fed the reconsider the effectiveness of its policies on an ongoing 
basis. This is a consequence that is seen in the non-responsiveness of certain policies. For 
example, the Federal Reserve is responsible for setting and aiming for a variety of 
economic targets such as inflation or the prime interest rates. Frequently, the Federal 
Reserve will set a goal and pursue policies to reach the target. Unfortunately, with more 
than ideal frequency, the Fed policies fail to meet this target (recently, this trend is 
prototypical of the Federal Reserve’s inflation policies). Instead of immediately 
reconsidering the policy tool being used to meet the target, the goal itself is merely 
revised downwards to make it closer to the reality that occurred.
cxxviii
 In spite of this 
revision, the policy tool has not actually effected any change yet continues to be used for 
some time until its repeated failure forces the Fed to reconsider its action plan, far later 
than it should have taken to reevaluate the policy.  
 This is certainly not a situation unique to the Federal Reserve. Failure to formally 
review historical results can occur as a result of the apparent urgency of new issues that 
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require response, overwhelming the perceived importance of a retrospective analysis. 
Alternatively, if individual actors feel like they have ‘learned their lesson,’ they may not 
formally document what to avoid or pursue which cannot then be passed onto other 
members of a department or to the agent’s successor when he/she retires or accepts 
another job. Because of these tendencies, formal evaluation procedures are necessary 
both to consider the effectiveness of ongoing policies at an institutional level and to force 
individual officials throughout the bureaucracy to internally reevaluate the validity of 
their ‘rules of thumb’ or shared images that commonly guide their day-to-day decision 
making. Such procedures should improve the responsiveness of bureaucracies to failing 
policies and long-term quality of policy decisions.  
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Section 4: Bureaucratic Management 
 
“Good government only happens when the people working in it do their jobs, and do 
them well.”  
– Matthew Lesko  
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Section Overview 
Having covered the theoretical and philosophical justifications for an expanded 
bureaucratic state as well as the best practices for structuring a bureaucracy in order to 
maximize its efficiency as a governing organization, we are now faced with the question 
of, “now what do we do with it?” Only the most naïve and socially removed theorist 
would attempt to argue that any organization simply follows its structural procedures 
without any regard to the people who operate within it. Everything an organization does 
it only does because of choices made by people – managers, middlemen, or workers on 
the ground. The very purpose of government or any socially constructed institution is to 
help coordinate this far flung group of individuals; to figure out a way to overcome 
collective action problems and get hundreds or thousands of competing perspectives and 
opinions on the same page. As such, to ignore the role of human incentives and choices in 
an analysis of these institutions would be dangerous and absurd in the extreme.  
The purpose of this Section is to consider the impact that individuals have in the 
overall structure of a bureaucracy and provide advice to a ‘manager’ (President, CEO, 
etc.) on how best to oversee such an enterprise. As necessary background information to 
understand how to consider individual impact, a brief explanation of types of people to 
hire for certain positions is useful. The first chapter will address concerns relating to the 
flow of information in an organization – how to handle the tension between preferring 
speed or quality of information that reaches top management, how to extract information 
that subordinates are attempting to hide or that low-level workers do not realize is 
important, and how to strategically share information with other key players in order to 
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overcome divided or opposing efforts from subordinates. Once the executive or manager 
has received the information they need to make a decision, the second chapter helps 
explain how to actually implement that decision. This second chapter handles issues such 
as what types of people to hire for certain positions and the importance of maintaining 
morale in order to guarantee effective work from bureaucrats. Finally, the third chapter 
combines the lessons of the previous chapters to discuss how a new manager can 
overcome the problems associated with instituting new policies or reforms.  
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4.1 Information 
 The role of any manager of an organization can functionally be split into three 
purposes: (1) gathering information for subordinates relevant to making a decision, (2) 
making the decision, and (3) getting the organization to implement that decision. This 
chapter focuses on the first of these goals.  
 While there are a number of structural issues that determine how information is 
passed (who is allowed or required to see something), the first issue we will discuss is the 
role of individual incentives and how a particular person can modify the information that 
ultimately flows from themselves to another. Obviously, this analysis requires a fairly 
robust understanding of how different people act and react based on their personal 
experience, prerogatives, and interests and what effect that is likely to have on 
information. While a more robust breakdown of these interests in covered in the next 
Chapter 4.2 Implementation, for now it is sufficient to understand that career officials 
who have spent a long time with an organization often view themselves as more qualified 
than their (often newer) managers – whether elected officials in government or 
middlemen employees with a new CEO. As President Truman noted in his memoirs: 
The difficulty with many career officials in the government is that they regard 
themselves as the men who really make policy and run the government. They look 
upon the elected officials as just temporary occupants. […] Too often career 
people seek to impose their own views instead of carrying out the established 
policy of the administration. Sometimes they achieve this by influencing the key 
people appointed by the President to achieve this by influencing the key people 
appointed by the President to put his policies into operation.
cxxix
 
 As we discussed in Chapter 2.1 Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucracy, from 
a democratic perspective, this attitude may be potentially problematic. While for all of 
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the reasons discussed previously, the relative negative impact on democracy is negligible 
and may have positive effects by increasing the consistency of government policies, such 
arguments are little comfort to a President who is considering a change away from ‘the 
way things have always been done.’  
 According to Morton Halperin & Priscilla Clapp, there are three primary reasons 
why an executive may find difficulty in translating their will into implemented policy: 
1. Officials may not know what senior officials really want 
2. Officials may be unable to do what they think they are being assigned 
3. Officials may resist what they have been instructed to docxxx 
All of these problems are certainly worthy of addressing for anyone concerned 
about improving the quality of administration. The second of the points ultimately cannot 
be helped – if one is unable to do what they are tasked (given a set allocation of 
resources), no amount of structural quality is going to consistently enable individuals to 
be better equipped to handle all situations. The third issue of officials resisting 
instructions is covered in detail in the next two chapters. This section deals with the first: 
how can senior officials better understand the issues at hand and communicate solutions 
back to the lower levels in ways that the people on the ground will comprehend.  
 
Information Movement: Quality & Speed 
 One of the most insidious issues regarding inefficiency in information 
transmission is fundamentally structural. Ultimately, any structure has to choose whether 
it is more important for its top officials to see information quickly, or see information that 
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is good. For an empirical quantification of this problem, refer to the bureaucratic 
structuring parameters described in the last chapter (3.3 Accountability).  
 To understand this more intuitively, consider two different organizational 
approaches. Imagine you are the President of the United States and you have to decide 
whether to execute a drone strike on a suspected terrorist and you can select two different 
methods of gathering intelligence. Your first option is that a single source on the ground 
tells you that the individual you see from your satellites is indeed the target you suspect. 
There is no time to corroborate this source with other people, make sure the facts of the 
story line up, or have intelligence analysts assess the credibility of this testimony. 
Furthermore, you may suspect that this source is only telling you what you want to hear 
in order to earn some reward money. If you are wrong, you risk killing civilians and 
inviting international backlash. Your second option is to submit this testimony to intense 
scrutiny and analysis. You will find lots of corroboration and all of the experts will be 
able to confirm without serious question whether the person is the target you intend. 
However, this analysis naturally requires far more time to confirm and it is highly likely 
that the target will no longer be in range by the time you get this information. Which 
system would you prefer? What is the appropriate level of compromise between these 
extremes? 
 In order to answer these questions, let us consider some of the ways that 
information quality and speed can be improved. One of the biggest problems that affect 
the quality of information that is passed on is that the underlings who choose which 
information to advance to their boss rarely see their boss’ problems.cxxxi Halperin & 
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Clapp explain in more detail the way this issue compounds across entire organizations 
such as the U.S. government:  
Few officials see the president at all. Even fewer see him often enough to have a 
good feel for his approach to problem solving. Many of those who have to 
implement decisions are not privy to conversations between the president and his 
principal advisers or between those advisers and their subordinates. The orders 
that they receive, in writing or orally, are not only very general but often are the 
only clues they have.
cxxxii
  
 It is important to note from this insight that there are a number of ways that 
information is permuted as it spreads through an organization – even if all participants are 
well intentioned  
 Not sufficiently understanding what the information will be used for, subordinates 
may pass up information that is irrelevant to the executive’s concerns and miss 
some small but key pieces of relevant information 
 Due to time constraints, principal advisers do not have a sufficiently clear 
understanding of what the executive wants to achieve 
 End users of information may have a similar problem as above (unclear 
instructions) but also lack explanation of the reasoning that went into such 
decisions and therefore are unclear in what direction to err in instances where 
their discretion is required 
Lacking an understanding of the nuance behind decisions critically damages the 
ability of policy implementers to properly conform to the policies requested by the 
executive(s). Back in 1957, American diplomat George Kennan explained the implication 
of this phenomenon on foreign policy noting that, “policies can be correctly and 
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effectively implemented only by people who understand the entire philosophy and world 
of thought of the person or persons who took the original decision.”cxxxiii While Kennan 
goes on to describe the frequency with which this communication fails to happen, the 
issue has arguably gotten even worse in the half-century since he originally made the 
observation.
cxxxiv
  
This deterioration is regrettable as it is actually one of the lowest cost ways that 
information quality can be improved both up and down the chain of command. Managers 
spending marginally more time explaining the objectives they hope to accomplish and the 
reasoning that they are pursuing a particular strategy can greatly improve performance at 
all levels of their organization. As noted above, this can improve information quality that 
managers receive as well as the use of information and instructions that are passed back 
down. The caveat of course is that general platitudes about the organization’s “mission” 
are no more helpful than meaninglessly vague statements by politicians committing to 
“security” or “justice.” Instructions must be both clear and specific in such a way that 
they pertain to a particular kind of behavior implementers can practice.
39cxxxv
 
Nonetheless, with a bit of practice, it is an ultimately time efficient method of improving 
organizational efficiency.  
Having covered an example of improving information quality, let us now examine 
a manner of improving information speed. Throughout most organizations, individuals 
often have the ability to affect the speed at which information is advanced based on 
                                                 
39
 In many ways, this is arguably one of the things that makes Warren Buffet such a renowned manager. 
Rather than vague statements about commitment to “profits,” “client service,” or “value-add,” annual 
letters regularly specify ethical expectations that managers are expected to observe, instances where 
managers ought to use discretion as opposed to escalating an issue, and when make a variety of financial 
decisions  
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which channel they choose to send it through.
cxxxvi
 While this ability does have the 
potential to create problems when individuals wish to bury information by sending it 
through slow channels, this issue will be addressed in more depth over the next two 
chapters. Nonetheless, having departments be able to signal new and urgent information 
or even institutional priorities is critical knowledge that executives require.  
One good example of this type of channel is military assistants that the armed 
services regularly keeps stationed at the White House in order to pass information to the 
President. Secretary of State Dean Acheson details one of these instances when naval 
assistance directly brought information to the President before a meeting with the British 
Prime and Foreign Ministers: 
After dinner the President and Prime Minister withdrew to the aft saloon while the 
table was being cleared, in a few minutes sending for [the Foreign Secretary] and me. 
The President opened by a complaint that I instantly recognized as coming from a 
persistent and infuriating practice of the Navy. Through his naval aide the President 
would be given what was known in the trade as “raw intelligence,” reports not 
analyzed and appraised in accordance with required procedure.”cxxxvii 
 Of course, this method obviously has its costs in terms of information quality, 
having surpassed all of the typical channels that typically analyze whether certain data is 
significant. In this particular example, “[w]hen fully analyzed and put together with other 
data, […] this Navy bombshell amounted to very little.”cxxxviii While this method is likely 
to generate plenty of ‘false positives’ in identifying issues of concern, it may be useful to 
offset the tendency of a slower moving, fact-checking bureaucracy to generate implicit 
‘false negatives’ that occur through the weeding out process or an expiration of 
timeliness and thus relevance of information. Even in instances that turn out to yield 
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nothing, increasing executive attention on an issue that has dramatic escalation potential 
can result in significant, preventative actions.  
 The key lesson to be learned is to employ both a large bureaucracy meant to 
methodically process the majority of day-to-day information and issues while permitting 
some intentionally constructed channels to permit immediate escalation of issues on an as 
needed basis. This is preferable to a ‘middle ground’ or compromise approach which is 
likely to neither be fast enough to respond to the most urgent of crises or comprehensive 
enough to handle the most complicated of issues. Given that crises tend to come in the 
form of either (or sometimes both) extremes, the cost of being unable to effectively 
respond in either scenario would be detrimental to most organizations – especially if the 
stakes are such that missing even one proper response is catastrophic for credibility or 
continued operation.  
 However, for managers who elect to utilize this approach, there are a number of 
other factors that are critical to keep in mind. One, recognize that information being sent 
through fast-track channels is often unfiltered and therefore not immediately actionable. 
Such information must be subjected to further scrutiny – the advantage being that your 
renewed focus on the issue is likely to expedite the analysis process on the issue.  
Two, recognize that fast-tracked information may not reflect a generally urgent 
issue and instead an institutional priority from a particular division. While some may be 
inclined to write-off such attempts to ‘subvert’ the process, such signals can be valuable 
for understanding relations and differing priorities between various sub-level branches 
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which can be used to analyze how they will respond to policy changes you wish to make 
(see chapters 4.2 and 4.3).  
Three, in order to maximize your time, it is important that the number of these 
channels is limited to prevent their perpetual use by underlings to grab your attention. 
Having everything being advanced quickly is as good as nothing being advanced as none 
of the critical weeding out process can occur. Unless you think you can replicate the work 
of the tens, hundreds, or thousands worth of people’s work that is required to weed out 
irrelevant information before it gets to you through the normal procedure, reviewing all 
information is simply not an option. What then is the best way to ensure that channels are 
used judiciously? Ensure that control over them is shared by a number of people, perhaps 
a variety of sub-managers in a particular division. Competition between the controllers of 
the channel will push them to only use the channel in particularly important instances in 
order to avoid diluting the impact of ‘fast-tracking’ information when the next manager 
has something they wish to advance.  
 
Reducing/Widening the Circle 
 Aside from the structural issue of speed vs. quality of information flow, an 
effective manager also needs to be able to understand the variety of interests that go into 
information that they are presented with in order to understand the attendant biases. 
While this perspective has a distinctive flavor of realist cynicism, executives (government 
officials in particular) “find […] that the real test of their ability is to expand their own 
information, because they learn that the information being provided to them by 
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subordinates is designed not so much to enlighten them as to convince them to adopt 
certain positions.”cxxxix  
 Since subordinates want to look good in the eyes of their boss, they frequently 
only show information that supports their position or that they think their superior wants 
to hear. One example comes from the U.S. ambassador to NATO in the 1960s, Harlan 
Cleveland, who details how information can be selectively presented in the example of 
armed services divisions making requests for greater levels of funding and soldiers: 
Sober and honest officers […] will describe the Warsaw Pact “threat” to the 
central front as more than a million men, against perhaps three-quarters of a 
million for NATO without reminding you of the War College dictum that the 
attacker needs two or three times as many men as the defender. […] They will 
speak of NATO manpower without explaining that the Western allies have 
committed to NATO varying proportions of their men under arms; some of those 
armed but uncommitted men, ranging from one-fifth to four-fifths of national 
totals, would surely be available in a real pinch.”cxl 
It is clear that ground level operators need not lie in order to mis-contextualize 
information in a way that favors their aimed objective. A similar phenomenon occurred in 
the justification for the Iraq War. The Bush administration pushed for a particular set of 
fact patterns in Iraq to be analyzed regarding links to Al Qaeda or WMDs. While the 
original sets of the reports yielded nothing, continued pressure to look specifically at Iraq 
began to bias the intelligence scope and thus generate ever more desperate pieces of 
‘concerning intelligence’ in the hopes of finding what senior administration officials 
wanted.  
 To make matters worse, beyond the individual incentives to ‘look good’ that 
generate selective information sharing, branches that find themselves in competition with 
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each other for disputed jurisdiction over their purpose or authority can institutionally hurt 
how information is reported to higher level managers. A clear example of this is the 
intelligence failure in Vietnam which systematically damaged assessment of conditions 
on the ground: 
According to a former Air Force intelligence officer, both the Air Force and the 
navy exaggerated the effectiveness of their bombing of North Vietnam. Both 
recognized that the postwar dispute over the Navy’s bombing role would be 
affected by evaluation of their bombing operations in Vietnam. Each service, 
believing (or fearing) that the other would exaggerate, decided to emphasize the 
positive in order to protect its position.
cxli
 
Highlighting this lesson of information bias is critical for Presidents as it often 
takes a fair amount in time in office before the lesson is typically learned. LBJ did not 
realize until 1965 that optimistic outlooks being projected for Vietnam were basically 
worthless.
cxlii
 It took President Kennedy more than a year into office until he made this 
realization saying, “Winston Churchill once said that the secret of the survival of the 
British Empire was that they never trusted the judgment of the man on the spot. I never 
understood that until recently.”cxliii Given the amount of time that it takes (read: is 
wasted) before many executives learn this lesson from experience, it is particularly 
important to avoid the problem preemptively. But what exactly can one do in response to 
this unfortunate reality? 
The next chapter 4.2 specifically discusses how these problems ought to inform 
hiring decisions in order to address some of these issues preemptively. However, for 
executives at the highest levels facing this problem prospectively, communicating 
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bilaterally or establishing small core meetings (sometimes informally
40
) may allow more 
upfront and honest discussions among senior officials. Brent Scowcroft, National 
Security Council (NSC) Adviser during the first Bush administration retells of an 
example of how this approach was used effectively: 
It was becoming apparent to me that a full-blown NSC gathering was not always 
the place for a no-holds-barred discussion among the President’s top advisors. 
Some might be inhibited from expressing themselves frankly with staff present 
and the constant possibility of leaks. I suggested that [an] opening session take 
place informally, in the Oval Office and with only a select group present […] The 
President liked the suggestion, and it worked. This marked the beginning of a new 
pattern for top-level meetings (the “core group”) during the rest of the 
Administration.
cxliv
 
This method of reducing the number of people involved in a certain conversation, advice 
giving session, or decision making process is known as ‘reducing the circle.’ While this 
tactic can be highly effective when gathering clear and honest information,
41
 it is a bad 
method of translating information and instructions back to subordinates. For the reasons 
discussed previously about low-level implementers being able to understand the 
reasoning for their boss’ decision, reducing the number of people who have access to 
understanding information about a new policy decision can have catastrophic 
consequences on its implementation.  
 Reducing the circle can be achieved in a number of ways. A manager may 
structurally create some meetings to which certain individuals are not invited. He/she 
may personally entreat senior officials to avoid sharing information with other officials 
                                                 
40
 In a government context, this may require holding meetings outside of formal procedures 
41
 Note that institutional biases that affect how individuals choose to present information still exist. 
Understanding the direction of these biases and being able to mentally correct for them or push harder on 
particularly convenient conclusions is the critical hallmark of an effective manager. 
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on the basis that sensitive information may be leaked. Finally, he/she can personally and 
implicitly pressure particular senior officials to voluntarily stay out of the decision 
making process if it can be portrayed as outside of their institutional expertise. This is an 
advantage that becomes even more pronounced following the recommendations made in 
Chapter 3.1 Specialization. If officials feel that they are being consulted heavily when 
issues are viewed as primarily within their area of expertise, they can be persuaded to 
exert less pressure on issues outside of their area if that may be seen as diluting that 
expertise. An account of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles demonstrates this 
phenomenon particularly well: 
Dulles saw himself as Eisenhower’s exclusive advisor on foreign policy and went 
to great lengths to protect this position. But the consequence of this was that the 
more an issue moved away from the center of foreign policy, the more carefully 
Dulles would pick his ground before asserting himself with the President. Dulles 
was very conscious of Ike’s military background […] and on economic matters he 
watched what Humphrey would do first. He also thought it was hazardous to 
guess what Congress wanted.
cxlv
 
 Of course, some of these measures to reduce the circle are less necessary if 
disagreements between divisions are already apparent and the likelihood of biased 
information being presented unchecked is significantly reduced. In fact, in instances 
where a subordinate is more likely to benefit from a reduced circle strategy,
42
 widening 
the circle on the basis that it is important for the adviser to hear multiple perspectives or 
external opinions not beholden to particular bureaucratic interests may be in order. This is 
a common reason why corporate executives frequently rely on consulting firms to advise 
                                                 
42
 Namely, situations where the executive has a less clearly informed opinion on the matter, does not yet 
understand the institutional interests, or knows what he/she wants to do and is also competing with a senior 
official with a different opinion who has the ability to bring enough pressure on the executive to make it 
highly costly in terms of political capital to make a contrary decision.  
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on everything from executive compensation to operational procedures when they are 
finding internal resistance to a decision they wish to make. This issue of when it is 
appropriate to widening the circle brings us to the discussion of the adversarial vs. 
consensus advisement process.  
 
Adversary vs. Consensus 
 Having discussed a variety of ways that an effective executive can control and 
improve the quality of information flow both for the purposes of learning and 
implementing his/her will based on deciding who sits in “the circle,” it is necessary to 
consider a particular subsidiary version of this approach. In terms of the metaphor, this 
argument relates less to who sits in the circle and more about how people move within the 
circle.  
 To be specific, let us remember that your job as a manager (given the lessons 
above) is to maximize the quality of information coming to you, including by being able 
to rid, or at least see past, the biases of subordinates. Simultaneously, as a manager your 
time is also both limited and precious and so speed is of the essence. What is the best 
arrangement to achieve or balance these two goals? This question leads us to consider the 
costs and benefits of an adversarial or consensus based form of receiving 
advice/information from subordinates.  
 Let us be a bit clearer about what these two proposals entail. In an adversarial 
system, your variety of subordinate advisers come to you without having had significant 
time or institutional pressure to meet beforehand and jointly discuss the relevant issue. 
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Instead, you convene a meeting with everyone coming with their own, differing opinions 
on what should be done. At the meeting, your advisers argue about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the others’ proposals and you ultimately choose or 
invent an option that takes concerns from many parties into account. In a consensus 
system, the opposite occurs. Your advisers are forced to meet together prior to any such 
meeting, confer with each other to hash out their major differences, and only come back 
to you when they have a proposal that they can all agree with. 
 Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The consensus based 
approach that requires advisors to agree beforehand saves an executive’s time by 
reducing the amount of back-and-forth argumentation one has to hear. Furthermore, it 
avoids putting the executive in the uncomfortable position of having to overrule some of 
his/her senior advisors which can be highly damaging to morale, the severe consequences 
of which are discussed in more depth in the next chapter. As a result, U.S. Presidents 
without exception prefer this approach for handling all routine matters.
cxlvi
 However, they 
remain divided when it comes to more consequential decisions.
43cxlvii
 
 One reason for this division relates to the desire for divisions to protect their 
institutional priorities that we discussed earlier. Among other methods, representatives of 
different branches can collude to jointly hide information that might make either side 
look bad or make a proposal that requires the use of pet projects that each division has 
but is in danger of getting cut. In this way, divisions can protect their internal autonomy 
from higher level executives by only showing one possible (pre-agreed) option in order to 
                                                 
43
 As an example, Eisenhower regularly preferred his administration to adopt the consensus based model in 
a vast majority of cases. In contrast, as we will see shortly, other Presidents and senior officials view this 
approach as highly problematic.  
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minimize their bosses’ ability to choose any other course of action.cxlviii Presidents such 
as Kennedy and Truman avoided this problem by adopting the adversarial system and 
preventing key officials such as the Secretaries of Defense and State from coming to an 
agreement before meetings with the President.
cxlix
 Since that time, the existence of the 
national security adviser institutionally prevents ‘collusion’ between the Secretaries of 
Defense and State bilaterally as the “circle” has been widened, thus adding another voice 
that would have to be consulted with.
cl
  
 Of course, this approach is not foolproof. Besides the additional consumption of 
time needed to oversee the adversarial process, some individuals may not be able to 
challenge the opinion of other senior officials if they believe they may have to work with 
(and acquire the support of) said senior officials.
cli
 To the extent this occurs, the 
effectiveness of the adversarial system in bringing out the whole variety of options 
available to a President is diminished.  
 What then is the appropriate course of action? While there is obviously great 
disagreement, it seems that the adversarial system may be superior to the consensus 
approach. The concern about shyness in the face of having to criticize key colleagues that 
one depends on can be substantially mitigated if a President were to occasionally consult 
with people as individuals to get their independent opinion rather than forcing people to 
voice contrary opinions in front of each other – particularly if one expects power 
differentials between the advisers who are participating. Additionally, the time cost 
seems minimal compared to the high quality of information the executive receives. Not 
only does one receive many good options to choose from, potentially expensive or 
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otherwise detrimentally poor policies may remain unfound and in place if they are 
concealed through the consensus system. In such a world, these inefficiencies are likely 
never discovered.  
 As a final example in the value that the adversarial system can bring, recall the 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (mentioned in Chapter 2.3 
Bureaucratic Efficiency & Centralization) that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Colin Powell supported. Powell particularly supported the new ability for the Chairman 
to voice his/her own opinion to the Secretary of Defense and President (more adversarial) 
than merely having to represent the diplomatically negotiated compromise among the 
various Chiefs of Staff (consensus-based). In the consensus based system, the need for 
‘compromise’ resulted in a default to the least common denominator of uncontroversial, 
but equally unsubstantial recommendations that were neither decisive nor insightful. By 
contrast, hearing multiple opinions, even if it may have taken more time, actually 
equipped the President with the tools necessary to actually make a good decision.  
 
Conclusion 
 Before the next chapter discussed methods of implementing a decision once it has 
been made, let us recap the important lessons we have learned regarding the flow and 
acquisition of information by a manager of a bureaucracy. One, there is a structural 
tension between speed and quality of information and as it is important to handle 
emergency cases that arise in both extremes, it is imperative to both maintain a broader 
bureaucracy to improve information quality and a few quick channels to accelerate urgent 
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information in order to generate further scrutiny of the issue. Two, effective managers 
need to broaden the information they have access to while realizing that information 
provided to them by subordinates is often biased or laden with an agenda. Three, since 
managers have limited time and political capital to fight about decisions with their 
subordinates, they can reduce channels for advisors they know already oppose a decision 
that they wish to make. Alternatively, when awaiting subordinates to provide them with 
information and advice on issues where they are undecided, managers ought to adopt an 
adversarial process of consultation in order to listen to a diversity of arguments and facts 
rather than a consensus conclusion that may conceal a variety of inter-departmental 
biases. Through these methods an executive can maximize the quality of information 
being provided to them and set themselves up to implement their decisions with a 
minimal amount of resistance from other senior officials.  
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4.2 Implementation 
 
 Having covered best practices for a chief administrator to efficiently collect 
critical information for making decisions and how to begin preparing the ground with 
senior advisers to accept new policy decisions, it is time to consider the broader strategies 
that are necessary to ensure faithful implementation of these decisions. While the next 
Chapter 4.3 Resistance and Reform will discuss the more intensive problems faced for a 
new manager instituting a broad set of reforms and significantly shifted policy decisions, 
this chapter will have a narrower scope focusing on the variables that affect the level of 
resistance or enthusiastic implementation of policy decisions on an ongoing, day-to-day 
basis.  
 Previous chapters have spent an almost mind-numbing amount of time discussing 
the way that a variety of structural factors affect bureaucratic efficiency. However, 
understanding that bureaucracies are not cold, autonomously operating machines requires 
recognizing the indispensable role that human beings play in all of the operations a 
bureaucracy carries out. In particular, this chapter covers two aspects of the human 
element in bureaucracy. First, the way that differing backgrounds cause people to view 
and respond to bureaucratic inputs and problems differently. Second, the importance of 
high morale on the ground to ensure effective implementation of policy and some 
important ways that mismanaged/misstructured bureaucracies can devastate this valuable 
asset.  
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Hiring Decisions: Types of Bureaucrats 
 While there are an infinite number of ways one could split, categorize, and define 
different ‘types’ of bureaucrats, this paper will choose a delineation used by Halperin & 
Clapp: career officials vs. “in-and-outers.”clii While this categorization is particularly well 
suited for analysis of government bureaucracies, parallel lessons can be drawn for private 
sector bureaucracies by treating “in-and-outers” (IAOs or Outsiders) as individuals 
external to the company or industry such as consultants or an outside executive from a 
company not operating in an identical operational capacity.  
 The definition for career officials is reasonably intuitive – they are people who 
have served a majority of their career within the particular bureaucracy being assessed 
and have had a great deal of familiarity with the organization over its lifetime. In 
contrast, IAOs have spent the majority of their career in the private sector and spend brief 
periods of time coming to serve in the government.
cliii
 IAOs can also include private 
sector experts who lend their advice and expertise to the President or other chief 
executive while not holding a formal position within the bureaucracy.  
 Having identified the primary groups we will analyze, it is important to 
understand the radical differences that generally define how these individuals are likely to 
respond to incentives and direction from the executive. For the purpose of the analysis, 
we will assume that both groups have people have equal levels of technical expertise,
44
 
and that career officials only have a comparative advantage in understanding the culture 
and specific procedures unique to the bureaucracy.  
                                                 
44
 In practice, this may not be a safe assumption 
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Career Officials 
 Luckily for the sake of our discussion, career officials have one of the most 
intuitively obvious psychological profiles regarding their work. Having spent years 
working for the bureaucracy, they have come to identify with the interests of the 
organization. Wanting all of their hard work to have meant something, they care greatly 
about the future success of their organization and likely see their future career trajectory 
to be largely determined by their continued ability to earn promotions and advance within 
the organization. Furthermore, given the length of time they have spent working for their 
bureaucratic division, they believe that their experience and intimate knowledge of the 
organization uniquely qualifies them to understand the best policies forward (or problems 
with the organization) and may be resistant to external advice or decisions made by an 
executive they view as an ‘outsider’ whom they view to be less informed. By nature of 
their extended tenure in their job, career officials are usually patient in achieving long-
term objectives.
45
 Similarly, as the downside risk of being fired for a major error is 
catastrophically career ending, career officials tend to be generally cautious and risk 
averse in their recommendations and decisions.  
 This particular type of employee profile is indispensable for a number of jobs; 
namely they are needed for running routine operations, overseeing long-term projects, 
and operating divisions that have high risk profiles.
46
 The incentive system for career 
officials is also fairly easy to understand: insofar as they expect to continue their career 
working within the bureaucracy, they care about improving their eligibility for 
                                                 
45
 Seeing as they have the entirety of their careers to bring about the objectives they desire, why wouldn’t 
they be patient? 
46
 Ex. Agencies like the CIA or Homeland Security that cannot afford large public errors at any cost 
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promotion. While this raises the stakes for structuring beneficial conditions for assigning 
promotion, this setup can be extremely problematic if designed improperly or without 
thought.  
 For example, a promotion track that only permits advancement internally limits 
the freedom for subordinates to express ideas and opinions beyond the conventional 
perspective. While this issue and how avoid it through proper incentive and promotion 
structures were discussed in Chapter 3.3 Accountability, the general tendency of career 
officials to have adopted the perspective of their institution after viewing issues through 
that lens for so long still generates a creativity problem. In particular, the promotion of a 
career official into a managing role of the organization will be problematic if the chief 
executive is looking for someone who will challenge the current interests, purpose, and 
focus of the organization (as self-defined by the organization).
cliv
  
 So how can this be avoided without indiscriminately preventing career officials 
from being promoted to lead organizations? As noted below, such a policy would be 
devastating both to morale and talent retention. One step is for an executive to ensure that 
departments which have employees that share similar skill sets coordinate to give 
employees the ability to be promoted laterally into new divisions thus limiting their bias 
towards conforming their opinions to match the view of their immediate colleagues. A 
second option is to recognize that, so long as the type of reform wanted is not foreign to 
the department, career officials can be instrumental in settling internal debates about the 
future of the organization.
clv
 Indeed, career officials have a unique advantage in these 
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situations as they have credibility among their peers for a commitment to a shared vision 
for the department that outsiders cannot be trusted to have.  
 
In-and-Outers (IAOs) 
 While career officials were best described as patient, cautious, promotion-driven, 
and oriented to view problems through the lens of the bureaucracy, in-and-outers tend to 
have a very different profile. IAOs tend to come from the private sector as lawyers, 
bankers, scientists, etc. or from academia and thus initially tend to view problems through 
the lens of their personal experiences, academic theories, or business standard practices 
rather than defaulting to the bureaucratic norm.
clvi
 However, for IAOs without a 
significant degree of previous bureaucratic/public experience, they recognize that they 
suffer from a lack of specific experience in operating the bureaucracy and thus may be 
more easily pressured by career officials into eventually adopting the institutional 
perspectives that already exist.
clvii
  
 Since an IAO is likely to only have a limited amount of time in their new position, 
they may be less patient than career officials in implementing changes or accomplishing 
their objectives. Similarly, as the risk of performing poorly is reduced by an improved 
ability to return to work in the private sector after their service, IAOs tend to be less risk 
averse than career officials. However, this need not mean that IAOs are reckless – indeed 
the opposite may be true as poor performance can more easily result in their exclusion 
from having influence on important decisions. IOAs’ attitudes towards risk can be 
summarized thusly: 
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In-and-outers may be less patient and cautious, but nearly all participants in the 
policy process desire to be involved in decisions and actions of major importance. 
They wish to see themselves as being effective and influential in shaping those 
decisions. The desire to be involved most acutely affects participants who are not 
routinely and inevitably part of the decisionmaking [sic] process. It is difficult for 
the president not to involve the secretary of state and the secretary of defense in 
[national security] decisions […] Other officials who are on staff or in advisory or 
planning positions need to struggle to remain involved.
clviii
 
As IOAs tend to more frequently inhabit advisory positions, they are likely to have 
tempered, but still less risk-averse attitudes compared to career officials.  
 Due to the variety of perspectives an IAO might hold (relative to the psychology 
of a career official), it is prudent to further sub-divide IAOs into the roles they might 
take: namely, whether they are put in a managing position or a staff position. The 
position that an individual is assigned to is likely to reveal even more characteristics that 
are helpful in modeling their behavior.  
 Staff positions are those that tend to require a high degree of technical expertise 
and a great deal of experience with the issues at hand; while these tend to be held by 
career officials, IAOs tend to bring greater diversity of external perspectives when they 
hold these positions. Individuals in staff positions frequently serve in policy development 
positions, as personal staff assistants to senior officials, and in operation/planning 
positions rather than being responsible for management of other large staffs.
clix
 On 
account of the fact that these individuals are usually hired on the basis of their technical 
expertise with the subject matter, IOAs in these positions enter the bureaucracy with 
fairly pre-established attitudes and frameworks that may differ from those prevalent 
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among the existing career officials.
clx
 As a result, they tend to exhibit strong views and 
ideological thinking that can bring new perspectives to the bureaucracy. 
 In contrast, management positions are those that primarily lead large bureaucratic 
programs
47
 and equally have to deal with a great deal of subordinates and all of their 
attendant opinions. As an example, with regards to U.S. foreign policy, the most 
commonly known and high profile management positions typically held by in-and-outers 
include the Secretary of Energy, Secretary of State, the civilian heads of the three military 
services, and the administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID).
clxi
  
 If the IAOs that come to these positions also have significant technical expertise 
in the particular subject area then they may well exhibit behavior and perspectives similar 
to those described above who are in staff positions. However, as these individuals also 
require significant skills in organizational and personnel management and may have to 
manage programs that rely on a broad range of technical bases, it is more common that 
IOAs brought to these positions have expertise that is more generalized than for those 
hired to staff positions. As a result of viewing issues through the information they receive 
from their subordinates (mainly career officials) and having weaker convictions and 
ideological frameworks through which they view their programs, IAOs in management 
positions are more likely to come to adopt the perspectives and institutional interests of 
their department.
clxii
 In this sense, while these IAOs still less risk averse than career 
officials, without external pressure (such as from an executive) managerial IAOs without 
                                                 
47
 In this paper, these types of positions are nearly synonymously used with the term “senior official” 
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previous expertise are likely to be similar to career officials in terms of their 
organizational perspective.  
 To recap, IAOs that go into staff positions are likely to enter the bureaucracy with 
pre-established ways of approaching problems that they view as within their expertise 
and be more resistant to automatically adopting prevailing views. In contrast, IAOs in 
managerial positions and facing significant pressures from career subordinates have an 
increased chance of adopting the existing institutional perspectives. However, there is 
one more dimension, irrespective of position, that affects IAO behavior and may 
sometimes serve to mitigate the positional effects just described – specific or generalized 
expertise.  
 For any officials who draw their influence from reliance on their specific, 
technical expertise, they rely on others recognizing and deferring to them in instances 
where their expertise is relevant. In turn, they are likely to defer to others’ expertise in 
other matters in order to protect their image as a specialist and because to do otherwise 
risks retaliation wherein other ‘experts’ can then challenge them on their territory in the 
future.
clxiii
 This behavior is endemic to career officials and specialized IAOs.
48clxiv
 
Therefore, while IAOs in staff positions will tend to hold unique views in their particular 
area of expertise they are unlikely to challenge conventional orthodoxies in other areas.  
 On the flip side, IAOs without a specific area of expertise are more likely to be 
resistant to, so-called, expert advice. This is not to say that they do not consider it at all, 
but are merely more willing to challenge the information and advice being provided to 
                                                 
48
 For example, Foreign Service officers are quite hesitant to challenge views of the Treasury department 
on economic matters or the Department of Defense on strategic or tactical military questions. 
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them and more closely examine the basis on which it was founded. This insight is 
particularly useful because, although by default managerial IAOs are likely to adopt the 
perspective of their career subordinates, when entering with a particular agenda or strong 
allegiance to the views of their executive (who probably had a hand in hiring them), this 
tendency can be useful for challenging traditional orthodoxies. This phenomenon is more 
closely examined in the next chapter when discussing strategies to institute reform.  
 
Staff Deployment 
 Obviously, the purpose of this section is not to say that any one type of bureaucrat 
is better than another. A healthy bureaucracy requires a good mix of all of the personas 
described above in order to properly function in response to a diversity of needs. Career 
officials are particularly important for preserving institutional knowledge, retaining 
consistency in government policy, and carefully mitigating risk to sensitive institutions. 
In-an-outers in staff positions or with technical expertise are important to bringing new, 
cutting-edge, and innovative perspectives to the otherwise intellectually homogenous 
bureaucracy. And as we will discuss next chapter, IAOs in management positions can 
play an important role in facilitating large policy shifts or broad reforms when they are 
needed and injecting revitalizing energy to projects that are stalled under the supervision 
of more time-insensitive career officials. The hallmark of a great manager is the ability to 
constantly keep in mind the differing strengths, weaknesses, and incentives their 
employees have in order to utilize their talents most effectively.  
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Morale 
 The need to pen an analysis of morale is as bittersweet as waking from a deep 
slumber: it needs to be done but one hates having to do it. However, in the wise words of 
General Eisenhower, “the best morale exists when you never hear the word mentioned. 
When you hear a lot of talk about it, it's usually lousy,”clxv and indeed, this section 
contains imperative lessons for those who may suffer from a deficiency of charisma.  
 Recall from the previous chapter that the three greatest challenges administrators 
face in ensuring subordinates successfully implement their decisions are (1) that they may 
not know what the administrator wants, (2) that they may be unable to carry out the 
command, or (3) they may resist the orders they are given. As anyone who has had a 
particularly stirring teacher, mentor, or friend will readily tell you, blind loyalty can only 
be attained at the hands of one who commands your respect, admiration, and trust. For 
this reason, morale among your subordinates is the lynchpin to ensure the faithful 
execution of your instructions.  
 The initial lessons are probably self-evident to anyone who has ever served in 
even the most minute of leadership positions and cover the preconditions necessary to 
positively inspire subordinates. To begin with the obvious, personnel must believe that 
what they are doing matters. If bureaucrats, more than most, will be in the position of 
believing that they are merely spinning the wheels of a larger machine, the least they 
need to expect is the belief that what the machine produces is actually important. 
Therefore, clear demonstration of how individual divisions or units contribute to the 
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national or organizational interest is essential. Lacking that, the bureaucracy will suffer 
from lackluster workers and a significant drain of talent as they find careers elsewhere.  
 The same is true for workers who feel that they are in a dead-end job. This feeling 
can be generated in two main ways. First, if they believe that their career path within the 
organization does not provide room for advancement, younger career officials are 
unlikely to stay (or even take the job in the first place) and older ones are disincentivized 
from contributing their all or transitioning new replacements for their jobs.
clxvi
 Second, 
the general image and role of a particular division cannot be diminishing without a 
specific plan for existing workers.
clxvii
 Rounds of gradual budget cuts or an inevitable 
sense of closure to a particular agency or department both signals to workers the lack of 
future advancement opportunities and the not-so-subtle suggestion that the work that they 
are currently doing serves little to no purpose.  
Obviously, being able to eliminate obsolete or redundant divisions is critical to a 
healthy organization. As such, two approaches can help mitigate these effects. Firstly, lay 
out a transition plan to keep talented employees and move them to other, expanding 
agencies that require similar skill sets.
49
 Secondly, formulate decisive opinions about 
what divisions need to be eliminated. Killing an agency through a slow death of gradual 
rounds of cuts only serves to demoralize employees and decrease the likelihood that they 
can be retained. Therefore, elimination needs to be quick and a transition to a new 
program (or just employees to other departments if the issue is obsolescence) must be 
immediate.  
                                                 
49
 This approach will be all the easier to institute if one is already following the recommendation to have 
agencies coordinate to encourage lateral promotions mentioned above in order to limit institutional bias 
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The consequences of not heeding this advice can be disastrous. One need look no 
further than the current predicament the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) faces: with an 
aging workforce and crippling inability to hire young workers, there is serious concern 
about the basic sustainability of one of the most central bureaucratic agencies to the 
functioning of the U.S. government.
clxviii
 After successive rounds of budget cuts and a 
subsequent inability to invest in advertising the importance and mission of the agency, 
the IRS is unable to hire and retain new talent on account of its reputation as an agency 
that is universally hated and results in a presumably dead end career.
50
  
Having covered the structural prerequisites for maintaining positive morale 
(communication about why particular jobs make a difference, ensuring appropriate room 
for advancement, and preventing images of diminishing departments), there is also an 
important management aspect to morale. Namely, as Presidents and CEOs will tell you 
alike, there can often be advantages to making decisions in secret, confined to a few high 
level executives, and excluding the bureaucracy. These include preventing leaks to media 
or Congress that make it more difficult to proceed with a decision, avoiding bitter fights 
with established bureaucratic interests that are described throughout the rest of the paper, 
or simply saving the time of going through bureaucratic procedures. While these reasons 
are compelling and in some cases probably justified, a good executive must exhibit great 
restraint in using extra-bureaucratic tools. Keeping the bureaucracy in the dark and 
explicitly excluding it from key decisions has a detrimental effect on loyalty as it 
diminishes the impression of ‘what I’m doing matters’ insofar as a limited number of 
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 This is in spite of the fact that the IRS has some of the fastest advancement tracks in the U.S. federal 
government 
 178 
 
executives are prone to make decisions without input generated from lower levels 
anyway. This morale reduction in turn perpetuates even more passive disobedience which 
further incentivizes operating outside of the bureaucracy in an unending vicious cycle.  
From a basic efficiency perspective, keeping the bureaucracy in the dark also has 
negative impacts. Prior to serving for President Nixon, Henry Kissinger noted the 
following about the dangers of extra-bureaucratic approaches: 
Because the management of the bureaucracy takes so much energy and precisely 
because changing course is so difficult, many of the most important decisions are 
taken by extra-bureaucratic means. Some of the key decisions are kept to a very 
small circle while the bureaucracy happily continues working away in ignorance 
of the fact that decisions are being made […] The only way secrecy can be kept is 
to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged 
with carrying it out. There is, thus, small wonder for […] cynicism of American 
efforts because of inconsistent actions. In the majority of cases this was due to the 
ignorance of certain parts of the bureaucracy, rather than to malevolent intent. 
Another result is that the relevant part of the bureaucracy, because it is being 
excluded from the making of a particular decision, continues with great intensity 
sending out cables, thereby distorting the effort with the best intentions in the 
world. You cannot stop them from doing this because you do not tell them what is 
going on.
clxix
  
 This is not the say that for some issues such as those that contain highly sensitive 
information that acting covertly and with a limited number of people may not be 
necessary. However, an executive must be judicious in his/her use of these procedures 
and take all efforts possible to push the direction of the bureaucracy to support the policy. 
This approach has the added benefit of enjoying longer sustained effects the can last even 
after one leaves their position. Of course, as Kissinger noted, this approach naturally 
takes both more time and effort – neither of which are inconsequential to an already busy 
manager. This brings us to our next chapter which discusses in detail how to balance 
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these demands when trying to do the difficult work of reforming bureaucratic culture, 
perspective, or structure.  
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4.3 Resistance and Reform 
 After slogging through all of the previous chapters covering both the types of 
structural improvements one ought to make to bureaucracies as well as the personal 
challenges that come with running it, we finally reach the ultimate purpose of gathering 
together all of these tools: understanding how to guide the bureaucracy in a new direction 
and implement significant reform or policy change. Certainly this task sounds far easier 
than it seems; few challenges are more daunting than the thought of showing down 
against a seemingly immovable institution of hundreds, thousands, or even millions of 
people with their own personal and organizational interests potentially opposing your 
every move. Alas, whether you view the modern era as a period of unprecedented 
population (growth) where this required level of coordination is inevitable or an 
information age with the opportunity to deploy the best efficiencies of technology and 
collective action to bring our society closer together and address or worst ills, 
understanding how to manage bureaucracy and steer it for the better is an integral part of 
both our present and future lives.  
 In thinking about how and why bureaucracies change, we will adopt one of the 
more pessimistic (although not necessarily unrealistic) perspectives of large social 
systems. That is to say that “[t]he bureaucratic system is basically inert; it moves only 
when pushed hard and persistently.”clxx There is a wide variety of reasons that this is 
generally the case: most bureaucrats prefer the status quo, only small groups of people 
have an interest to execute any particular change, and since each person and manager 
trying to make a change has limited resources and time there is only so much they can do.  
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 In addition, it may be difficult to institute policies that go against the “shared 
images”clxxi of most of the participants. While it is probably prudent to be highly sensitive 
to (and potentially cynical of) structural issues related to bureaucracy, there is no reason 
to believe the majority of bureaucrats are cutthroat, House-of-Cards style power 
maximizers regardless of the consequences. Indeed, as we noted in Chapter 2.1 
Democracy, Representation, & Bureaucratic Capture, one of the primary advantages of 
working with bureaucracies is the increased likelihood that individuals care deeply about 
the public interest.  
 As such, most bureaucrats approach their job with a set of ideological beliefs and 
particular schemas for understanding and simplifying the world. Through all of the 
pressures to conform mentioned in previous chapters, with enough time in the 
bureaucracy, these schemas tend to converge to a set of shared images that the vast 
majority of people operate off of. Consequently, policy decisions are often made with 
these in mind. Some examples include the entire notion of the Cold War, viewing the rise 
of various powers as threats rather than peaceful expansion. On the domestic policy side 
increasingly positive images of LGB
51
 individuals shaped LGBT oriented policies from 
the Health and Human Services (HHS) department and concerns about ‘peak oil’ and 
‘dependence on foreign oil’ (particularly following 9/11) helped generate increased 
support in the Treasury and Energy Departments for transition to renewable energy.  
 Policies that can be justified in terms of the generally accepted shared images are 
likely to be accepted favorably and duly supported while those that cannot will almost 
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 Regrettably, trans individuals still face overwhelming stigmatization in the media and public at large. 
Fortunately, recent HHS policies have had spill-over effects and have been trans inclusive. 
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inevitably face resistance.
clxxii
 While such iconoclastic policies are not impossible, the 
risk of opposition is high. Consider for example Nixon’s denouement with China: the 
Nixon administration made significant efforts to plan the President’s meeting with Mao 
in his trip to Peking and it was widely agreed that such a move was so unorthodox that 
only a small handful of people could afford to know.
clxxiii
  
 While policy changes may be accomplished by changing shared images, changing 
shared images is often either an exceedingly slow and gradual process (shifting away 
from viewing Russia as a primary strategic threat, evolving views on gay marriage, etc.) 
or requires a significant exogenous shock (9/11 and the sudden rise in the perceived 
threat of terrorism).
clxxiv
 Admittedly, from this perspective, the amount an executive can 
do in a restricted amount of time is limited. Therefore, three limitations should be kept in 
mind when approaching any significant reformation or change: 
1. One can make changes more easily if they can be justified in the context of 
prevalent shared images 
2. One can make changes where shared images are either unsettled or insufficiently 
controversial to have an ideological perspective without significant resistance 
3. One has a limited amount of political capital to make a direct shift away from a 
given set of shared images (whether held by solely by the bureaucracy or the 
public at large). As such, one can only realistically pursue a limited number
52
 of 
these ‘big picture’ reorganizations at a time. 
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 Probably only one if the shift requires adding public pressure to get the bureaucracy to conform 
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Understanding Interests & Types of Resistance 
 Let us now assume that we understand the limitations listed above and have 
chosen one of the given paths. We still need to ensure that we understand what types of 
changes will generate resistance at the local and institutional levels. This inquiry 
naturally requires us to revisit the question of what interest all of the other actors hold.  
 First, it is important to realize that not all branches or organizations of a 
bureaucracy view put equal emphasis on all types of benefits and costs. Divisions that 
have large (and generally expensive) “capabilities” will treat budget issues far differently 
than those that already operate off of lower-cost approaches. New policies will be closely 
scrutinized by high capability organizations with regards to the impact they will have on 
existing budgets and plans. Conversely, the low capability division may care less about 
budget impacts,
53
 but probably far more about the immediate implications of a policy 
decision on their long-term goals, reputation, or whatever their ‘currency of choice’ 
might be.
clxxv
 A good example is the difference between the Department of Defense and 
the State Department and their differing responses to the proposal for deployment of an 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system during the Cold War: 
For the U.S. Army, it meant a bigger budget and a greater role in strategic 
warfare. State Department officials on the other hand, cared much less about costs 
and capabilities than about how the decision would affect U.S. relations with 
allies and potential adversaries.
clxxvi
 
Understanding whether a division is likely to care more about how a decision affects their 
budget vs. their reputation vs. a key policy variable that they are highly concerned with 
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 If they are being considered relevant to a policy, they have already ruled out any cost-intensive 
approaches or are expecting increased funding to handle the issue 
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(like goodwill among foreign states) is integral to identifying where to expect resistance 
among your bureaucracy.  
 The second complication is that while organizations generally support increasing 
their jurisdiction (and thus influence over important policies – holding preference for 
budget implications equal), they will resist expansion if such expansion requires bringing 
in more high-level players externally and/or if their new tasks appear to dilute their 
‘essence.’  
To understand this point, one must recognize the importance of people and 
organizations understanding a clear vision of their purpose and mission. In the same way 
a library is meant for lending books, a college is meant for teaching students, or an HBO 
Go account is meant for watching Game of Thrones, diluting the perceived specialization 
of an agency has the potential to create confusion about its purpose and effectiveness. In 
small doses, expanded purview has the potential to reap great economies of scale: a 
library that hosts community events becomes more like a community center, a college 
that invests in social activities for its students may find better satisfaction and interest in 
learning, and being able to watch other great shows like The Wire or The Newsroom is a 
great bonus! But if stretched too far, their value ironically can fall as their capabilities 
expand. If ‘library’ becomes synonymous with ‘community center,’ it is likely to invest 
less in its books and more poorly serve the studious or intellectually curious individuals it 
once did. As any college senior writing (read: procrastinating on) thesis will tell you, an 
excess of activities distracts one from their noble school work more than it enhances it. 
When suddenly you have access to 1,000 shows that you never watch, you find yourself 
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asking, “is this subscription really worth it?” even if you would have been perfectly 
happy to pay for it to get access to the few that you do really like. As both psychology 
and behavioral economic research is beginning to suggest, having more choices or 
capabilities can actually decrease satisfaction or confidence in an organization’s 
competence if the additions make something’s purpose or mission murkier.clxxvii  
This is the phenomenon that leaders of bureaucratic agencies intuitively 
understand: if new functions dilute their perceived specialization or purpose it will 
damage their long-term objectives or core competency. Note that not all changes 
necessarily have this impact in order to be resisted, only the perception of the existing 
bureaucrats matter. For example, following WWII, the U.S. State Department actually 
resisted the creation and reliance on the UN as those efforts increasingly required reliance 
on expert advice outside of the Foreign Service and expanded its focus to interdependent 
economic cooperation (something not previously under its purview).
clxxviii
 Most people 
today would readily agree that the formation of the UN has had a net positive impact for 
U.S. (and global) interests but being a good idea is not enough to ensure the policy will 
sail smoothly.  
Similarly, ground level implementers tend to resist or at least not enthusiastically 
initiate new protocols or take new jobs if they are viewed as not essential to their 
organization’s core. Given a little thought, this conclusion is hardly surprising. 
“Ambitious career officers avoid serving in ‘unessential activities,’”clxxix as those roles 
tend to carry less prestige and give the impression of containing fewer ‘core’ skills that 
would be valuable when superiors consider their promotion.  
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In application, the confluence of these problems can be seen in the internal fight 
among the U.S. armed forces regarding control of air-based missions. The Navy and 
Airforce fought over who controlled planes at sea as the Navy sees their core purpose to 
be all matters at sea and the Airforce considers their purpose to be all matters related to 
aircraft.
clxxx
 Their desire to remain one of the preeminent military branches ultimately 
spilled over to actively negative recommendations. For example, the Navy opposed the 
creation of long range bombers that could be launched from “semi-prepared fields” and 
hit targets across the ocean as such capabilities would seriously diminish the need for and 
thus importance of naval aircraft carriers.
clxxxi
 Similarly, the Army and Airforce ran into a 
similar problem stemming from the ‘moral hazard’ of unessential activity incentives: 
While the Army willingly ceded to the Airforce the ability to provide air-based combat 
support and transport (air travel was not a core competency of the Army and thus they 
were willing to shed it while the Airforce naturally desired control of the skies), the Army 
soon realized that the Airforce “was giving its highest priority to strategic bombardment 
and therefore was neglecting missions of concern to the Army.”clxxxii In response, the 
Army reconsidered its decision and aimed to develop capabilities to provide its own 
combat air support, transport, and airlifts. The Airforce found itself in a catch-22 wherein 
it simultaneously was unable/unwilling to sufficiently support the Army’s missions but 
equally unwilling to allow the Army to run its own air capabilities and operations as such 
a move was perceived as a threat to its core purpose.  
As you can tell, there are a whole mess of problems tangled among the various 
military anecdotes. However, to simplify the issues a bit, consider the following macro 
level lessons that can be learned about responding to these problems. First and foremost, 
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this highlights the importance of the lessons discussed in Chapter 3.1 Specialization 
which elucidates the importance of allowing groups to specialize in more clearly defined 
core competencies rather than tack on purposes to a mega-organization lacking a clear 
purpose. Second, each executive needs to look at issues such as the conflict between the 
Airforce and Army over air support and decide whether allowing the (representative) 
Army to create its own capabilities will just basically duplicate what already exists, thus 
wasting resources, and whether the respective Airforce can be sufficiently incentivized to 
support the other actor. If the answers to those questions are no, the executive needs to 
take a playbook from the previous chapter 4.2 Implementation and promote a career 
official who believes as you do and can simply settle the debate between the divisions. If 
the answers are yes, it is important to articulate and emphasize the importance of these 
additional missions and reduce their stigma as ‘non-essential.’ 
 While the previous issue related to policies that expand a division’s jurisdiction, 
whether expanding or contracting, policy changes that will reduce available spots for 
promotion of career officials will be resisted. Relating to the morale issue last chapter, 
career officials continue with their job in the expectation for a chance at promotion – 
either higher in command within their branch or to be put in charge of a role that 
coordinates a variety of agencies (their own included). Decisions that decrease this 
likelihood either by formally eliminating senior positions or that requires bringing in 
large numbers of outsiders to compete for those positions will be opposed.
54
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 Consider again the example of the State Department resisting the inclusion of UN experts as part of their 
team(s) 
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 Responding to the concerns discussed up to this point can frequently be done at 
the most senior levels: if you can identify where resistance is likely to come from 
disputes can be headed off by using some combination of personal charm and wit to get 
the senior participants of a particular division on board with the plan and quell general 
discontent among those whom the policy will affect (but have little influence over the 
existence of the policy in question). However, we must also face matters that are subtler 
either because the locus of resistance is diffuse (just a general sense of disagreement 
rather than a particular person/branch objecting) or because resistance can take place at 
the lowest ground level.  
 One of the most common ways for lower level officials to resist instructions is to 
follow the letter rather than the spirit of an order. For example, in 1968 as military 
officials were planning escalation of military intervention into North Vietnam, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson made a speech where he said: 
We are reducing – substantially reducing – the present level of 
hostilities…unilaterally and at once. Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft and our 
naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the 
[DMZ] where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens allied forward 
positions.
clxxxiii
 
The implication is clear – only make military attacks on specific, tactical targets that 
directly threaten our forces south of the DMZ. However, the formal orders directly sent to 
military officials only instructed cessation of bombing north of 20 degrees. While it 
seems probable that the military officials had some form of access to the speech and its 
content, without direct communication they could claim ignorance. Whether with malice 
or not towards LBJ’s policy intentions, the next day’s military activity focused on an all-
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out bombing of the only major North Vietnamese city south of 20 degrees – certainly not 
a purely tactical target – in a move that suggested further escalation of violence, not 
less.
clxxxiv
  
 While this difficulty can never be fully eliminated, the lesson is clear. As 
discussed in Chapter 4.1 Information, equally as important as transmitting specific 
instructions about policy decisions to the lower levels, good executives must formally 
include detailed explanations about the purpose of a particular policy and what it is meant 
to achieve.  
 In summary, organizations will view policy changes in terms of whatever 
common dimension they are used to thinking about policy – budget reliant divisions 
caring about budget implications, image focused divisions caring about reputation, etc. 
Additionally, agencies and the people who run them deeply value clarity of their mission 
and purpose. They will favorably view moves that help them focus on their perceived 
core purpose and resist moves that muddy that vision. Whether expanding to include 
more outsiders or closing senior positions available, moves that decrease the chance of 
career official promotion will be resisted. Finally, without clear explanation about the 
purpose of instructions, low level officers can avoid implementing new policies by 
strictly following (and misinterpreting) the letter of one’s instructions rather than their 
intent.  
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Utilizing Time and Energy 
 Given all of the different factors that trigger some part of the bureaucracy to resist 
a new policy change, we are faced with the question of how an executive can effectively 
manage his/her time in the face of these challenges. As some researchers note, “no matter 
how important [an] issue may appear to an observer in retrospect, it was only one of a 
large number of issues confronting any senior participant at the time.”clxxxv It is also 
important to recall that this limitation, in addition to a restricted amount of political 
capital severely constrains senior officials’ ability to effect policy. This is the primary 
explanation that Henry Kissinger provides for Secretary McNamara’s apparent 
ineffectiveness in effectively managing the Vietnam War: 
McNamara’s profundity in analysis had to give way to a very practical problem: 
how many times a month could he go to the mat with the JCS? […] If one wants 
to explain why it is that McNamara’s theories about the war in Vietnam were not 
always matched by implementation, especially toward the end, the primary reason 
was that he felt that confronted with issues of ABM, troop deployment, force 
levels, renewal of the strategic force, and Vietnam strategy, he could only handle 
so many of those simultaneously. He picked those which he thought were crucial 
at the moment.
clxxxvi
 
While this example highlights a contest of wills between senior officials, similar 
problems plague executives in ensuring that their subordinates are working. Not only 
does the executive need to busy him/herself with all of the problems that particular 
official is working on but all of the issues every other subordinate has on their plate.  
 As a result of this inevitable tendency for the executive to be stretched thinly, 
often decisions opposed by senior officials can be resisted simply by forgetting about 
them. Only on the largest issues is one likely to face repeated pressure or follow up about 
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a particular decision. Jonathan Daniels, a seminal figure in the civil rights movement and 
advocate for the voting rights act observed this phenomenon: 
[i]f the President asks about a suggestion a second time, he can be told that it is 
being investigated. If he asks a third time, a wise Cabinet officer will give him at 
least part of what he suggests. But only occasionally, except about the most 
important matters, do Presidents ever get around to asking three times.
clxxxvii
 
The inability of one person to manage everything (particularly if it is being resisted or 
ignored) is fundamentally inescapable. However, before we discuss general ways that 
executives can expediently force an intransigent bureaucracy to comply with orders, there 
are two particular responses that are appropriate to the threat of a senior official 
‘forgetting’ about instructions.  
Although this will be discussed in far more detail below, if you are unable to 
dedicate time to perpetually follow up on decisions you think are likely to be resisted or 
ignored, appoint particular individuals (that you know agree with your position) to 
implement the management and follow up for you and merely alert you if there is a 
problem. The pressure and knowledge that lack of compliance will be noticed may alone 
be enough to solve the problem.  
Of course, appointing a whole new set of people just to watch the existing people 
would only serve to duplicate the entire bureaucracy and moot the very purpose of having 
the senior officials there to do their job. Consequently, this is a strategy that can be 
employed in select circumstances that coordinates multiple people across organizations 
(see below) or when you can reasonably expect resistance to occur. Therefore, you must 
be able to identify when these situations will arise. Recalling the discussion from chapter 
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4.1, this is another reason why the adversarial advisement process is preferable to a 
consensus process. During the adversarial process when you are still in the business of 
being persuaded, individuals have a great deal of incentive to clearly express what it is 
they would like to see and not see. Information revealed in this process permits you to 
have a better gauge of the extent that particular subordinates will support or resist your 
decision. If you expect resistance, consider following up (or appointing another to do so).  
This business of ‘following up’ reveals another important aspect about effective 
implementation in the face of resistance. Namely, presidential/executive emphasis helps 
signal that high level attention is being given to a particular issue and therefore that poor 
implementation will be quickly noticed and not received well.
clxxxviii
 To most people that 
conclusion is intuitive – of course you work harder when your boss is looking right at 
you. But it is also important to recognize that the relative effect of executive emphasis is 
inversely correlated with the number of people a job requires to get done. That is to say 
that if an action requires a lot of people to act – maybe it is particularly complicated or 
requires coordinating many individuals – executive attention will have little marginal 
effect on any given person.
clxxxix
 This is true for two reasons: one, unless you are the 
person being stared down by the president/executive, you probably do not feel the same 
sense of urgency as the person who is. Therefore, without even knowing it, unless your 
boss (senior official) explicitly expresses that urgency, you may be complicit in stalling 
an effort simply by insufficiently prioritizing the objective. Two, finding a particular 
person to punish or hold accountable among a diverse set of actors is naturally difficult. 
Of course, this problem is significantly mitigated if one has instituted the 
recommendations noted in Chapter 3.3 Accountability. 
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But ultimately, in spite of however many accountability measures one has in 
place, there will always be room for lower level implementers to resist a decision. One of 
the most time efficient methods of forcing the bureaucracy to be on board (public 
bureaucracies in particular) is to create what are known as “action-forcing events, 
including presidential trips and speeches that would oblige the government to develop 
policies.”cxc These can either be used to align the bureaucracy with a controversial 
decision that has already been made at the top (ex. a presidential speech expressing 
support for Palestinian statehood) or force the bureaucracy that has been unwilling to 
commit to one piece of advice or another to do so (ex. a presidential visit to Kurdistan 
might force the State Department to develop a decision on whether an independent 
Kurdish state ought to be supported). Any move the brings expanded pressure by making 
commitments more openly (to the public or even other divisions within an organization) 
that even a bureaucracy would not dare back down from can be considered ‘action-
forcing.’ Because such measures are so quick and can force alignment at all levels of the 
bureaucracy, this approach, when deployable, is highly efficient.  
 
Effecting Policy Across Organizations 
 Having covered the general lessons regarding resistance, let us consider the 
methods to implement new policies across organizations (now potentially even more 
disparate having followed the advice in chapter 3.1). Coordination among groups of 
specialized experts and divisions is the ultimate ideal for solving any complicated issue 
and is what bureaucracy is supposedly meant to accomplish. Of course, doing this is 
certainly more difficult that in sounds. As anyone who has spent any time among 
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professional academics will readily tell you, experts from different fields are almost 
inevitably going to disagree. Additionally, the time utilization problem we just discussed 
tends to have the impact of causing organizations to prioritize the issues that are 
exclusively on their plate and neglect those that other divisions are jointly working on 
and could be held equally responsible for. Furthermore, time constraints prevent the 
executive from perpetually managing every interdepartmental project.  
As a modern example for us to examine the importance of these joint efforts, 
defense experts are currently advocating for greater coordination and someone to run 
efforts to respond to the Islamic State’s (ISIS’s) online outreach. As Frank Cilluffo55 and 
Sharon Cardash
56
 point out, “[l]ots of government agencies are doing something; the 
White House needs to coordinate them.”cxci In particular, they acknowledge a great many 
departments need to be coordinated including the armed forces, other war and defense 
operations (under title 50), foreign relations, local law enforcement, and private 
companies who provide internet mediums for ISIS propaganda.
cxcii
 They also highlight 
the danger from a lack of coordination: when one US agency goes to shut down a 
particular site or outlet, it may disrupt another branch that is using that site to collect 
valuable information to target even more ISIS efforts. These are the types of issues that 
proper coordination can avert.  
 A majority of joint efforts, particularly if they will exist on an ongoing basis, can 
be routinized in a series of standard operating procedures which allows a department to 
become accustomed to a regular cost of dedicated resources and human capital. However, 
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 Served as Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security immediately after 9/11 
56
 Served as Security Policy Advisor to Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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in order for this to happen, a onetime ‘reform’ or policy event is required to force 
divisions together, assign them their mission, and establish these procedures (such as 
choosing someone to organize the online anti-ISIS measures). While an executive could 
personally supervise these reorganization efforts, the ability to enact reform is then 
limited to the executive’s attention span, which is probably better left to the most 
important reformations. This returns us to the approach mentioned briefly ago wherein 
one appoints a special agent (hereafter referred to as a “Special Reform Agent (SRA)”) to 
do the follow up effort necessary to ensure that instructions are carried out.  
 There are a number of historical examples of Presidents using this technique to 
great effect. President Nixon used Henry Kissinger to accomplish objectives that were 
moving too slowly (e.g. likely being resisted).
cxciii
 President Kennedy appointed Averell 
Harriman to coordinate negotiation with Russia over the weapons test ban treaty and the 
Laos agreement.
cxciv
 President Truman called on John Foster Dulles to help settle disputes 
between the State and Defense Departments regarding the timing for a peace treaty with 
Japan.
cxcv
 In all of these examples, an important common theme is that the individuals 
held the great personal confidence of the President and/or were a relative outsider to the 
departments that needed to be coordinated and thus did not have an overwhelming 
inclination to only represent one perspective.  
 This leads us to a couple of interesting conclusions. First and most obviously, as 
an executive, it is important to ensure that you can guarantee that the SRA you choose to 
appoint is more loyal to you than any of the other competing powers involved. Second, in 
selecting an SRA that does not have a pre-existing bureaucratic loyalty that overwhelms 
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loyalty to you or prevents the agent from handling concerns from the other departments, 
in-and-outers often make ideal candidates for these positions.  
 Recall from last chapter the general characteristics of IAOs:  
 They tend to be less cautious than career officials about trying new 
things 
 They tend to be more urgent than career officials due to their 
perception of a limited amount of time to accomplish their goals 
 They retain key incentives to ‘be effective’ and conform to the 
positions of whoever appointed them 
 Those without lots of personal involvement with the division they are 
working with tend to accept the organizational interest(s) of the career 
officials under them without a competing imperative 
 Those without specialized expertise tend to be more willing to 
challenge ‘expert advice’ 
Many of these characteristics make IAOs excellent candidates for SRA positions. 
Besides the fact that an IAO would share the executive’s urgency to accomplish their 
goals in a more reasonable timeframe, he/she would also be more likely to challenge 
conventional systems that career officials may otherwise be satisfied with.  
However, this is not to say that all IAOs are equally good for all types of 
interagency policies. For example, since IAOs without a detailed understanding of the 
divisions they will be working with will tend to blindly accept the existing institutional 
interests and biases, it may actually be worse to appoint an IAO that does not have a 
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strong personal interest, vision for reform, and/or history working with/for the relevant 
agencies than a career official (a) who understands the ways the arguments behind the 
existing biases are overhyped, and (b) who’s appointment to a more advanced position 
will increase morale among other career officers.  
A similar split occurs for IAOs with/without specialized technical expertise. 
While IAOs with specialized expertise may be good candidates for cooperative 
interagency projects, they may not be ideal for leading reform efforts. Recall that those 
with specialized expertise require others to value the supremacy of their judgment in their 
field and thus have an imperative to defer to others when the subject matter extends 
beyond their expertise. When attempting to implement reform across one or more 
departments, conflicts with existing career experts is inevitable and an SRA who too 
easily defers to their institutional preference will be of little help to the executive’s 
reform agenda. Recall however that since IAOs without a particular field of specialized 
expertise are more likely to challenge ‘expert opinions’ and therefore may be able to push 
agendas farther before having to return to the executive for additional political support.  
Whether these SRAs should appointed on an ad hoc basis or institutionalized in a 
formal role (ex. Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group under Sec. Rumsfeld, the 
creation of the National Security Advisor under Pres. Eisenhower, etc.) is a function of 
how effective the executive views the options for the particular situation and of political 
climate which is outside the scope of this paper. However, it is imperative that the person 
chosen for the job have the right qualities for the job. To summarize these situations: 
For reform agendas: 
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 An IAO 
 Someone who has an understanding of the structure of the agencies they 
are reforming 
 Someone without a particular field for specialized technical advice 
 A clear vision of the end result that aligns with the executive’s objectives 
For cooperative interagency projects: 
 An IAO 
 Someone with expertise specialized to the issue being tackled by the 
various agency 
For running existing, well-managed programs: 
 A career official who knows the organization and who’s promotion will 
boost morale 
Of course, no matter how inclined one might be to challenge experts on the 
assumptions that go into their conclusions, particularly when there is a competing interest 
to protect the status quo, it bears remembering the importance of always understanding 
the limitations of expert advice. Presumptively, this work has been oriented around the 
notion that bureaucracies that empower experts to work on issues within their area of 
expertise are the core of efficient governance. While that is a principle worth standing 
behind, any good executive will realize that this does not equate to taking expert advice at 
face value. Indeed, further inquiry to understand why projections are made the way they 
are and the levels of confidence about various pieces of information is integral to a 
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decision maker’s risk analysis – it is an important lesson that is sometimes too easy to 
forget.  
History is rife with examples of people reading reports produced by the 
bureaucracy to fixate on numerical projections as somehow fixed and containing a great 
deal more certainty than there actually is. For example, David Lilienthal who was 
charged with leading the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) made the following 
shocking revelation during his tenure about the terrifyingly simplistic way experts made 
estimates about how long it would take the Soviet Union to acquire atomic weapons: 
It is chiefly a matter of reasoning from our own American experience, guessing 
from that how much longer it will take Russia using our methods and based upon 
our own problems of achieving weapons. But when this is put into a report, the 
reader, e.g., Congressional committee, is given the impression, and deliberately, 
that behind the estimates lies specific knowledge, knowledge so important and 
delicate that its nature and sources cannot be disclosed or hinted at.
cxcvi
 
The fact that some expert analysis may be based on far more limited data or 
simplistic ‘rule of thumb’ assumptions than one might initially assume is too dangerous 
to risk forgetting. Nuclear physicist Herbert York tells of a similar tale of how 
subjectively the performance standards of the first American ICBMs were determined (1 
megaton explosive yield, range of 5,500 nautical miles, margin of error of 5 miles or 
better):
cxcvii
 
So why 1.0 megaton? The answer is because and only because one million is a 
particularly round number in our culture. We picked one megaton […] for the 
same reason that everyone speaks of rich men as millionaires and never as being 
tenmillionairs [sic] or one-hundred-thousandaires. […] Thus, the actual physical 
size of the first Atlas warhead and the number of people it would kill were 
determined by the fact that human beings have two hands with five fingers each 
and therefore count by tens. […] The only funny thing about this story is that it is 
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true. It really was that arbitrary, and what’s more, that same arbitrariness has 
stayed with us.
cxcviii
 
The implications of these stories are clear. While the availability of expert advice 
is indispensable in the vast majority of cases, it is the incumbent responsibility of the 
executive (or any consumer of bureaucratic/expert advice) to challenge the assumptions 
of information provided to him/her to better inform decisions. A number of lessons 
mentioned before can help assist with this effort including appointment of IAO advisers 
that will challenge conventional wisdom on your behalf and an adversarial advice process 
that will not only allow other senior officials to make challenges but also provide an 
alternative body of evidence in a different subject area that may overrule the first 
suggestion. Indeed, expanding the variety of expert type that is permitted to weigh in is 
not only helpful for understanding many facets of a problem but for providing the 
executive an excuse to overrule a department head he/she disagrees with without 
slighting the senior official(s).
cxcix
   
While there was certainly a large amount of material covered here that may be 
difficult for a manager to keep in mind at any given moment, consider the lessons at their 
most simplistic: (1) resistance can be overcome by an action-forcing event or appointing 
an agent to follow through on particular goals, (2) since agents can only be deployed 
sparingly, recognize when individuals or departments are likely to resist you when 
utilizing this strategy, (3) organizations are likely to resist new policies that require 
bringing in more players, reduce the possibility that existing career officials will be 
promoted to senior positions, or add responsibilities not core to the function of the branch 
(or remove responsibilities that are considered core), (4) ensure that the people chosen to 
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be SRAs hold their first loyalty to you (the executive) and have the ideal personality 
profile, and finally (5) while it is important to rely on all of the tools at your disposal 
including a wealth of expertise, never surrender your own critical thought in 
understanding and challenging advice provided to you – even if it is by an expert. With 
these lessons in mind, one should be well equipped to effectively organize and execute 
meaningful reform throughout even the largest bureaucracies.   
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Section 5: Case Studies 
“In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is 
essential that public opinion should be enlightened.”  
– George Washington, September 19, 1796 
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5.1 Puerto Rico – When Centralized Bureaucracies Fail 
 
 Although the majority of this paper has been spent extolling the virtues of 
bureaucracy and discussing ways in which they could be improved, it is equally 
important to highlight the importance of following those lessons and that requires a 
discussion of instances when bureaucracy runs amok.  
 Since our discussion in Chapter 2.3 Bureaucratic Efficiency & Centralization, we 
have implicitly taken for granted that bureaucracies tend to operate best in systems of 
policymaking that are generally centralized. To recall, the primary reasons for this were: 
(1) avoiding unnecessary and wasteful duplication of systems, (2) preventing inconsistent 
policies that are confusing and inequitable to citizens, and (3) generating the closest thing 
a government can achieve to ‘economies of scale.’57 Certainly, a specific analysis of the 
advantages, limitations, and best practices for centralized vs. decentralized policy making 
is deserving of more attention and to ignore its influence would be disingenuous, but such 
an analysis is ultimately beyond the scope of this work. Consequently, this case study 
highlights the factors relevant to centralization of jurisdiction to recognize their effects 
separately from those specifically related to bureaucratic structure.  
 When criticizing the outcomes of centralized systems, many use autocratic and 
totalitarian systems to demonize centralization neglecting other important factors that 
may have contributed to their ruin (e.g. substantially fewer personal freedoms). They 
                                                 
57
 The same decision makers have access to larger, standardized datasets; platforms for large programs 
(social security, healthcare.gov, etc.) are identical across regions thus reducing resources spent replicating 
fixed costs and in cross-system transaction costs; and reducing citizen transaction costs to moving within a 
country.  
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should instead look no further than directly off of the U.S. coast; Puerto Rico is a perfect 
example of a centralized government that is riddled with flaws despite substantial 
protections for personal freedoms. The purpose of this chapter is to use Puerto Rico as a 
case study to (a) assess the valid concerns of those who are concerned about greater 
centralization that may correlate with an expanded bureaucratic arm, as well as (b) 
highlight the importance of the lessons discussed in Sections III and IV by using them as 
a framework for understanding the failure of government on the island.  
 
Puerto Rico – The Situation 
 Puerto Rico is a protectorate of the United States. Ceded by Spain to the U.S. in 
1898 (along with Cuba, the Philippines, and Guam), Puerto Ricans received U.S. 
citizenship beginning in 1917 and the island officially joined the U.S. Commonwealth in 
1952.
cc
 As an “unincorporated territory” or “insular area,” Puerto Rico is in the awkward 
position of not being a state but still being a part of the United States.
cci
 As a protectorate 
of the U.S., the federal government retains the right to apply federal laws to Puerto Rico 
(although they are officially granted local autonomy). However, its lack of statehood 
prevents the Constitution (except guarantees of personal freedom) and many federal laws 
from automatically applying to the territory.
ccii
 This somewhat ambiguous political status 
both helps and hinders the island in a number of ways, which will be debated later.  
 What is not up for debate is the exceedingly distressed situation Puerto Rico finds 
itself in today. To begin, Puerto Rico’s economy faces numerous structural issues – a 
portion of which are arguably caused by poor governance and public policy. In many 
places, positive economic growth can still be considered a sign of distress if it is too low 
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to sustain expected levels of spending, debt, etc. For the past decade, the Puerto Rican 
economy has not merely grown slowly but has actively contracted; which, according to 
former Chief IMF Economist Anne Krueger, “is remarkable for an economy suffering 
neither civil strife nor overt financial crisis.”cciii In a vicious cycle, the poor economic 
situation has led to outmigration and population loss as citizens move to the US mainland 
to find better jobs.
cciv
 As more people (especially those with high skills) leave, the labor 
force and tax base shrink causing even more economic malaise. These forces, among 
others, have led to unsustainable growth in the Puerto Rican government’s debt. With 
over $72 billion in public sector debt, debt has reached over 100% of GNP, triggering 
multiple credit downgrades and the island now borders on the edge of default. To put this 
in perspective, Puerto Rico has more debt than any U.S. state other than New York or 
California while only having the population of Oklahoma and a GDP smaller than 
Kansas.
ccv
 Simply put, Puerto Rico’s economy is in big trouble.  
 As if the purely economic pressures were not enough, Puerto Rico is also hurt by 
a number of exogenous crises. Years of neglect have left the island with a “crumbling 
infrastructure.”ccvi Until 2013, high oil prices resulted in exorbitant energy costs that 
funneled money away from the local economy.
ccvii
 Being an island with an oil-dependent 
energy system, import of fuel alone added a significant premium to electricity costs as 
residents pay an average of $0.22/kWh – multiple times the rates found on the U.S. 
mainland.
ccviii
 Finally, a drought that began in 2013 has resulted in poor access to water 
and some city governments have had to institute strict rationing policies.
ccix
 All of these 
issues further exacerbate the economic woes as companies find themselves in a difficult 
environment for doing business and people are driven away from the island.  
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 The questions now remain: what are the causes of these problems? To what 
degree is the government at fault for making these problems? Are inefficient, centralized 
bureaucracies at fault? Whatever is to blame, what specific responses should the 
government have and how do they inform our understanding of governmental 
organization? 
 
Federal Centralization 
 This section is meant to identify the failures of centralized decision-making 
systems as separable from decisions specific to bureaucratic decision-making. We will 
begin with the problems that centralization at the federal level has caused for Puerto 
Rico. As we will see, when the federal government applies laws that are uniform across 
the United States, it often fails to account for some of the specific situations in places like 
Puerto Rico. In particular, we will look at how the Puerto Rican economy differs from the 
U.S. as a whole and how federal regulation failed to account for these distinctions.  
 One of the key characteristics that makes Puerto Rico a useful example is that, as 
an island, its difference in geography represents a fundamentally different type of 
economy than U.S. mainland which is usually what federal government considers when 
drafting laws. For example, in an effort to promote manufacturing jobs (a capital 
intensive form of labor that is generally sensitive to economies of scale and competition), 
the U.S. Congress passed a series of tax breaks in Section 936 of the U.S. tax code to 
benefit domestic manufacturers operating in Puerto Rico.
ccx
 In the short term, this had the 
effect of bringing manufacturing jobs, pharmaceutical and software development in 
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particular,
58
 to the island. However, properly understood, legislators making these 
incentives should have viewed the tax breaks in one of two ways: (a) a permanent 
subsidy meant to sustain an otherwise inefficient manufacturing economy in Puerto Rico 
indefinitely, or (b) as a temporary subsidy that only served to draw investment away from 
Puerto Rico’s comparative advantages (tourism, low labor costs, etc.). Unfortunately, 
they ended up with the latter when Congress voted in 1996 to phase out Section 936 over 
the next decade.
ccxi
  
 Some pundits argue that these tax breaks are a significant contributing factor to 
Puerto Rico’s current debt problems.ccxii This position is not entirely accurate if we 
assume that this subsidy could not be expected to last forever. Removing the tax breaks 
returned Puerto Rico to the same economic capabilities it maintained prior to the benefits 
– the same issues regarding how to develop the island economically that exist now would 
have equally existed then. Therefore, it is not so much that the tax breaks caused the 
problem so much as they ‘added to the clock’ before Puerto Rico had to face its debt 
problems. Nonetheless, these tax effects highlight a key issue that can arise from 
improper centralization: without sufficient consideration of how individual components of 
a jurisdiction are unique, blanket, uniform regulation can fail to be efficient or effective.  
 Unfortunately, unsustainable federal subsidies are not the only manner in which 
federal regulations have stifled Puerto Rico’s natural comparative advantages. As alluded 
to earlier, Puerto Rico’s labor market differs drastically from that of the mainland. Puerto 
Rico is on an island, making large, tangible capital investments relatively costly. 
                                                 
58
 Due to high transportation costs to and from the island, industries that produce low-weight products 
benefit disproportionately. 
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Furthermore, unlike any other states, Puerto Rico is surrounded by other island nations 
such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas, which all face similar 
restrictions and therefore find their comparative advantage in producing cheap labor in 
lieu of providing cheap capital.  However, the U.S. federal minimum wage of $7.25/hour 
raises average Puerto Rico labor costs to be far greater than its neighbors. For example, a 
Puerto Rican worker would be paid $290 for a 40-hour work week compared to less than 
$60/worker per week paid in the Dominican Republic.
ccxiii
 As one might imagine, when 
Puerto Rico loses this comparative advantage (ex. cheap tourism – a labor intensive 
industry), they sacrifice lots of business to these neighboring countries. Imagine it this 
way: you are planning a trip to the Caribbean. You can choose to go to Puerto Rico where 
you will get sun and beaches and sand and your stay will cost $1,000. Your other option 
is to go to the Dominican Republic where you can also get the same sun and beaches and 
sand but for $300 – less than a third of the price! Which place are you going to choose to 
visit? That is the same question potential tourists are going to ask themselves and it 
shows the powerful predicament Puerto Rico finds itself in.  
 Now before we simplistically begin decrying minimum wages as harmful to the 
economy, let us consider the nuance and context to this analysis.  Puerto Rico finds itself 
in this situation because tourism and cheap labor (without considering artificially 
subsidized industries) is really the only basis on which it can compete. Many expert 
studies have shown that in most cases, minimum wages do not have a substantially 
negative impact on employment and that raising minimum wages can have net positive 
impacts on an economy.
ccxiv
 This reasoning is fairly intuitive as well – in major cities and 
established economies like Los Angeles or San Francisco, minimum wage workers are 
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not performing jobs that can be easily exported to a new, lower cost area. All of the 
restaurants in Los Angeles cannot just pick up and leave for New Mexico because 
Hollywood simply is not going to move with them; and our beloved celebrities are 
certainly not driving hundreds of miles to get their Chipotle. What this tells us is that the 
effectiveness of policies like the minimum wage are contingent on factors that vary from 
place to place – we may want a lower minimum wage in a lower cost area like Puerto 
Rico or Alabama, but be fine having a higher wage in New York. In most cases, the 
federal minimum wage currently plays this role well; since most states have minimum 
wages higher than the federal level, the federal wage provides a useful ‘catch-all’ to set 
the lowest bar and let capable states raise their levels higher. As the mainland U.S. 
economy is reasonably cohesive, this policy tends to work out fine. Unfortunately, when 
there are significant exceptions like Puerto Rico, sometimes it does not quite work out. 
As another warning to making inappropriately uniform policy across a large jurisdiction – 
centralized policy makers need to build in mechanisms that allow for flexibility for 
differing circumstances.
59
 As discussed in Chapter 3.2 Autonomy, this is actually a 
characteristic that properly structured bureaucracies given direct policy-making power 
can be empowered to do.  
 In addition to the effect of the federal minimum wage on the Puerto Rican labor 
force, high federal welfare payments (relative to income and cost of living) disincentivize 
unskilled laborers from looking for work. Through many federal transfer programs such 
as Medicaid and Social Security, low-skill, low-wage Puerto Ricans can receive just as 
                                                 
59
 As applied to minimum wages, this could take the form of pegging regional or state-by-state minimum 
wages based on costs of living, etc. In this way, a centralized policy making institution could still adjust for 
differences between areas.  
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much and sometimes more money in benefits than they would working (wherein they 
would no long qualify in many cases).
ccxv
 One estimate shows that “a household of three 
eligible for food stamps, AFDC, Medicaid, and utilities subsidies could receive $1,743 
per month – as compared to a minimum wage earner’s take-home earnings of 
$1,159.”ccxvi  
 Again, it is important to stress that we cannot reductively conclude that welfare 
benefits are inherently bad and primarily cause laziness. In moderation and with 
sufficient oversight, such benefits can help struggling families take time to search for 
higher paying jobs and allow creative entrepreneurs to take risks in starting their own 
business that they may not otherwise take. The problem(s) as applied to Puerto Rico are 
that the federal programs do not sufficiently account for difference in wages, income, and 
cost of living in unique local situations. Furthermore, an issue specific to these welfare 
policies is that they provide high benefits to a few that are costly to lose, rather than 
fewer, broadly available benefits that face less resistance when being phased out.
ccxvii
  
 As we have noted, improperly applied, blanket centralization can result in very 
poor outcomes. However, all is not lost; we have also learned an important lesson that 
could help even centralized decision making institutions avoid these problems – be 
prepared to make exceptions and extend flexibility of policies to areas with differing 
circumstances. Or better yet, if there is a metric by which these differences can be 
consistently scaled (such as cost of living), build those adaptive measures into the policy 
itself to reduce arbitrariness in policy application. As with any type of organizing 
structure, centralized governments definitely have risks to avoid. However, the mere 
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existence of problematic centralized governments does not summarily discount the 
possibility for a strong and effective set of centralized institutions or bureaucracies.  
 
Territorial (Local) Bureaucracy 
 In addition to some of the issues stemming from centralization at the federal level, 
many of Puerto Rico’s problems are compounded by inefficient and poorly administered 
bureaucracy at the local (territory) level. In a manner unique to Puerto Rico, the territory 
owns and runs in excess of 20 different public corporations. While most other U.S. states 
manage utilities and similar businesses through partially privatized systems/partnerships, 
Puerto Rico instead runs all of these operations itself. Some of the largest include the 
Electric Power Authority (PREPA), the Aqueduct and Sewers Authority (PRASA), the 
Highways and Transportation Authority (HTA), and the government’s financing arm, 
COFINA. These examples will help show us the ways in which government-run 
bureaucracies can run amok and why the government should not be solely responsible for 
operations that can be effectively run in partnership with the free market.  
 The first and probably most significant problem that these state enterprises have is 
that they are beholden to political interests that are often contrary to the long-run goals of 
the agency and territory. As discussed in chapters 2.1 Democracy, Representation, & 
Bureaucratic Capture and 3.2 Autonomy, one of the supposed advantages of bureaucratic 
administration is that it leaves policy implementation to experts who will be the best at 
assessing the options available – failing to do so leaves institutions vulnerable to political 
capture by elected politicians. Unfortunately, Puerto Rico finds itself in this exact 
 212 
 
situation. In large part, the failure of the existing bureaucratic institutions can be blamed 
on the significant degree of political appointments.  
For most of the agencies, the replacement of top bureaucrats is aligned with the 
political election cycle. Therefore, it is commonplace for a political party to immediately 
staff all of the public corporations with their appointees when they win an election; in the 
process, they wipe out expertise and operating continuity from the agency. For example, 
the public utility PREPA appoints a new executive director almost every time a new 
political party gains power. This new director, along with the new party, functionally 
replaces the entire board of directors. This perpetual back-and-forth tends to treat public 
agencies as political tools rather than public resources and greatly reduces their efficacy. 
Furthermore, for PREPA, many of these appointments do not even require expertise in 
engineering, finance, or energy systems to become part of the board. This helps generate 
a culture of incompetence that defeats the supposed purpose of bureaucratic 
administration: having experts make expert decisions.  
Because these agencies are so sensitive and accountable to the political parties in 
charge, they often find it difficult to institute politically difficult but necessary changes. 
Despite running deficits for years, PREPA has been unable to raise electricity prices in 
order to balance its costs or even invest in necessary technology to continue operating. 
Expert reports indicate that PREPA is “using technologies decades out of date,” costing 
significantly more than it could if the proper investments had been made.
ccxviii
  
Similarly, Puerto Ricans continue to pay more for less when it comes to 
education. “Puerto Rico currently has 40% fewer students but 10% more teachers than a 
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decade ago,” and students attending the University of Puerto Rico pay a low, flat tuition, 
regardless of need, that is far lower than on the mainland or even comparable private high 
schools.
ccxix
 While it would be far more efficient to consolidate schools in low population 
areas and increase university tuition (and only extend need-based subsidies), such actions 
would result in significant political backlash as teachers would be laid off and some 
families would face higher education costs.   
Other agencies suffer from over-employment and inflexible labor forces causing 
the territory to issue more new debt to cover recurring expenses such as payroll.
ccxx
 
Significant layoffs would be immediately blamed on the existing administration and 
politicians would face punishment in the next election. This of course deters action that 
may be needed to slim down government and in some cases, may be causing politicians 
to pressure agencies to hire more people, even if they are unnecessary.  
Aside from inordinate labor costs, agencies even find it difficult to collect money 
they are rightfully owed for performed services. Tax evasion is rampant on the island and 
is one of the many reasons government revenue estimates consistently fall short.
ccxxi
 
PREPA finds itself often unable to collect money for electricity it has provided and 
refuses to shut off power to customers with delinquent accounts as such a move would be 
politically unpopular, further incentivizing such behavior.
ccxxii
 Instead, such agencies 
‘bargain’ with customers by offering to arbitrarily reduce the amount they owe in order to 
collect at least some of what the public corporation is owed.
ccxxiii
 Tax collection has 
certainly never been a popular government function; but at the point a government is 
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unable to collect payments due to the political consequences of cracking down, it is clear 
that politics is playing too great a role in day-to-day governance.   
Here we can see many of the dangers of having bureaucracies that are inherently 
political. In an ironic plot twist, increased accountability to elected, political branches of 
government can actually harm the effectiveness of government in doing its job(s). This 
example serves to stress the importance of having government agencies that are 
independent and shielded from other political branches of government to ensure 
continuity from administration to administration (rather than agencies acting as political 
tools) and to allow departments to make difficult, but necessary decisions (Chapter 3.2).  
 
Culture of Incompetence: 
 In addition to the problems caused when bureaucracies are not protected from 
politics, Puerto Rico’s public corporations generally suffer from what is best termed a 
‘culture of incompetence.’ A combination of poor accountability and unqualified 
bureaucrats regularly results in inadequate government responses to new (and old) 
problems.  
 As an example, massive spending aside, Puerto Rico’s budget is also in trouble 
largely due to the inability to perform basic government functions. Not only is the 
Commonwealth unable to collect its taxes, the bureaucrats in charge of the island’s 
finances are unable to track how much money is spent and owed
ccxxiv
 and make 
perpetually inaccurate projections. Every year since 2004, revenue forecasts have 
exceeded their actual collections by about $1.5 billion and (as if things were not bad 
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enough) estimates for tax refunds have also been consistently underestimated.
ccxxv
 The 
treasury is so unequipped and poorly managed that many external experts agree that a 
financial oversight board run by more experienced individuals is critical for a solvent 
financial future for Puerto Rico.
ccxxvi
 
 Among others, there are four main reasons for this chronic bureaucratic failure 
that have been covered in previous chapters. First, reform efforts to date have been 
unsuccessful because they have often been led by the appointment of career officials who 
lack the same experience and urgency as their predecessors (chapters 4.2 and 4.4 
Reform). This may change over the next few years as external financial firms that have 
lent Puerto Rico money are pushing to bring in expert advisors who are not beholden to 
existing bureaucratic institutions. 
Second, rather than hiring a smaller number of qualified specialists for positions, 
a morass of under-experienced workers fill many positions. The government employs 
nearly a third of the island’s populationccxxvii and often have insufficient skill 
requirements when hiring employees (recall how little it takes to be part of the Power 
Authority’s governing board) – a detrimental impact to anyone hoping for a bureaucracy 
based around expert specialization as discussed in Chapter 3.1 Specialization. For the 
employees that are hired, there is little accountability and often not even a measurable 
standard to assess how well workers are performing.  
Third, on account of the lack of measurable performance standards, employee 
compensation is often fixed and unable to reward exceptional work (or punish poor 
performers). Consequently, there may be little incentive to do anything other than show 
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up at work every day, discouraging any impetus to tackle looming institutional threats. 
As discussed in Chapter 3.3 Accountability, properly structured compensation is critical 
to ensuring employees work their hardest but also to attracting individuals with the skills 
and qualifications that Puerto Rican institutions are so badly lacking. Without the 
potential for competitive compensation for their skills, Puerto Rico will likely continue to 
suffer brain drain as their most talented graduates leave for the U.S. mainland.  
Finally, lack of accountability results, as there are few institutional procedures 
wherein public corporations are forced to review the effectiveness of their previous 
policies in projecting a long-run plan. This is not only evident as many of the public 
corporations have pursued the same policies for nearly two decades in the face of 
crumbling infrastructure and budget overruns, but also unsurprising – after all, how could 
we expect institutions who cannot even track how much money they are taking 
in/spending to assess the cost-effectiveness of programs? As chapter 3.3 also notes, 
processes that allow agencies to review their work are the only way that bureaucracies (or 
any organization for that matter) can learn from their mistakes and adapt to the problems 
that confront them.  
 
Conclusion 
  Fortunately, all need not be lost for Puerto Rico. Many of the issues highlighted 
are entirely controllable with the proper changes in public policy – the problems are not 
insurmountable. To begin, there are a number of policy changes at the federal level that 
can correct for the current discrepancies between Puerto Rico’s circumstances and federal 
law. Oddly enough, many of the issues attributed to ‘centralization,’ are largely a result 
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of Puerto Rico’s treatment as a protectorate rather than a fully-fledged state. Ironically, as 
a result, more centralization may actually solve many of these issues.  
 Consider the impact that equal statehood recognition would have for the island. 
Equal levels of federal funding for programs such as Medicare or higher education could 
both improve economic growth and stem the flow of mass migration to the U.S. 
mainland.
ccxxviii
 Similarly, access to the centralized, professional tax collection apparatus 
would offset the poor quality duplication for these functions that are run by the local 
government.
ccxxix
 Finally, access to the U.S. bankruptcy code (particularly Chapter 9) 
would give the island the ability to systematically and legally impair debts that are 
unsustainable.
60
 In essence, centralization or lack thereof may not be the most important 
factor in terms of governance efficacy but rather that one must make a full choice of one 
or the other. Either fully centralize and benefit from the consistent application of federal 
policies so that the island has the same advantages of every other U.S. state or 
decentralize and permit Puerto Rico full autonomy to govern themselves.  
 With regards to the incompetent bureaucracies, the variety of best practices 
discussed throughout this work would be a good first step for rectifying these problems. 
To recall, these include the following:  
                                                 
60
 Currently, Puerto Rico’s protectorate status neither provides them legal access to the U.S. code nor 
allows them to institute their own bankruptcy procedures basically leaving the entire island at the mercy of 
federal courts and bilateral agreements with hedge funds that hold their debt.  
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 Permit policymakers (bureaucratic or otherwise) sufficient autonomy to set 
different thresholds for a given policy
61
 to adapt to varying situations of different 
regions (Autonomy) 
 Ensure that bureaucracies are insulated from political pressures by reducing the 
number of employment conditions based on political appointment and increase 
those based on merit or job qualification (Democracy and Representation, 
Autonomy, & Specialization) 
 Provided measurable standards by which to assess employee performance 
(Accountability) 
 Incentivize performance by making employee pay variable based on the 
performance standards mentioned above (Accountability) 
 Institute formal procedures to ensure that bureaucracies are reviewing the 
effectiveness of past decisions and performance (Accountability) 
 Hire people who have the correct level of urgency and incentive to spearhead 
reform efforts (Implementation & Reform) 
More than anything else, this case helps feature the universalizability of the principles in 
Sections 3 and 4. Failing to take these into consideration is not insignificant – such an 
oversight could have devastating impact on the efficiency and quality of governance.  
 
  
                                                 
61
 It is important to retain the same type of policy from the perspective of platform, implementation, and 
legality in order to still access economies of scale 
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5.2 Japan vs. China 
 
 Japan and China pose a uniquely useful case for considering the material we have 
covered so far: from the broadest themes of the proper role of bureaucracy in a 
democratic society (and a contrast to its role in a non-democratic one) to highlighting the 
radical difference between how a good vs. bad bureaucracy can shape the direction and 
prosperity of a nation.  
Through periods of significant upheaval in both Japan and China, the status of 
their respective bureaucratic classes remained the best indicator of their national stability 
and economic success. That is to say, from the (approximate) period of the 1880s to 
WWII, Japan developed rapidly, largely on account of its superior bureaucratic 
organization and centralized state structure. Meanwhile a decentralized China with a 
progressively less professional civil service faced one of the greatest declines in its 
abnormally long history. In contrast, emergence from WWII resulted in a sudden role 
reversal. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) developed an extensive, centralized, and 
specialized bureaucracy capable of managing radical social and economic changes in the 
years to come. Meanwhile, as strengthening political parties
62
 in Japan began 
aggressively interfering with and dismantling the existing professional civil service the 
politicians were simultaneously captured by a variety of rent-seeking interests in the most 
decisive political capture seen in the developed world.  
                                                 
62
 In reality, it was really just one party - singular 
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Certainly, it would be naïve to pretend as if the state of these countries’ 
bureaucracies was the only variable that affected their relative ability to develop. As a 
consequence, in the interest of full disclosure, the below analysis provides the cases’ 
entire context, much of which will appear irrelevant to the topic of bureaucracy. 
However, as you will hopefully notice, many other factors such as culture, democratic vs. 
autocratic structure, and the status of political elites are largely relevant due to their 
influence on the structures of bureaucracy and the potential for development of a 
centralized, ‘big government,’ administrative state.  
Before beginning, it is important to note that the purpose of case studies is to 
identify common or extendable principles about the variable in question – namely the 
importance of effective and centralized bureaucracy. That is not to say that all aspects of 
a particular case are generalizable nor that just because a series of conditions turned out 
well that all of those conditions ought to be emulated. For example, recognizing some 
aspects of well-organized bureaucracy by the CCP is neither an endorsement of 
authoritarian rule nor communism as ideology. Similarly, recognition that the Japanese 
government had extensive reach into the personal lives of citizens and also happened to 
generate positive bureaucratic outcomes is in no way an endorsement of a similarly 
expansive government reach. Lessons insofar as they can be identified here must be 
contextualized by the respective objectives and needs of a given society. For American 
readers in particular, keep in mind the discussion throughout Section I discussing the 
balancing of various values held by the American polity and use it as a guide in 
determining which lessons are directly transferrable and which aspects are not.  
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1880-1945: Why Did Japan Progress While China Plodded? 
From the period of 1880-1945 (the Meiji era in Japan), this paper asserts that 
modernization was more successful in Japan than in China due to a stronger national 
identity and flexibility to permit change. This conclusion is in line with modern historians 
who are beginning to recognize and emphasize the larger impact of macro-level social 
disruption rather than technical micro-policies in their narratives on industrialization and 
progress.
ccxxx
 As such, Japan soon discovered that one of the easiest ways to generate a 
state-centric national identity was simply greater presence of the State – for better or 
worse, “expansive government”63 undeniably has the impact of increasing social reliance 
on the state. As John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman highlight in “China: A New 
History,” “the one thing essential for the industrialization of late-comers like Japan or 
Russia was government leadership.”ccxxxi Conversely, the relative weakness of the 
Chinese government in day-to-day lives likely explains China’s inability to modernize 
quickly.
ccxxxii
 
Japan was clearly aided in its development by “an emerging national 
consciousness” that occurred during the Meiji era.ccxxxiii Supported by neo-Confucian 
ideals about respect for authority generally and the government in particular, the 
developing bureaucratic state was considered widely legitimate. This meant the Japanese 
were both psychologically prepared for change that was generated by reform and 
recognition of the State as the most legitimate actor to facilitate these social 
adjustments.
ccxxxiv
  
                                                 
63
 In contrast to ‘big government’ which is meant to describe the size of the governing apparatus to achieve 
its objectives, ‘expansive government’ is meant to describe the level to which government action reaches 
into people’s personal lives. While big government tends to be a corollary of expansive government, the 
reverse need not be true as the concepts are theoretically independent.  
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As manifested in Japan, neo-Confucian ideals helped the populace embrace 
change through a commitment to learning/accumulation of knowledge from the outside 
world and a self-sacrificial attitude towards the nation that likely reduced the threat of 
explosive unrest resulting from change.
64, ccxxxv
 In the words of Sibusawa Eiichi, “the 
secret to success […] is the determination to work for the sake of society and of mankind 
as well as for the future of the nation, even if it means sacrificing oneself.” By contrast, 
neither the Chinese scholarly elite nor common people were prepared to depart from 
traditional “Chinese learning” and this lack of flexibility likely translated in a general 
“lack of responsiveness” to a world developing around them.ccxxxvi 
The adoption of these attitudes in Japan was greatly advanced by compulsory 
education instituted by the centralized Meiji government which ensured that everyone 
had a unified understanding of their relation to the state
ccxxxvii
 and a broader 
understanding of the foreign threat that existed if Japan was left behind (spurring local 
pressure toward reform, rather than away from it). In tandem, the government changed 
curriculum to emphasize state unity and state-centric moralistic ideals in response to the 
threat of resistance.
ccxxxviii
 In essence, higher rates of education and literacy in 
combination with a centralized school system helped cultivate a unified ‘Japanese 
identity’ that prevented local factionalism.   
Japanese elites focused the locus of this newfound Japanese identity around the 
mythic image of the historically irrelevant emperor (not dissimilar to the sense of mythic 
reverence Americans feel towards the Constitution).
ccxxxix
 Nonetheless, even the national 
                                                 
64
 This was also supported by a generally more colored history in Japan of using foreign ideas, 
technologies, and developments. 
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identity of the Emperor would not have ensured the success of modernization without a 
general reliance on the competence of the Japanese state.  Unlike China where 
governance was fairly local and tended to avoid interference beyond basic public 
institutions, Japanese rule extended into everyday life for the Japanese people. This likely 
increased the efficiency and speed with which reforms could be implemented and made 
people more reliant on the state as they became used to the benefits provided by high 
quality government institutions. Certainly when the people have a vested interest in the 
government’s continued existence, it seems reasonable to expect fewer revolutionary 
tendencies to overthrow the institutions that be. 
Beyond education, a focus on meritocratic recruiting into all government 
positions assuredly improved the quality of government services/actions.
65
 Assisted by 
the neo-Confucian ideals of meritocracy, Japan opened its administrations to a broader 
pool of talent
ccxl
 and began civil service examinations for recruitment in 1887.
66, ccxli
 By 
contrast, while China originally began with similar merit-based recruitment for its 
institutions, broader corruption in addition to dilution of the curriculum for civil service 
examinations culminating in the abolishment of the examination system altogether further 
perpetuated an unpreparedness for nationally directed reform.  
While unrelated to bureaucracy, the final important factors in establishing a 
legitimate, unified national identity were anti-imperialist concerns and a sense of gradual 
change. Concerns of foreign domination almost universally help generate nationalist 
                                                 
65
 It also played a contributing role to a sense of social mobility which will be discussed later. 
66
 Recall both previous lessons concerning the importance of technical competence (Chapter 3.1 
Specialization) and morale that is generated from mobility within a bureaucracy that is based on one’s 
efforts (Chapter 4.2 Implementation) 
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tendencies to resist occupation or subjugation. While this was true for both Japan and 
China, it was likely of graver concern to Japan due to the Iwakura Mission and the threat 
not fully realized in China until it was too late.
ccxlii
 While a helpful factor (indeed, what 
eventually spurred sufficient Chinese nationalism during Japanese occupation), at the 
time it was ultimately not enough alone to combat other factors resisting Chinese 
modernization. Concurrently, Japan’s ‘head start’ in instituting reforms in response to 
these concerns gave them enough time to institute gradual change that did not appear to 
attack core values and institutions. While initially resisted, pre-industrial reforms like 
compulsory education and military were resisted, but “eventually […] became a well-
accepted obligation.”ccxliii As noted earlier, these key institutions for later reform gained 
legitimacy over time. Were these reforms to be introduced simultaneously with broad 
industrialization, Japan may have faced significantly more resistance and threat of revolt 
due to a perception of ‘destroying the Japanese identity’ as functionally happened during 
the transitions in Chinese educational curricula. 
One lesson here is important – acceptance of changed or new institutions take 
time and may best be done gradually. As discussed in Chapter 4.3 Reform, it is important 
to keep in mind your level of political capital at any given moment when pursuing 
reform, lest a critical mass of the powers that be come to oppose you.  
Admittedly, there are far more factors that affected the relative development of 
the Chinese and Japanese economies during this period. Some of these include relevant 
control of their tax bases,
ccxliv
 ability to democratize and integrate new technology,
ccxlv
 
education levels with regards to containing inequality from industrialization,
ccxlvi
 and the 
 225 
 
structuring of industrial reforms so as not to alienate powerful societal elites.
ccxlvii
 While 
none of these reveal any unique insights about bureaucracy in particular, it is critical to 
note that all but the last of these variables were largely determined by Japan’s transition 
to a centralized governing structure and implementation of a professional civil service 
that was able to quickly, cheaply, and uniformly implement these policies on a national 
scale.  
 
1945 – 2007: Chinese Rise, the Unitary Party, and the Death of Japanese 
“Democracy” 
 One of the most fascinating aspects of the Japan/China case is the significant role 
reversal between the two countries that closely tracked the efficiency of their 
bureaucracies (measured by speed and cost of policy implementation, not necessarily the 
quality of any given decision). On the Japan side, the rise of structurally democratic 
influence resulted in a democratic capture while simultaneously reducing the autonomy 
of bureaucracy. As discussed both in chapters 2.1 Democracy, Representation & 
Bureaucratic Capture and 3.2 Autonomy, these changes had a highly damaging effect on 
Japan’s otherwise efficient bureaucracy as increased micromanagement by captured 
Japanese politicians translated into a de facto captured bureaucracy. Meanwhile the CCP 
developed an extensive bureaucratic apparatus that was able to implement policies 
quickly with a great deal of political insulation. Of course, in the Chinese case, this 
insulation came at the cost of any formal democratic voice and a lack of responsiveness 
to citizen needs engendered by the lack of political opposition. However, it would be 
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difficult to deny that for an autocratic state, China has done an unusually good job at 
stably managing a vast nation and facilitating rapid economic growth.  
 Before we get into the specific facts of Japan and China during the time period 
from 1945 – 2007, it is important outline the important implications they will suggest. 
Furthermore, we must revisit some of the discussion from Chapter 2.1 in order to 
contextualize these situations and explain how exogenous factors (namely, the rise of a 
single dominant political group hereafter referred to as the “Unitary Party” 67) had a 
negative impact on governance outcomes independent of the quality of their 
bureaucracies.  
This paper asserts that the lesson to be learned from post WWII Japan and China 
is that the structure of a largely Bureaucratic State
68
 is likely superior to that of a Political 
State.
69
 The ultimate success or failure of democratic governing procedures (in terms of 
public responsiveness and effectiveness) is contingent on the structure of the participating 
parties. In particular, democratic governance is rendered ineffective when political parties 
engage in political ‘capture’ and rely on a system of clientelism to remain successful. As 
a corollary, while strong states (as might be typified by the Bureaucratic State or to a 
lesser extent, the Chinese Communist Party) are well-empowered to respond to citizens’ 
concerns or changing circumstances, virtually unrivaled strong parties are ultimately 
                                                 
67
 To further clarify the definition of a Unitary Party, it can be seen as a party that is so successful that it is 
virtually unchallengable – whether in a democratic system or not, the Unitary Party ultimately has enough 
influence to single-handedly pass/direct policy and is stable enough to retain control over multiple years.  
68
 In some cases synonymous with the “Modern Administrative State,” the “Bureaucratic State” is a country 
governed ostensibly with a politically autonomous/insulated bureaucracy rather than micromanagement by 
formally elected politicians.  
69
 The reverse of a “Bureaucratic State,” policies in the “Political State” are micromanaged by formal 
political officials (or political appointees made to a bureaucracy) without regard to their expertise in a 
particular subject matter. In a Political State, a bureaucracy (if it exists at all) is merely a direct extension of 
legislative power.  
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detrimental to active governance. This results from the methods of political maneuvering 
that are likely to ensure the necessary success of the Unitary Party:  namely, either that 
the party relies on a base too broad to risk considering substantive reforms or that the 
party successfully gains reliable support through methods of clientelism, which 
ultimately leaves citizens thinking of the voting process on a demographic rather than 
ideological basis. Ultimately, this section makes two conclusions: (1) that in a democratic 
system, the Unitary Party (often referred to as “successful” parties) fails to effectively 
govern, and (2) the China and Japan example demonstrates that, independent of factors 
such as centralized political power, initial starting points of economic development, and 
(on the margin) differences in cultural homogeneity, bureaucratic quality remains a 
defining characteristic of good governance.  
The Success of Parties 
 To put bureaucracies, particularly for these cases, in their political context, let us 
begin with an assessment of how parties cultivate and maintain their strength generally. 
Let us further make a simplistic but useful distinction between two main ways that 
political parties can gather strength. Namely, accruing a political following might be 
thought of either primarily ideological or primarily demographic (ex. Patronage-based, 
clientelistic, etc.) As an illustration, an ideological political society is one where the 
members (voters, politicians, rulers) discuss political issues from the perspective of what 
might be in the interest of society as a whole; similar to what Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
refers to as “the general will.”ccxlviii Similarly, political members might advocate for 
policies on the basis of principled ideologies that they believe should represent the 
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guiding values or tenets that should govern society. Indeed, many Americans admire the 
quality of the American founders. Renowned political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes 
that “[a]t least part of the reason for [America’s] strong leadership was that America was 
not a full democracy but rather a highly elitist society,” which articulated opinions rooted 
in a broader public interest rather than a ‘rational’ self-interest.ccxlix By contrast, a 
demographic political society is one where members vote or make political decisions as a 
corollary to their self or demographic interests. 
 The importance of this distinction is the way in which the political system affects 
party behavior. An ideological perspective might shift over time in response to changing 
circumstances or political commitments and does not require any specific set of policies 
except insofar as they are in accordance with the prevailing ideological commitments of 
the time. Conversely, to earn ‘patronage’ of a demographic, a party might require 
extensive and expensive policies targeted to appease a variety of bases or local interest. 
These policies are generally less susceptible to review or change as such action would 
risk offending/losing the relevant base. However, a patronage-based system may be more 
common in large democratic systems as they are significantly more stable from a party’s 
perspective: it provides a base of support that can be relied on despite changing 
circumstances or even varying governance success. One could even assert that mass 
ideological consensus is so difficult to achieve (even more so to maintain) that 
demographic politicking is virtually the only way to sustain a Unitary Party that is so 
successful/dominant that it dwarfs any competition.  
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 Clientelism is often a function of demographic politics described above. 
Specifically, clientelism is the implicit exchange wherein politicians rely on citizens’ 
support by guaranteeing specific, local, and potentially rent-seeking benefits that 
localities can benefit from, sometimes at the expense of more efficient national goals. On 
a theoretical level, “[i]t is impossible to understand the rise of clientelism except in the 
context of the emergence of modern democracy and the appearance of the first mass 
political parties,”ccl as large parties lend sufficient political capital to accommodate rent-
seeking policies and are in turn perpetuated by an assortment of these interests. As 
discussed in Chapter 2.1, the risk of clientelism and its outsized impact on democratic 
capture is a fundamental advantage of politically insulated bureaucracies – both from the 
perspective of economic efficiency and democratic equality. 
 Whether in an ideological or demographic political society, mass mobilized 
parties may have efficiency issues in-and-of themselves as they rely on so many branches 
of support that they are functionally immobilized from enacting substantive or wide-
ranging reforms. This is not to say that mass mobilized parties do not provide important 
benefits in modern democracies. Parties manage to overcome collective action problems, 
generate democratic interest, and help clearly articulate positions and policies.
ccli
 
However, often, mass mobilized parties and even more, the formation of the Unitary 
Party, achieved through the advent of clientelism defies a framework of checks and 
balances. While a Madisonian theory of factionalism argues that competing interest 
groups check/balance each other by legitimately trying to appease a multitude of these 
groups simultaneously and thus improving the quality of democracy,
cclii
 these effects 
disappear when the number of interest groups becomes quite small. The important 
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conclusion from this is that the benefits of political parties in many ways require the 
existence of multi-party pluralism. 
 Ultimately, the development of mass parties further reduces the responsiveness of 
government. Mass mobilized or Unitary parties that rely on a broad base of support (think 
– the Democratic Party in the U.S.) will find itself facing many challenges in passing 
wide-spread reforms. Either the party will be unable to risk upsetting an existing 
constituency, it will fail to form a coherent policy out of a group of disparate and 
diverging interests, or it will be unable to cater to newly developing social groups.
70
 This 
presents two scenarios for proponents of bureaucracy: either a mass party is unresponsive 
to democratic desires in which case bureaucracies that are at least nominally responsive 
as noted in Chapter 2.1 may be preferable. Or we have the luxury of living in a multi-
party system in which case all of the other discussion of bureaucracy throughout this 
work in compatibility with a system of more responsive elected officials.  
 
The Success of States 
 The next important distinction is the difference between the Political and 
Bureaucratic State. At a generalized level, this dichotomy is centered on whether the 
locus of policy making is located in democratically or politically exposed branches of 
government (often, a legislature) or a more autonomous, politically insulated branch 
(often, an executive branch or administrative agency). This paper asserts that a 
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 Tt least until they reach a critical mass such that they can functionally support their own, new, mass party 
(one that may face all the same problems of the other mass parties) 
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Bureaucratic State, which develops policies through professional, politically insulated 
administrations, tends to produce more targeted, comprehensive, and largely effective 
legislation than a Political State. For this point Japan serves as a particularly useful 
example as it could be best described as a ‘Bureaucratic State’ from the Meiji era through 
the beginning of the post-occupation period. However, with the rise of strong political 
parties and a more legislature-heavy constitution, Japan eventually transitions to a 
‘Political State.’  
 One issue that governments, particularly political ones, face is the threat of 
(democratic) political capture. As discussed earlier, political capture represents any 
instance in which an inefficient decision is made solely as the result of a political calculus 
to unduly favor one segment of society over another. This could manifest in a number of 
ways, including the need to appease local, demographic interests for votes (as described 
earlier); the need to appease moneyed interests to finance campaigns; the need to make 
appointments to important administrative positions on the basis of political motive 
instead of skill, talent, or experience; or a need to provide rent-seeking policies to some 
influential interest group. Political capture can occur any time a personal or local interest 
has the ability to interfere with policy decision making. For obvious reasons, this can 
happen far more readily (although not exclusively) to democratic regimes than 
authoritarian ones.  
  However, reconsider one of the themes discussed throughout this paper: one of 
the ways that a government, democratic states in particular, can help shield public policy 
from democratic capture is to vest policy making authority in professional, technocratic 
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administrations that are granted a certain degree of autonomy. The U.S. succeeded in 
creating “the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control, the armed 
services, and the Federal Reserve [which] are among the most technically competent, 
well-run, and autonomous government bodies anywhere in the world.”ccliii This autonomy 
grants greater consistency and predictability in terms of policy execution, permits the rise 
of policies and people on the basis of merit rather than status, and better upholds the 
concept of rule of law.    
 
Japan 
The development of modern, post-WWII Japan is characterized namely by the 
rise and continuing dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Since the Meiji 
era, Japan was ruled by an oligopoly with limited democratic participation; an efficient, 
educated, and competent bureaucratic administration; and managed to rapidly 
modernize/industrialize far faster than any of its Asian neighbors in the early 1900s. 
While these successes continued through the first few decades following occupation, 
Japan began to slowly decline in terms of its political responsiveness. Beginning with the 
consolidation of the Liberal and Democratic parties (founding the LDP) and merger of 
the two wings of the Socialist Party in 1955, Japan came to be dominated by mass 
political parties.
ccliv
 A while after this consolidation was completed, Japan came to enter a 
number of political and economic crises including the inability to satisfactorily 
renegotiate the terms of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the Lost Decade(s) beginning 
in the early 1990s. 
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The correlation between this transition and the effectiveness of Japanese 
government is no accident. During the Meiji era, “politicians were not interested in the 
daily considerations of policy or the drafting of laws. […] Policy was used as a way of 
protesting.”cclv That is to say, the Japanese legislature, the Diet, exercised power to 
oppose the default of centralized bureaucratic administration rather than holding 
responsibility for drafting all parts of public policy. Even during the period directly post-
occupation, economic bureaucrats used “informal mechanisms of state intervention in the 
economy [that] came to be called administrative guidance.”cclvi Up until the ultimate 
consolidation of the LDP in the 1980s, Japanese bureaucracies such as the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) were described as “small, inexpensive, but elite 
state bureaucrac[ies] staffed by the best managerial talent available in the system.”cclvii In 
this manner, bureaucratic policy direction was used to great success. However, the 
transition away from this bureaucratically centered model to a broader form of 
democracy left this governing structure vulnerable to democratic political capture. 
 With regards to law-making more generally, Japan has a particularly unique 
approach. “While the western democracies regard the formulation and decision of policy 
as a single function, the Japanese regard it as two,”cclviii not dissimilar to the politics vs. 
administration dichotomy examine in Chapter 2.2 Efficiency vs. Politics. As a result, 
Japan’s law-making process is split into two tracks: The policy affairs research council 
(similar to the U.S. Senate sub-committee system) and the executive council (the 
metaphorical equivalent of the U.S. Senate itself). Yamamoto Katsuichi, a Japanese 
lower minister and economics professor describes it thusly: “’the policy affairs research 
council is where the specialists’ decisions are made. The executive council is where the 
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political decisions are made.’”cclix During the Meiji era and throughout the war, the policy 
council was not considered to be of great political concern and was generally left to a 
lower party official (sometimes not a party official at all) with past experience in 
administration.
cclx
 As a social matter, the policy council chairmanship was never regarded 
as equivalent to the leader of a party - the council reflected the will of the government, 
not the parties which were only marginally relevant. However, the introduction of more 
widespread democracy through the new constitution changed this balance. The 
chairmanship is now quite coveted in Japanese politics and has been host to a number of 
Japanese politicians. Consequently, we might draw parallels between the politicization of 
the post so central to basic policy construction and the relative decline in the 
government’s ability to meaningfully act in terms of policy progression or reform.  
 Even in terms of political administration (as opposed to policy development), 
Japan is left with a number of political/democratic vulnerabilities in its decision making 
process(es). The economist Toichiro Asada points out that, economic ideas are not the 
central limitation on economic policy as political/institutional constraints affect economic 
policy just as much. “In the case of Japan, the government was and still is divided, with 
the opposition parties holding the majority of one of two diets, and there is not inflation-
targeting framework despite the ‘independence’ of the Bank of Japan”cclxi This was likely 
a key component prolonging the depression of Japan’s economy for more than two 
decades since the 1990s. 
In addition to the lack of independence between political decision making and 
policy construction, widespread participation and influence in the democratic process 
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spurred the formation of political parties which could rely on demographic methods of 
gaining political support rather than ideological ones. As historian Andrew Gordon points 
out, “[i]n the 1950s the LDP sought alliances with a variety of social constituencies […] 
The LDP concluded the first of several implicit social contracts with the millions of 
farmers who had taken ownership of their fields under the land reform.”cclxii Similarly, the 
LDP functionally bought off “the huge population of [small] business owners” by taxing 
them lightly and passing the Department Store Law in 1956. The Department Store Law 
instituted a series of zoning restrictions which prevented the rise of larger, non-family 
owned stores that existing small business owners may not have been able to compete with 
due to economies of scale.
cclxiii
 To a lesser extent, Gordon also notes that the LDP 
strongly supported certain union interests which ultimately rounded off a broad base of 
political support that was virtually unrivaled.
cclxiv
 
This type of clientelism extends beyond broadly demographic interests and can 
also affect the actions of individual statesmen and representatives. For a number of 
campaign and other expenses, “the Dietman is expected to pay handsomely. […] Since 
the villager is inclined to give his support to the politician who does the most for him, 
there is vigorous competition among the politicians over who can supply the most 
largesse for the community.”cclxv Local economic clientelism is also quite pervasive: 
village elders often expect representatives to pay for many local or private events (boy 
scout trips, monetary gifts for weddings/funerals, etc.).
cclxvi
 Handling these issues creates 
further inefficiencies as representatives now require extensive staffs in order to process, 
manage, and respond to these various interests which further drain national resources. In 
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many ways, this clientelism is what permits and perpetuates the success of the LDP in 
ruling Japan over the past six decades. 
A large, powerful economy such as Japan’s might be able to survive just an 
economic drain on national resources alone. However, the LDP is further immobilized as 
a function of their broad-based demographic support as the party cannot engage in 
serious reform or redirect wide-reaching national policies without the risk of upsetting 
given constituencies. Through the 1960s-1970s, the LDP was becoming “a big tent party” 
and thusly needed to accommodate the interests of far more demographic factions.
cclxvii
 
While in its initial stages, this may appear to be an increased level of political 
responsiveness, the eventual consolidation resulted in policy paralysis which destroyed 
the effectiveness of the Japanese state. As an example, in 1975, public sector employees 
(a non-key demographic to the LDP) attempted to demand greater protection from recent 
inflation. “Over one million public sector workers participated in the Strike for the Right 
to Strike. […] The labor movement could not mobilize on a broad front”cclxviii Despite 
requesting similar rights as the private sector unions which generally received at least 
compromise support from the LDP, the public sector workers were functionally crushed 
by a government that no longer required their support to succeed. Beyond an ability to 
resist responding to individual interest groups, major policy reform that threatens the 
‘protected’ status that farmers or large corporations currently enjoy seems unlikely as 
they retain the ability to force the ruling LDP away from such courses of action.  
 To highlight this, we can observe the specific failures of the LDP’s governance of 
Japan after consolidating its power. For example, the party was unable to respond to 
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serious environmental concerns on its own. In the 1970’s, students and local farmers 
opposed the construction of an airport in Chiba prefecture on environmental/pollution 
concerns.
cclxix
 “It was only after highly publicized pitched battles between heavily 
armored police and the fiercely opposed farmers and students that the airport finally 
opened.”cclxx In the end, the anti-pollution groups failed to force change with regards to 
economic policy despite “reach[ing] out to build strong networks of support 
nationwide.”cclxxi In the end, change in Japanese environmental policies had to be 
facilitated by non-democratic judicial decisions as a number of landmark court decisions 
regarding pollution were made from 1971 to 1973.
cclxxii
 This is significant as it reflects 
the lack of responsiveness coming from the legislature.  
As another example, during the same time period, local elections for mayor or 
governorship ultimately determined the responsiveness of the Japanese government. 
“This trend was dubbed the era of ‘progressive local government.’ It was an unusual 
moment in Japan’s modern history when local governments ran ahead of the national 
government. […] The central bureaucracy and the LDP responded to these unprecedented 
gains for the opposition by joining rather than fighting.”cclxxiii Here, the local governments 
and remaining independent bureaucracies, less concerned with national political efforts 
than bureaucratic administration of specific territories, were ultimately the ‘most’ 
responsive to the people’s needs. The national government was ultimately unable to 
respond to the issues until dragged by the sizable demographic coalitions built at the level 
of the local governments. Problems ranging from the lack of flexibility in monetary and 
fiscal policies through the 1990s-2000s to the inability of the government to fully reflect 
citizens’ serious concerns about the status of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty demonstrates 
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what can happen when an efficiently managed bureaucratic state improperly transitions to 
a politically captured democracy of mass parties.  
 Ultimately, the degradation of the Japanese state can be attributed to the methods 
of political capture listed above. The deadly combination of democratic political capture 
and demographic politics in Japan is best articulated by Japanese statesman (speaker of 
the lower house) after retirement: “When asked what was wrong with Japanese politics, 
he answered, ‘First of all, the electorate is at fault. […] they force the politicians to spend 
money on them.’”cclxxiv Given that democratic ‘accountability’ can only be narrowed to 
local constituents/interests, there is an outsized incentive and ability to get politicians to 
support potentially inefficient financial allocations to fund local projects or benefit 
interest groups. This ultimately has detrimental effects to the efficacy of national policy. 
When interest groups are able to influence their political agents that control bureaucratic 
agencies, these politicians can be directed to force agencies to adopt complex and often 
self-contradicting rules leaving them unable to leverage their professional expertise 
implement commonsense solutions.
cclxxv
 In addition to issuing self-defeating public 
policy, micro-management control of budgets can also be seen as a core limitation of the 
political state. In contrast to Japan, European nations largely leave control of drafting and 
directing budgets to formation by the executive branch, affording significantly more input 
from the relevant agencies and helping preserve the autonomy of the Bureaucratic State.  
 Another important component of political capture is not the result of external 
groups, but rather the direction of appointments for potentially apolitical and professional 
administrative roles to party members as a means to internally control the party. In Japan, 
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“politicians standing at the peak of the hierarchy got first shot at the cabinet and favored 
party posts.”cclxxvi However, given the LDP’s dominance, the party is split into a number 
of ‘factions’ that represent a small, but at least partially diverse range of regional and 
ideological interests. Strength and loyalty to the faction is also considered in assignment 
of positions within the party and government.
cclxxvii
 This structure further divides the 
internal politics of the party and prevents the LDP from truly gathering common support 
for major initiatives, which was identified above as one of the primary purposes for 
political parties. Similarly, political appointment to government positions might not be 
exceedingly onerous so long as the authority of the positions were confined to agency 
direction and oversight rather than administrative policy making. However, in Japan, 
“[a]ppointment to a ministerial post is also supposed to offer the opportunity for 
fundraising. […] Another reason why Dietmen want to become ministers is that none of 
the top positions in the party are open them until they have had ministerial 
experience.”cclxxviii With such incentives, even the day-to-day administration is left to 
political actors who may see their job as a means to an end rather than an important and 
solemn duty in-and-of itself.  
 
China 
In contrast to Japan, the Chinese Communist Party managed to begin with a state 
that was weak at best, non-existent at worst, yet managed to transition to a relatively 
successful modern state. A number of key factors here include the central direction of an 
authoritarian state that was resistant to the influence of interest groups or local politics as 
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well as the development and increased reliance on a professional technocratic class of 
bureaucrats.  
While new Japanese parties predicated their political success on demographic 
support and clientelist favors, the Chinese Communist Party managed to achieve its 
widespread success within a framework of ideological politics rather than demographic-
specific pandering.
71
 “In China, the state was colonized not by patronage politicians but 
by a disciplined Leninist party that sought to subordinate it to its own ideological 
purposes.”cclxxix Beyond the difference in how politics was framed, the very structure of 
Chinese political organizations differed greatly from that of democracies. In liberal 
democracies, parties are primarily responsible for ‘representing’ their constituents and 
bringing both attention and resolution to those interests. In China, parties were instead 
regarded as the primary organizational unit for developing state institutions and 
industry.
cclxxx
 These differences highlight the relative strengths and weakness of modern 
Japan and China in responding to public concerns or changing circumstances. 
This paper argues that the extent to which Chinese industrialization and 
reformation was successful was largely predicated on the creation of a professional 
bureaucratic class. “[T]he First Five Year Plan and Soviet-aid projects nurtured CCP’s 
first generation of technocratic bureaucrats. […] It was from these people [trainees of 
Soviet expertise] onwards that CCP technocratic bureaucracy started to emerge as a 
distinct social-political elite group in the Party and China’s economic governance 
system.”cclxxxi While certainly not the entire reason for the success of China’s 
                                                 
71
 Note that this was largely accomplished due to military dominance, rendering extreme political 
pandering relatively superfluous.  
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development, the parallel formation of the bureaucratic class and swift progress in China 
is an important factor in explaining their rapid national growth.  
 As a structural matter, it would appear that a more wide-spread democratic system 
is particularly vulnerable to these threats. It is true that patronage exists in all 
authoritarian regimes, but electoral democracies leave the state uniquely vulnerable to the 
issues of political capture highlighted above.
cclxxxii
 During the consolidation of the 
modern Chinese state, Chinese leaders recognized the weakness on the international state 
produced by a weak state apparatus. While at the time, decentralization was arguably a 
more pressing issue, it is unclear how a strong, centralized state could have been formed 
with the early introduction of democracy. As founder of the nationalist party, Sun Yat-
sen described in 1945, “[b]ecause of too much ‘freedom’, China has had no organization, 
no resisting power, and has become a pan of loose sand so that she has been subjected to 
the encroachment of foreign imperialism […] To resist foreign oppression, we must 
curtail ‘individual freedom’ and form a solid organization, like putting cement into loose 
sand to make it a solid rock.”cclxxxiii It appears reasonably clear that following the civil 
war, the Communist party managed overcome both the weakness of the central state and 
avoid the potential for weak, undirected action that could have resulted from the creation 
of a democratic state on top of a socially and ethnically fractured nation. Functionally, 
this emphasizes the need for government authority to be sufficiently centralized in order 
to sustain a bureaucracy that can reach and unify the various parts of a nation. 
 Empirically speaking, this policy flexibility was wielded with great success. 
While recovering from a traumatic civil war, the new Chinese government managed to 
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quickly industrialize despite beginning without important institutions such as reliable tax 
collection. In spite of particular poor economic policies such as the Five Year Plans, the 
bureaucratic apparatus managed to institute a very fast ‘trial-and-error’ process to test 
new programs. Unlike the Soviet Union which carried autocratic Communism with an 
ideological fervor that drove it into the ground, the Chinese bureaucracy was willing to 
‘test’ Special Economic Zones (SEZs) when existing programs were failing. As these 
tests began yielding positive results, transition to more capitalist models was instituted 
quite rapidly. If anything, the failure of particular Chinese/communist policies highlights 
the high levels of responsiveness that effectively organized bureaucracies can exhibit.  
 Consider the supposed benefits we have discussed from Japan’s path through 
modernization: a strong and ideologically motivated leadership, the development of a 
professional bureaucracy, and the insulation of policy decisions from political influence. 
Furthermore, we have claimed that as the correlation between the diminishing of these 
factors and the devolution of Japan’s governance quality is meaningful. This correlational 
claim becomes more compelling as China saw the opposite effects during the same time 
period (controlling for global trends at the time). This is evidenced in China by the fact 
that Mao, Deng Xiaoping, and the Chinese Communist Party to manage to conduct 
massive policy changes in the face of a historic lack of centralized government control in 
China with relative ease. That is not to say that all the policies, when implemented, were 
effective. Rather, conducting the overhaul in policy did not require a concurrent overhaul 
in bureaucracy. Indeed, “[i]f there is a single quality that would seem to distinguish the 
Chinese party-state from those of other developing countries, it is its degree of 
autonomy.”cclxxxiv Rather than operating as a mere mouthpiece for local or powerful 
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interests, the Communist party has been able to set independent policies that are subject 
to quick and efficient reversal when policies appear to be ineffective.  
 
Conclusion 
 This case provides us a valuable look at the confluence of lessons we have learned 
throughout this paper and their interaction with a variety of other variables. In 
particularly, this case demonstrates that, generally speaking, a centralized government 
that either is generally protected from democratic influences or operates a sufficiently 
autonomous bureaucracy can be successful. Given that Americans should be unwilling to 
surrender their democratic voice, even for higher quality policymaking, the semi-
autonomous bureaucracy seems to be the clear option to get the best of both worlds. 
However, without heeding these considerations, systems that remain vulnerable to 
democratic political capture are ultimately doomed to immobilization.  
 As we have observed, “Chinese style autonomy” permitted to Communist party to 
act relatively free of interest groups, procedural constraints, or the need to participate in 
demographic politicking.
cclxxxv
 With proper leadership committed to the public interest, 
such autonomy “allows the government to move much more quickly and dramatically on 
policy issues than its democratic counterparts.”cclxxxvi Although some of the mechanisms 
of Chinese reform/industrialization may have been distasteful, it is undeniable that it 
permitted an unprecedented level of development in a relatively short period of time.  
 That is not to say that the Chinese system does not have its issues. China expert 
Minxin Pei highlights a number of issues that the Chinese bureaucracy specifically faces 
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which may be the result of too much autonomy and development that outpaces proper 
regulation. In the modern Chinese bureaucracy, “subordinate units of the state have 
become […] able to protect their own political and economic positions regardless of 
performance, and resist discipline from higher levels of the state and party.”cclxxxvii 
Additionally, the rapid development of China risks the possibility that the government 
will lose control over social actors that gained power through the rapid economic 
growth.
cclxxxviii
 However, while many of these limitations are specific to China, they 
reflect they reflect the importance of having a multi-party democratic system that will 
challenge the existing administration as an important complement to healthy bureaucratic 
structures.  
The lessons that other nations are able to learn from these examples are numerous. 
Foremost, the legislature should afford more autonomy to professionally administered 
bureaucracy. Rather than micro-managing policies, the legislature should instead start out 
by giving agencies broad powers with particular mandates. From there the role of the 
legislature can be to veto particularly poor decisions that the agencies make and eliminate 
branches that become obsolete. Given many Western liberals’ attachment to democracy 
(the U.S. and Europe are unlikely to transition to single-party authoritarian states), 
citizens should be wary of the formation of a party that attempts to govern too many 
competing or non-aligned interests and should consider reforms to permit greater 
electoral rewards to the success of smaller, issue-specific parties. Finally, a strong 
bureaucratic organization is important for protecting the quality of policymaking in the 
worst-case scenarios. In spite of the rise of the Unitary CCP, the insulation of the 
technocracy left the government marginally responsive and highly efficient in removing 
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failing policies. In essence, for those most concerned that a ‘big government authoritarian 
takeover’ is inevitable – an empowered and professional bureaucracy may actually be 
your best bet.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1.1 
C = Cost 
S = Speed  
Q = Quality  
m = number of organizational levels 
n = number of people per management node 
y = number of managers per management node 
?̅? = number of groups for lowest level workers 
 
The number of levels in the organization are an effective proxy of how long it will 
take decisions to flow (S = m). We will assume that the amount of work needed to be 
done at the lowest levels is exogenous such that the people at the lowest level (nN) is 
fixed. However, we will assume that one can decide how many people each manager 
should be in charge of (n). Similarly, the organization can decide how many managers 
should be responsible for reviewing information at any given level (y). We know that the 
relationship between these variables in a n
th
-node tree is: 
𝑛(𝑚) = 𝑛?̅? 
𝑛(𝑚−1) = ?̅? 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛(?̅?) = 𝑚 − 1 
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∴ 𝑆 =  𝑚 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛(?̅?) + 1   𝑠. 𝑡. (𝑚 ≠ 0) 
 
 Similarly, the number of people working for the organization are an effective 
proxy for the cost of a system. Mathematically, we know the number of people to be the 
sum of people at each node. However, if an organization has assigned multiple managers 
to each level (node) this should be reflected by multiplying to total number by the 
number of managers (y). However, as the managers do not duplicate the base level, that 
multiplier effect must be removed by subtracting away a base level for every multiplier 
effect above the base. Finally, the executive at the apex of the bureaucracy is presumably 
not duplicated in the same way the managers are and so an extra 1 per y is removed.  
𝐶 = (∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
) 
𝐶 = 𝑦 (∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
) 
𝐶 = 𝑦 (∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
) − (𝑦 − 1)(𝑛?̅?) 
∴ 𝐶 = 𝑦 (∑ 𝑛𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=0
) − (𝑦 − 1)(𝑛?̅? − 1) 
Finally, our proxy for quality is based on a more proximate system. The number 
of levels are presumed to increase decision quality be pruning out poor options and 
adding further analysis for more senior chains. Consequently, y has a similar effect as 
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more managers are increased. However, increases in n hurt decision quality as managers 
become more stretched and are unable to observe, evaluate, or refine work quality 
coming from their subordinates as well.  
𝑄 𝛼 𝑚(
𝑦
𝑛
) 
Therefore, an ideal bureaucracy will: 
max(𝑆, 𝑄) ; min(C)  
In this system, C may be held constant as it may be constrained by a set budget. 
Therefore, the systems should be solved such that they can maximize S and Q.   
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